NINEWA PROVINCIAL ELECTION RESULTS NOT DIRECTLY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000719 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL TU IZ SUBJECT: NINEWA PROVINCIAL ELECTION RESULTS NOT DIRECTLY RELEVANT FOR RESOLUTION OF DIBS; CREDIBLE SUB-DISTRICT ELECTIONS MAY REQUIRE AGREEMENT ON CENSUS REF: BAGHDAD 578 Classified By: PMIN Robert S Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ninewa's January 31 provincial election results may be a starting point for discussions on the resolution of the disputed internal boundaries issue but should not be considered a de facto Article 140 referendum. The largest minority in the DIBs region, the Yezidis, returned a mixed result: support for the Kurdish "Fraternity" list, but also a clear preference for Yezidi candidates over Sunni Kurds. Only some 51,000 voters cast ballots for the three quota seats (Christian, Yezidi and Shebak); the political preferences of the second largest confessional minority, Christians, cannot be discerned from the available data; the same applies to the Shebak. Ninewa Turkmen clearly identify politically with the Iraqi Turkman Front (ITF),which fell just short of winning a seat. Highly successful provincial elections notwithstanding, conditions in Ninewa Province are not, and likely will not be, in place for similarly credible district and sub-district elections in the middle of ¶2009. The voter registration system based on ration cards is an inadequate basis for the process; limits on free political activity in areas of the province where single parties dominate (Sheikan, West Mosul, Rabiya, Sinjar) is an as-yet unaddressed impediment; and IDP voting remains highly problematic. ¶2. (C) While the net impact of all the alleged fraud on 31 January - even if all true - would not significantly alter the results, similar election irregularities would have a magnified effect in many of the district and sub-district elections in the DIBs region. We need IRI and NDI working directly in Ninewa to build political and governance capacity. While some Ninewans have participated in their training activities, their absence from Ninewa itself so far has resulted in a lost opportunity to make a greater contribution to political process strengthening in the province. We need their expertise in Mosul. End summary. The Geography of the Ninewa DIBs region -------------- ¶3. (S) The disputed internal boundaries (DIBs) region in Ninewa stretches from Sinjar in the west, along the northern portion of the province, down to Makhmour in the east. The exception is the western Ninewa Rabiya region, which is inhabited by Shammar Arabs. By our estimate, some 500,000 to 750,000 people live in the DIBs region, to include Yezidi, Christians, Shebak, Kurds and Arabs. Not even the most ardent Sunni Arab politicians who vow to defend the borders of Ninewa can actually describe them; some GOI maps show Agrah (east of Shaykhan) and Faida (north of Mosul Lake) as part of Dahuk; some maps show Makhmour as part of Irbil. For its part, the KRG practices cartographic aggression by disseminating maps that lay claim to the entire DIBs region, including parts that are a surprise to many Kurds. Areas inhabited by Kurds and ethnic and religious minorities are entirely under the de facto control of the KRG, an authority exercised in some places via Iraqi Army units whose leaders answer to Irbil, in others by the Peshmerga militia and the Asa'ash secret police. Although security and social services tend to be better in the KRG-administered areas, our sense is that there are limits on freedom for political activity and major barriers to free movement by Arab Iraqis, just as there Qmajor barriers to free movement by Arab Iraqis, just as there are limits on political activity in homogeneous ethnic Arab areas like West Mosul and Rabiya. The Demography of the DIBs region -------------- ¶4. (C) The last census whose results are broadly accepted by all in Ninewa took place in 1957; given the social disruptions caused by forced relocations and arbitrary gerrymandering at the provincial and district level, current population ratios cannot be extrapolated from those data. The 2009 provincial elections, in which the overwhelming number of voters voted for parties that represent their ethnic/religious group, may be a more useful indicator. Of Ninewa's estimated total population of 2.5 to 3 million, the ethno-sectarian components follow: ¶A. Sunni Arabs account for some 55-60 percent of the population, a figure borne out by the combined vote totals of Al Hudba Gathering (AHG) and the Iraqi Islamic Pary (IIP). BAGHDAD 00000719 002 OF 004 ¶B. Some 25 percent of the population identify politically with Kurdish parties, but of that figure, some two-thirds are Yezidi, most of whom maintain a distinct social as well as confessional identity. ¶C. Christians of all denominations make up 5-8 percent of the population; Shebak and Turkmen probably account for another 3-5 percent each. ¶5. (C) The Yezidi are likely the largest confessional minority in Ninewa, numbering more than 300,000, and centered around Shaikhan and Sinjar Districts. Others live in homogenous villages, including in Tal Kayf, Tal Afar and Hamdaniya Districts; there are few if any left in Mosul city. The election results suggest to us that, among Yezidi, confessional identity is stronger than their linguistic and kinship ties to Sunni Kurds. The Ninewa Fraternity List (NFL) has 12 seats in the new Council, of whom eight are Yezidi, some of whom owe their election to attracting votes for their individual candidacies rather than their prominence on the NFL list. (The rest are an Arab woman, a Shia Kurd, and two Sunni Kurds.) Of the Al Hudba Gathering's (AHG) 19 seats, none will be held by Yezidi. The winner of the quota seat, was an AHG-affiliated candidate. What is clear is that most Yezidi opted for the NFL, but selected individual Yezidi candidates rather than the NFL's preferred slate. ¶6. (C) We believe there are 150-200,000 Christians of all denominations in Ninewa Province, an historic community of some 3,000 families in Mosul plus Christian towns and villages mainly in Tal Kayf and Hamdaniya Districts. (Note: Our interlocutors tell us that some 90 percent of the Moslawi Christian families who fled have since returned.) Christians are divided over several key issues. Many, such as Assistant Governor Yussuf Lalo and Hamdaniya Mayor Nisan Karumi, believe that the security and welfare of the Christian community rests on avoiding partisan politics altogether. To their thinking, Iraqi Christians are a professional white collar elite who have been imperiled by both the US invasion and subsequent sectarian-based political organization. On the other side are officials such as Tal Kayf Mayor Basim Belo and others in the Assyrian Democratic Movement who maintain the need for a discrete Christian political identity. The Christian community is also divided on whether its interests lie with the KRG or with Ninewa/Baghdad. ¶7. (C) Absent data on individual polling stations (which we are trying to obtain from the GEO),we cannot characterize Shebak political sentiment. One surprise in the election was the emergence of the Iraqi Turkman Front (ITF),which fell just short of enough votes to claim a seat on the Council, as the clear favorite among Ninewa Turkmen, most of whom live in, or are displaced from, Tal Afar. Our Turkmen interlocutors invariably stress their combined Turkic-Arabic identities and distinguish their political agenda from the Kirkuki Turkmen. Election results -------------- ¶8. (C) A total of 995,169 Ninewa voters cast their ballots in election day, some 60 percent of registered voters. Results (based on informal documents shared with us, please keep close hold) of the popular vote were: AHG: 435,595 -- This figure is combined votes for the party list and individual candidates. Athiel el-Nejefi, likely the future governor, received 262,539 votes, the most Qlikely the future governor, received 262,539 votes, the most of any individual in Ninewa and some 14 times more than the second-place finisher. This translates into 19 seats awarded to AHG; our in-house calculation, confirmed by IFES, reveals an error in IHEC's initial third round of apportionment that (if final results match the preliminary ones) could cost AHG one seat mistakenly awarded to the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). NFL: 273,458 votes -- This translates into 12 seats, of whom eight are Yezidi. The NFL is a group of seven political parties, including the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), but the dominant element is the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). IIP: 60,191 votes -- This should translate into two seats, but an apparent IHEC error (if not fixed) could award them an extra seat as discussed above. ITF: The electoral divider was 27,777 (2.94 percent of BAGHDAD 00000719 003 OF 004 valid votes cast for the 34-seat general election); although we do not yet have the final vote total, the ITF received 2.8 percent per IHEC's February 5 press release. Based on our imprecise demographic data, we believe that this result shows an overwhelming Turkman identification with the ITF. Minority quota seats: There were 50,761 votes cast for the three minority seats, but we do not have the vote totals by community. The pro-KRG Ishtar List won the Christian seat by a two-to-one majority over the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM),affiliated Al Rafadin list. The anti-KRG Shebak Democratic Assembly affiliate won that seat by a greater than two-to-one margin. Although the vast majority of Yezidi voted in the general election, the anti-KRG Yezidi Movement for Reform and Progress won the quota seat with just over half the votes. What does this all mean? -------------- ¶9. (S) The first implication of these preliminary results is that with the possible exception of Makhmour, which is an overwhelming non-Yezidi Kurdish district, we cannot extrapolate Art 140 attitudes on the part of the communities in the DIBs region based on these results. The results could be a starting point for discussions. They should not, however, be given excessive weight in our own thinking, or UNAMI's reporting, on the future delineation of the Ninewa provincial boundary. (Comment: UNAMI officials agree. Election results are only one of more than a half-dozen "lines of inquiry," and will not be accorded disproportionate weight, not least because UNAMI has concerns about ballot box integrity in Kurdish dominated DIBs areas, including northern Diyala. End Comment.) ¶10. (S) The second implication is that while provincial and, later this year, national elections can take place in Ninewa under conditions of ballot integrity and statistically irrelevant levels of fraud, conditions are not in place to replicate this at the district or sub-district level. For example, the late addition of 25,000 Kurdish IDPs to the voters' list was still shy of the electoral divider in an election where AHG won an outright majority in the new council. Manipulation of local elections of that magnitude, however, would skew the results at the local level. There are limits on political freedoms in KRG dominated areas, but the Yezidi election is evidence there is also substantial latitude to campaign and win contests against KRG-supported candidates. It is harder to assess political freedoms in Sunni Arab and Turkmen dominated areas like West Mosul, Tal Afar, and Rabiya -- because they are dangerous, because the international community was focused on the potential for Kurdish irregularities, and because international observers have a hard time distinguishing local social pressures that produce political monocultures. ¶11. (S) The third implication is that while the PDS ration-card based system of voter registration can produce a statistically valid provincial or national result, an updated census that also accounts for IDPs is necessary for credible local elections. The current voter list will not suffice for local elections; to get a legitimate result based on a credible process, a census is essential. And for that, there must be a national-level political agreement on the rules for governing residence and voter registration in areas that have been wholly or partially Qregistration in areas that have been wholly or partially ethnically cleansed. (Comment: It is not clear whether there can be a political agreement on rules governing a census prior to local elections, although we hope there will be. Waiting for such an agreement could significantly delay elections. End comment.). The Need for IRI and NDI in the Province -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Comment: If the GOI decides to proceed with local elections this summer and if the USG wants to help the process, we need the resources and expertise of USG-funded NGOs, especially IRI, NDI and IFES. While NDI and IRI have conducted trainings with Ninewans in Erbil, neither has visited Mosul or Ninewa in the last nine months; NDI has worked with several political parties, but the impact has not been sufficient in our view. IRI staff members have not worked in the province, at least within the last nine months. IFES visited the FOB twice: once to meet the local GEO and once as part of a briefing to USG personnel on the elections process. (USAID comment: IFES BAGHDAD 00000719 004 OF 004 works with IHEC and its GEOs but lacks the resources to travel the country and visit the more than 15 IHEC offices. Instead, it works with the GEO office of IHEC and provides training, capacity building, and systems design and development from Baghdad. End Comment). Our work in the field of democracy and governance has been handicapped by IRI and NDI's inability to work inside Ninewa Province. We believe, for example, that USG-funded NGOs could make much more robust contributions to political party capacity building in Ninewa. These critical organizations cannot do this Ninewa work in Erbil. Although it is only 50 miles away, it may as well be the dark side of the moon for many parties. PRT Ninewa has a standing offer to IRI, NDI and IFES: we will transport them to the FOB on the same air and ground assets that we use. We will house and feed them on the FOB; we will fold them into our own military movement team; and we will provide office space with internet connectivity. We will use our political capital with all parties to get them to work with the NED organizations, although we will be pushing on an open door. We are not asking IRI, NDI and IFES to take any risks beyond that which the PRT takes on a daily basis; however, if they insist on taking less and staying in Erbil, it robs us of the tools needed to do our job. (Embassy comment: we have spoken to NDI and IRI about the importance of expanding links with Ninewa. Both organizations have limited their direct in Ninewa for security reasons, but we anticipate that representatives from both will visit Mosul in the coming weeks to explore opportunities to meet the PRT's concerns. End Comment). BUTENIS