IRAQ 201: IRAQ'S PRESIDENCY AND CABINET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000691

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: IRAQ'S PRESIDENCY AND CABINET

Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The Presidency COUNCIL and COUNCIL of
Ministers (Cabinet) reflect a broad-based membership of the
Iraqi Government and are institutions that sometimes attempt
to restrain an increasingly assertive Prime Minister. The
Presidency has used its authorities to ensure consensus on
key issues, such as the contentious 2008 provincial elections
law. However, Presidency COUNCIL figures and cabinet members
often complain that they are marginalized from key decisions
by the Prime Minister. During the formation of the next
government next year, Iraqi politicians probably will seek to
continue a degree of ethno-sectarian balance across key
leadership positions. We can anticipate protracted
negotiations to stand up that new Iraqi government during the
first quarter of 2010 after the NATIONAL parliamentary
elections. Notably, if Jalal Talabani retires from the
presidency and there is only one vice president instead of
the current two, the negotiations will be even harder than
they were in 2006. End summary.

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Outline of the Presidency COUNCIL
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2. (U) The Presidency COUNCIL -- consisting of Iraq's
president and two vice-presidents -- is a temporary body
designed to promote NATIONAL consensus by giving Kurds,
Sunnis and Shi'a veto authority over legislation during the
first government under the 2005 Constitution. After NATIONAL
elections, planned for late 2009 or early 2010, the
Presidency COUNCIL will be replaced by a single President
once the next parliament is seated. The Presidency COUNCIL
is the successor to the prime minister, has veto power over
legislation and decisions enacted by the COUNCIL of
Representatives, can initiate a no-confidence vote against
the Prime Minister and his cabinet, and must ratify death
sentences. Its other responsibilities are largely symbolic.
Future presidents may have fewer powers than the Presidency
Council. (Comment: Although some believe the new president
will have veto power over legislation, strong arguments exist
that the Presidency -- unlike the Presidency COUNCIL -- will
not have the power to veto legislation. A strict reading of
the constitution suggests that under the next and each
successive term of government, the single president may not
have the power to veto measures taken by the COUNCIL of
Representatives. We can expect this to be an issue the next
Iraqi parliament and Iraqi Federal Supreme Court likely will
examine. End Comment.) Additionally, Article 75 indicates
that there will be only one vice president, who succeeds the
president in absence or vacancy of the position. This vice
president appears to have no specific constitutional
responsibilities other than to assist the president in
carrying out his official functions.


3. (C) President Jalal Talabani (Patriot Union of Kurdistan),
Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi (Sunni Arab Iraq Islamic
Party) and Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi (Shi'a Islamic
Supreme COUNCIL of Iraq) gained their positions through their
respective political parties. Their preapproval of
legislation or U.S. policies usually translates to support
among their large voting bloc in parliament. Thus, we have
found it effective to use the Presidency COUNCIL and the
Prime Minister (the four positions making up the "Executive
Council") as a primary mechanism to advance critical
legislative agenda items, including the Provincial Election
Law and SECURITY Agreement (SA) in 2008.


4. (C) President Talabani and the two Vice Presidents
Q4. (C) President Talabani and the two Vice Presidents
regularly tell us that they are frustrated with Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki's reluctance to include them in
deliberations and executive decision making. The Executive
Council -- an
attempt to bring the prime minister and the presidents
together regularly -- has been used, but not on a consistent
basis. The President and VPs have complained to the Embassy
that the U.S. government too often deals exclusively with the
Prime Minister's Office, unnecessarily cutting them out of
the diplomatic process. At the same time, they often shirk
responsibility by requiring the prime minister to move ahead
first on difficult and contentious issues. For example, they
all directed our SA efforts through the Prime Minister
(saying they would support his endorsement) but then either
held out for additional provisions (Hashimi for the July
referendum provision) or complained afterwards that they did
not get credit for being vocal supporters of the SA (Abd
al-Mahdi). Consequently, U.S. hand-holding and frequent
consultation with these leaders on important issues remains
vital for ensuring broad-based support for key initiatives.

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Presidency United to Restrain Maliki
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5. (C) As sectarian tensions abate and cross-sectarian
cooperation develops, Iraq's presidency and their parties
have increasingly worked together to resist the Maliki
government. The Kurdish Alliance-IIP-ISCI membership in the
Presidency COUNCIL mirrors a durable alliance in parliament
that has come to share a common goal of restraining the Prime
Minister. In the fall of 2007 a direct threat by President
Talabani to withdraw support from Maliki (at U.S. behest) led
to successful completion of the Declaration of Principles for
a Long-Term Relationship between the U.S. and Iraq -- the
precursor to the SA and Strategic Framework Agreement. This
direct pressure on Maliki has had an impact, but Talabani
uses it selectively. (Comment: In general, Talabani has a
better working relationship with Maliki than most other
top-level Iraqi officials. Talabani would prefer a different
prime minister, but he keeps the lines of communication with
Maliki open. Now, in the wake of Maliki's perceived triumph
in local elections in January 2009, and with increasing
Arab-Kurdish tensions, threats from Talabani against may no
longer carry the desired impact with Maliki. End Comment.)


6. (C) In November 2008, while Maliki sought to sell the
Security Agreement to parliament, VP Hashimi used the veto
threat to win a referendum on the agreement, and to secure
passage of an accompanying political reform resolution that
calls for changes within the Maliki government. VP Abd
al-Mahdi told Embassy officials he helped write the
resolution with Hashimi. (Note: To date, there has been
little action to implement the resolution. End Note.) Also in
November, the Presidency COUNCIL issued a statement critical
of Maliki's tribal support councils, a move probably designed
to undermine Maliki while his opponents were seeking
concessions.


7. (U) The Presidency COUNCIL has also acted to temper
parliament's excesses. In July 2008, Talabani and Abd
al-Mahdi vetoed a provincial elections law that that passed
despite a walkout by all Kurdish MPs. The law would have
limited Kurdish representation in sensitive Kirkuk province,
and was favored by some Sunni and Shi'a MPs seeking to limit
perceived Kurdish expansionism. The compromise elections law
that eventually passed after the veto postponed elections in
Kirkuk until a compromise is found.

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Outline of the COUNCIL of Ministers
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8. (C) The Prime Minister's 37 person cabinet -- called the
Council of Ministers -- represents ten parties and numerous
independents. Under the Constitution, the prime minister
nominates and parliament approves each minister. The prime
minister can fire a minister only with parliament's consent
(a constant complaint of Maliki and something he points to
routinely when his ministries fail to perform). The COM has
executive authority to implement laws and the ability to
initiate legislation.


9. (C) Maliki's COM has fluctuated since it was established
in 2006. In March 2007, Fadhila and Sadrists ministers
withdrew from government. Fadhila publicly criticized
Maliki's alleged closeness to Iran, but in private was
frustrated that Maliki refused to offer Fadhila the Oil
Ministry or another high-profile position. The Sadrists
withdrew to protest the detention of Jaysh al-Mahdi members
and the lack of a timeline for Coalition withdrawal. In
August 2007, the Sunni Tawafuq front left government largely
to shore-up support among its constituency after Maliki
turned down the bloc's demands for greater Sunni
inclusiveness. A few days later, former Prime Minister Ayad
Qinclusiveness. A few days later, former Prime Minister Ayad
Allawi pulled his Iraqiyya party from the COM to protest his
own marginalization. A handful of Tawafuq and Iraqiyya
ministers broke with their party and remained in government.
Since then, we have seen the blocs seeking a return to
government -- their position and influence outside carrying
little visible gain.


10. (U) Maliki's current self-proclaimed "national unity"
government gained its composition in July 2008 when Tawafuq
reentered government with a deputy prime minister slot and
five ministries -- Higher Education, Culture, Communications,
State for Foreign Affairs, and State for Women's Affairs.
Also in July, four COM vacancies were filled with Shi'a
candidates -- Transportation, State for Tourism and
Antiquity, State for Provincial Affairs, and State for Civil
Society Affairs.

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Loyalists and Rivals Within
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11. (C) Because Maliki had a relatively small support base in

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parliament (his Da'wa Party holding 12 of 275 seats),he was
forced to bring many rivals into his cabinet to maintain the
confidence of parliament and to pass legislation. Maliki's
inherent suspicion of these outsiders, however, has led him
to circumvent many ministers and create governing channels
outside the COM. The Political COUNCIL for NATIONAL SECURITY
(PCNS),which is outside the Constitution but can help
marshal the major political forces at once, often sits before
the COM takes up contentious pieces of legislation. The PCNS
brings together the most important ministers as well as the
Presidency COUNCIL and the head of all the party blocs.
Maliki looks to the PCNS for political cover on contentious
issues, and endorsement of the PCNS assures ready and swift
approval by the COM.


12. (C) Ministers who have gained Maliki's trust have been
able to expand their policy influence. Oil Minister Hussein
Shahristani, NATIONAL SECURITY Minister Shirwan al-Waili,
Parliamentary Affairs Minister (and former acting Justice
Minister) Safa al-Safi, Trade Minister Abd al-Falah
al-Sudani, and Education Minister Khudayr al-Khuzai are
allies of Maliki, and most assisted Maliki's State of Law
Coalition during the January provincial elections. Defense
Minister Abd al-Qadir al-Mufriji and Interior Minister Jawad
al-Bulani were not Maliki loyalists but have come to gain the
prime minister's respect because they wield power over
ministries important to Maliki. (Note: Following Bulani's
establishment of a new party for provincial elections, there
have been rumors that Maliki might seek to replace him. End
note.) Similarly, Maliki is often suspicious of Finance
Minister Bayan Jaber but probably understands his importance
within ISCI. Foreign Affairs Minister Hoshyar Zebari has a
widely-known hostile relationship with Maliki, which has
encouraged Maliki to bypass the Foreign Ministry and conduct
diplomacy through his own office. The inability of Maliki and
Zebari to work well together has led to long delays in
agreement on the selection of Iraqi ambassadors to key
countries.


13. (C) The administrative head of the cabinet and its STAFF
is COM Secretary General Ali al-Alaq, an effective Da'wa
functionary and regular Embassy contact. Maliki has appointed
Alaq as his point-man for anti-corruption efforts, probably
because Maliki trusts Alaq to protect Da'wa's political
standing during sensitive investigations.

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Government Formation in 2010 Will Be Difficult
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14. (C) As was the case in 2006, when the next government is
formed it is likely that the presidency and cabinet positions
will be allotted based on an omnibus package among parties
willing to join a governing coalition. Many Iraqi politicians
criticize the "sectarian quota" system among Kurds, Sunnis
and Shi'a that in 2006 gave each ethno-sectarian group a
representative at the prime minister, presidency,
speakership, and cabinet levels. To overcome lingering
inter-sectarian distrust and to establish broad based buy-in,
the next parliament probably will have to uphold some
variation of the quota system to select the next slate of
government officials. If the Presidency loses its veto power
under the next government, the power of the Prime Minister as
well as the parliament -- especially the speaker -- will
greatly increase. Moreover, if Talabani retires from the
national scene and there is only one vice president, the
negotiations over division of top-level positions will be
even more contentious than they were were during the five
Qeven more contentious than they were were during the five
months required in 2006 to stand up the Maliki government.

BUTENIS