MOI OFFICIALS SEEK CONTINUED, EVOLVING U.S.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000658 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: IZ MARR MOPS PGOV PREL SUBJECT: MOI OFFICIALS SEEK CONTINUED, EVOLVING U.S. ASSISTANCE TO IRAQI POLICE FORCES REF: SECSTATE 13379 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Embassy and U.S. military officials met between February 21 and March 7 with senior Government of Iraq (GOI) officials to discuss Iraq's priorities for the future development of its civilian security forces. Mi6dqOS8QA](KQAffairs (DOIA) met with several senior Government of Iraq (GOI) officials between February 21 and March 7 to discuss their visions and priorities for the future development of Iraq's civilian security forces, in preparation for an interagency assessment team that will arrive in late March to develop a roadmap for the future of USG assistance to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) and its forces. Embassy and DOIA officials met on February 21 with Deputy Minister of Interior for Police Affairs Major General Ayden Qadr, Senior Deputy Minister of Interior Adnan al-Asadi, and MOI Director General of Training and Qualifications Major General (Dr.) Jassim. They met on February 25 with Mr. Hamza Hasan, Director General for Regional Planning in the National Security Council staff, to check the MOI officials' message against the broader thinking within the GOI's national security leadership. The Embassy and DOIA officials met finally with Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bulani on March 7. All of the officials expressed strong support for the forthcoming assessment team. ¶4. (SBU) The U.S. military currently provides training and advising functions to the full range of MOI forces, including the National Police, Iraqi Police Service, Facilities Protection Services, the Department of Border Enforcement's border security forces, and the National Command Center. The Qborder security forces, and the National Command Center. The paramilitary National Police have deployed to support major operations in several provinces but report directly to Baghdad, whereas the Iraqi Police serve traditional policing functions throughout Iraq in local police stations and districts, reporting to provincial authorities as well as to the ministry. The MOI now has roughly 600,000 total personnel, including all of these services, the majority of which are local Iraqi Police. The U.S. military also provides advisors at the strategic level in the areas of personnel, intelligence, operations and planning as well as advice and assistance with logistics from the national to the local level. Provincial Reconstruction Teams include Rule of Law advisors, some of whom serve in law enforcement advisory roles at the provincial level as well. -------------- - Progress Made in Developing, Reforming the MOI -------------- - ¶5. (SBU) All four MOI officials emphasized the significant progress the MOI has made since 2006, when Bulani became Minister of Interior, in developing and reforming the ministry and professionalizing its forces. Asadi highlighted BAGHDAD 00000658 002 OF 004 the challenges the MOI faced in the first few years after the fall of the Saddam regime, due to both the scale of expansion required in the ministry's forces and to inconsistent MOI leadership, with five ministers serving over little more than three years. Ayden also noted 2006 as a turning point, when MOI leaders put in place new strategic plans to eliminate corruption from the ministry and militia or criminal elements from the police forces, while continuing to grow, train and equip those forces. The officials emphasized this progress in making several points: that the MOI now has sufficient forces - in fact probably too many for the country's future needs - and that the MOI is now capable of taking full control of leading and providing for its forces. -------------- Desire for Greater Ministerial Control -------------- ¶6. (SBU) All of the officials consulted expressed appreciation for the extensive assistance they have received from U.S. forces over the past six years and the desire for continued assistance - for which the key has been the U.S. desire to build capacity, not dependency. Several wish for this assistance to shift toward more advanced areas as appropriate to the progress that the MOI has made. Both Asadi and Ayden argued for fewer U.S. advisors disbursed throughout Iraq, especially removal from local police stations and districts, by explaining that the MOI must now exercise control over the Iraqi Police rather than have them dependent on U.S. advisors. Asadi said the relationships between local police stations, their provincial headquarters and the ministry in Baghdad are now quite strong and that Iraqi chain of command needs to be given primacy. Ayden said that an advisor to each Provincial Director of Police (PDOP) would be sufficient, since all provincial units fall under his authority. Jassim indicated that advisors are not needed at every police academy, but that some institutions still need more help than others, particularly the police colleges in Basrah and Mosul in addition to Baghdad. ¶7. (SBU) Hamza expressed a somewhat different view, arguing that the Iraqi Police will eventually need to become more decentralized, reporting to provincial governors - who are not part of the MOI - and responsive to more local interests in general. He noted that Iraq's Constitution gave the provincial governors authority over security and security forces within their jurisdiction. Bulani expressed the desire that U.S. training teams and civilian police advisors remain partnered throughout the MOI's various forces to continue developing their professionalism. He also stressed that extensive U.S. assistance to the MOI must continue and that any transition in the nature of the assistance role should be very gradual, so as not to leave any void. -------------- -------------- Competition with Iraqi Military, MOI Still Needs Help -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) While wishing to take ownership of their ministry internally, the officials indicated a strong external motivation for continued assistance from U.S. forces - the need to accelerate MOI development in order to compete with the MOD for primacy over internal security. Iraqi military forces currently lead many security operations in key Iraqi cities and provinces, with even the National Police serving a secondary role to them. Ayden perceives regaining the Qsecondary role to them. Ayden perceives regaining the internal security mission is the MOI's greatest problem right now. He suggested that if the MOI does not appear ready to secure Iraq's cities and towns by the time U.S. forces pull out of them, the MOI will have a much harder time winning authority back from the Iraqi Army at a later time. ¶9. (SBU) Hamza expressed a similar view, saying that Iraq is now a Constitutional democracy and civilian authorities need to be in control, but the military clings to its greater historic role in society. He believes that in the long term, the best strategy for maintaining stability in Iraq will be to have a smaller number of security forces who are very well trained, equipped, and professional - capable of and committed to fulfilling clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Hamza indicated that U.S. training and assistance to the MOI will remain essential to the GOI's overall objectives for the foreseeable future. Bulani acknowledged that Iraq's recent security needs compelled some exceptional implementation of security missions, but noted that it is time to begin moving toward normal civilian police taking the lead in Iraq's internal security. He said the MOI will need strong support from the U.S. for at least the next two to three years to deal with Iraq's remaining security BAGHDAD 00000658 003 OF 004 challenges. -------------- Requests for Advanced, Specialized Assistance -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The MOI officials expressed the desire for strategic assistance in targeted areas where the ministry still lacks the advanced capabilities it needs. Jassim stressed that Iraqi Police lack the expertise to deal with many of the major crimes prevalent in Iraq today, including kidnappings, money laundering and financial crimes, Internet crimes, and other organized crime particularly connected to terrorism. He asked for assistance in developing advanced training opportunities in Iraq, including building a mock city for simulated urban security operations, procuring fire arms training simulators, and providing train-the-trainer programs in investigations, DNA forensics, intelligence collection and analysis, explosives, and finance. Jassim also expressed interest in sending police officers to professional education training abroad and having MOI officials visit U.S. police academies to learn from their models. ¶11. (SBU) Asadi focused on the MOI's Planning Department, which conducts strategic planning several years out, establishing plans for the organization of the ministry, development of existing sections and creation of new ones. The department has some capability to conduct this level of planning but needs more, and Asadi stressed that this is the one area of the MOI - besides advanced police training - that still genuinely needs U.S. advisors. In terms of training, Asadi mentioned new programs the MOI is developing for finance professionals and for law enforcement in conjunction with the judiciary, working with other regional and European countries. He highlighted the value of train-the-trainer programs in advanced skills both inside and outside of Iraq. ¶12. (SBU) Bulani characterized the MOI's responsibilities as falling into two broad categories: paramilitary operations conducted primarily by the National Police; and traditional law enforcement missions for which the MOI needs help building the full spectrum of capabilities including criminal investigations, internal affairs, special MOI courts, and public relations for crime prevention. He echoed Jassim's desire for increased partnerships with parallel institutions in the U.S.; both suggested seeking memorandums of understanding for cooperative relationships with those institutions. Hamza agreed with the need for advanced skills training, deferring to MOI officials on specific requirements but responding enthusiastically to the suggestions of assistance with criminal investigations and strategic planning. He also spoke highly of the professional training the Italian Carabinieri are providing to the National Police through NATO Training Mission-Iraq and emphasized the need for increased training of border security forces. -------------- Resourcing Challenges Remain Unclear -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The officials expressed mixed views as to whether or not budget shortfalls and other resource constraints would pose a challenge to MOI force development. Ayden said that the MOI acquired plenty of equipment and other supplies over the past two years and that he doesn't foresee difficulty with resources in the near future. Jassim, from his more operational perspective, however, said that budget constraints affect every aspect of the ministry's work Qconstraints affect every aspect of the ministry's work because expenditures require the approval of multiple officials. Training outside of Iraq requires the Prime Minister's approval, whereas training inside Iraq requires Minister Bulani's, and all programs require the Minister of Finance to approve the funds. Jassim said that the delay in passing the 2009 budget severely limited what the MOI was able to spend. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶14. (SBU) MOI officials' views reflect Iraq's overall impatience to stand on its own balanced by its need to ensure that the drawdown of U.S. forces does not reverse the gains made in recent years. Desires for sovereignty and empowerment of central leadership over a vast and previously disjointed ministry are consistent with the leadership trends and strategic objectives of the GOI. At the same time, the MOI has struggled for years to make progress in developing BAGHDAD 00000658 004 OF 004 its capabilities and reforming as an institution. It has made a lot of progress over the past two years but that progress is still fragile, and the MOI continues to face competition from more advanced Iraqi military forces that have encroached upon its internal security missions. While MOI leaders seek to convince U.S. officials of their self-sufficiency, they still acknowledge their need for robust assistance in many areas to achieve the capabilities they have become impatient to reach. ¶15. (SBU) Post encourages the assessment team to consider the complex, sometimes competing motivations on the part of MOI and GOI leaders. Some of the officials' comments reflect desires to centralize in Baghdad all authority over Iraqi security forces, while in reality many decisions impacting stability and the rule of law will and should be made more locally. Such motivations often play out in Iraqi officials' tendencies to exaggerate their capabilities, without necessarily meaning that they don't want or need help in achieving the desired end state. Post views some continued U.S. advisory presence throughout the provinces as highly valuable to continued oversight of local stability, development of professional forces, and human rights mentoring. This continued presence is not mutually exclusive from a gradual shift toward more advanced, strategic assistance to the ministry in Baghdad, which the improving situation in Iraq also merits. Overall, the team should seek the appropriate balance of assistance that recognizes the progress and independence the GOI wants while providing sufficient assistance to support the ambitious objectives Iraq hopes to achieve. BUTENIS