PRT DIYALA: SUNNI ARABS CLAIM GOI REINSTITUTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000628 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM IZ SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: SUNNI ARABS CLAIM GOI REINSTITUTING SECTARIAN ARRESTS; REQUEST U.S. ASSISTANCE REF: A. BAGHDAD 64 ¶B. BAGHDAD 544 Classified By: PRT Leader George White for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Diyala cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Members of the Tawafuq/IIP party in Diyala fear that the Government of Iraq (GOI) is using the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to prevent Sunni Arab leaders from forming a new provincial government in Diyala (reftels). They claim that after a pause around the provincial elections due to American pressure, the GOI has begun again to issue warrants to and to arrest specifically Sunni Arab politicians on false terrorism charges in Diyala and elsewhere. Diyala Sunni Arab leaders requested USG intervention in these alleged arrests. While specific allegations are difficult to confirm, there is evidence of GOI targeting Sunni Arab leaders with politically-motivated warrants. Embassy Baghdad has requested further evidence from Sunni Arab contacts in Diyala on this issue. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) PRT Diyala and Embassy PolOff met the leadership of the Diyala Tawafuq list on March 2 at the PRT at the list's request. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) is the major partner in the list. Hamdi Hasun Al Mehdi, a leading representative of the IIP in Diyala and a member of the President's Council in Baghdad; current Assistant Governor Hafiz Abdul-Azzez Jum'a Saleh al-Jubouri; and Omar al Farook Muhammad Mahmud, a newly elected PC member and possible gubernatorial candidate, represented Tawafuq/IIP. The meeting focused both on the post-elections political maneuvering to form a new provincial government (reported SEPTEL) and on their concern that PM Maliki's security apparatus might arrest the top leaders of the IIP to prevent them from forming a new provincial government. ¶4. (C) Over the past eight months, Sunni Arabs in Diyala have repeatedly complained that the ISF have specifically targeted Sunni Arab political leaders for arrest and/or prolonged detention on terrorism or corruption charges in an effort to neutralize Sunni Arab leadership in the political process. Hamdi acknowledged that while there was a decrease in arrests around the provincial elections, in Diyala multiple levels of the Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP), the Crimes Office, Emergency Reaction Forces, and, within Khanaqin, the Asayeesh and Peshmerga, have begun reenacting a policy of arbitrary arrests and detentions to hinder the transfer of power from a Shi'a Arab- to a newly-elected Sunni Arab-led provincial government. ¶5. (C) Hamdi confirmed that the GOI had issued a warrant for his arrest but said he had not yet seen the warrant. He worried that he would be detained at any time. According to Hamdi, a prevailing atmosphere of fear and confusion over arrest had driven IIP politicians and other Sunni Arab leaders to avoid sleeping in their own homes in order to elude ISF. Hamdi recounted other incidents in which the GOI arrested prominent Sunni Arabs in Diyala and elsewhere, including the cases of Dr. Hussein Al Zubaidi (reftels),and Hasan Malali, the Diyala IIP's expert on religious issues, who was detained the week of February 22. Many of those arrested have been detained without formal charges or conviction for extended periods of time. Hamdi claimed that over 70% of those detained by the ISF are innocent. ¶6. (C) He also suggested that Coalition Forces (CF) had occasionally supported ISF in these arrests. He claimed that the new Diyala (Security) Operations Commander, Major General Tariq Abdal Wahaba Jasim Al Azawi, might be an ally of PM QTariq Abdal Wahaba Jasim Al Azawi, might be an ally of PM Maliki. However, Hamdi was especially concerned by the actions of Iraqi Counter Terrorism Special Forces that report directly to the Prime Minister's Office without coordinating with local security organizations. ¶7. (C) Hamdi, Hafez, and Omar entreated USG for assistance, saying "as the Coalition Forces are still responsible for security in Diyala, there must be something that you can do to alleviate this situation." Hamdi proposed forming a committee with Embassy representation to visit prisons and document cases. At points in the discussion when they felt the PRT and PolOff were not adequately responsive to their concerns, they warned that the public would be tempted to turn to the tribes (alluding to potential violence) for solutions, and that there may be significant danger Iran could gain control of Diyala. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) There has been a surge in reports and rumors of BAGHDAD 00000628 002 OF 002 arrests and warrant issuances for prominent Sunni Arabs in Diyala and Baghdad: Mohammed Al Daini and Hamdi Hasun himself are just two examples. But it is not clear at this point that this signifies a post-election resumption of concerted GOI efforts to limit Sunni Arab political engagement. PolOff requested that Hamdi send written, specific information to the PRT in order to help USG evaluate the extent of GOI arrests of Sunni Arabs. The PRT and Embassy believe that IIP's claims that Sunni Arabs will turn to tribal violence or of growing Iranian influence may be exaggerated. END COMMENT. BUTENIS