THE SOUTH AND ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000588 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ SUBJECT: THE SOUTH AND ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCE REF: BAGHDAD 583 Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor John Fox for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). (U) This is one in a series of messages intended to provide background for policy-makers on Iraq. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) As evidenced by the recent provincial elections, won decisively by Prime Minister Maliki's Da'wa-led State of Law coalition, southern Iraqis have moved from overt Shi'a identification to a more nationalist, pragmatic stance. Maliki catalyzed and capitalized on this shift by carrying out military operations against Sadrist militias in Basra and Maysan, and by distancing Da'wa from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). To consolidate gains, Maliki and his party still need to show they can deliver services and expand oil and industrial production in destitute southern provinces, some of which have regionalist aspirations of their own. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister's post-election strength and the dramatically improved security in the south have created opportunities to reconcile its Sadrist combatants and perhaps reunify Shi'a parties at the national level. Religiously moderate, partial to strong central leadership, and deeply suspicious of both Iran and the Kurds, Maliki and Da'wa more closely reflect southern sentiment than other Shi'a religious parties or secular alternatives. The rise of a more moderate and nationalist southern Shi'a identity brings benefits, but could make it more difficult for Iraqis to address their long-standing internal disputes. End summary. -------------- From Religious to Nationalist Identity -------------- ¶2. (C) As the birthplace of Shi'ism and home of its two holiest cities -- Najaf and Karbala -- southern Iraq exerts considerable political influence not only on Baghdad, but also on Iran, Lebanon, Kuwait, and elsewhere. Saddam Hussein brutally suppressed Shi'a activities for this reason, fueling the passionate Shi'a identity that emerged after his fall. The religious parties associated with Shi'a revival (ISCI, Sadrists, Fadhilah) quickly discredited themselves with corrupt governance and militia violence. Perhaps more importantly, the Shi'a religious hierarchy, led by Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Sistani, never endorsed governance by religious parties -- either in 2005 or 2009 -- opting instead to encourage maximal Shi'a participation in voting. The approach taken by the religious leadership has liberated southerners to endorse more technocratic, nationalistic and relatively secular figures, while ensuring that the southern Shi'a still maintain the country's dominant political position. Sistani's health is reportedly fragile and it is unclear who his successor would be, how long it would take to identify him, or whether he would pursue a similar approach. -------------- Improved Security -------------- ¶3. (C) Nouri al-Maliki, originally chosen as Prime Minister because of the weakness of his Da'wa party, dramatically improved security in the South and Baghdad by ordering operations against Sadrist militants in Spring 2008. The Jaysh al-Mahdi was routed in the process, losing control of the Basra ports and key marshland smuggling lanes -- a loss of several million dollars per month for them, which has never been replaced. Security has since improved in all southern provinces. In Basra, as U.S. troops prepare to assume command from the UK at the end of March, they enter a theater in which the Coalition Operating Base -- formerly subject to daily attacks -- has not seen a single rocket Qsubject to daily attacks -- has not seen a single rocket fired at it since last October. Southern Iraqis are not generally aware of the extent of the U.S. assistance that had been required, especially in Basra, to enable the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to succeed. Most of our contacts in the region know, however, that the ISF have great needs, and are less than confident about their ability to stand up to Iran when U.S. forces leave. -------------- The Maliki Factor -------------- ¶4. (C) The disproportionate suffering under Saddam's regime, BAGHDAD 00000588 002 OF 003 the Iran-Iraq War, and subsequent conflicts have forged a southern Iraqi character that is nationalist, disdainful of Iran, distrustful of the Kurds and Sunnis (and perhaps the U.S.),but pragmatic enough to know it is necessary to work with all sides. We repeatedly hear southern Iraqis, including members of other parties, praising Maliki for embodying these traits -- especially the anti-Iranian component. This level of respect enabled Maliki's Da'wa-led State of Law slate to carry nine of ten Shi'a-majority provinces in the elections, losing only Karbala (due to an intra-party split which has since healed; Da'wa will remain in power in Karbala also). While his provincial coalition list only won decisive pluralities in urban areas such as Basra, Nasiriyah, and Diwaniyah, where security improvements are most notable, anecdotal and polling evidence suggests that most southerners support the Prime Minister at the national level. Maliki has used his political capital back home in various ways, most notably by increasing centralized control over the ISF and by attempting to carry out reconciliation with Sadrist combatants, and possibly even form a political alliance with Sadrist parties. ¶5. (C) Over the past year, Maliki has centralized ISF command in several southern provinces and made it responsive to his office, bypassing normal Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police command chains. He has also made several ISF appointments outside the letter of Iraqi law. While these tendencies are not as potentially explosive as in Diyala or the Kurdish region, they have provoked resentment by some southerners, especially ISCI members, while providing questionable security benefit. Maliki's Sadrist overtures, which include an ongoing provincial-level review of detainees and the negotiation of provincial alliances throughout ths south, are much more hopeful. The reintegration of Sadrists into the governing system carries far greater political risks, however, since southern Iraqis remember the violence and chaos associated with their last, still quite recent, stint in government. That the Prime Minister would even attempt such a controversial initiative underscores his strengthened position in the south and his desire to minimize the standing of ISCI. -------------- Delivering Services -------------- ¶6. (C) The Prime Minister and his State of Law coalition list also face challenges in providing infrastructure and basic services to provinces in which electricity and water are only available to most people a few hours per day. While the new Provincial Councils (PC) appear to have more technocratic professionals with relevant skills, every province in the south has over 60 percent turnover on the PC, in some cases over 80 percent. Inexperience, combined with declining government revenues, make it likely that voters will be disappointed with the pace of reform and development. Much of the disappointment will be directed at us -- there is a strong feeling in the south that the U.S. has an obligation to rebuild Iraq's basic infrastructure. Our contacts, especially at the grassroots level, believe and expect that a large portion of the savings from our military wihdrawal must be redirected toward civilian assistance, including big-ticket initiatives. They have not realized fully that we will soon be leaving. -------------- Oil and Regional Aspirations -------------- ¶7. (C) Declining oil production in the south and the fall in the worldwide price of crude oil further limit the ability of Qthe worldwide price of crude oil further limit the ability of the provincial and national governments to address the region's problems. Oil Ministry officials estimate that production from the southern fields will fall from 1.9 to 1.8 million barrels per day this year. While the Ministry announced in October 2008 that service contracts will be on offer for companies to address the underlying problems of oil-field degradation and aging facilities, the contracts would not come on line until 2010 at the earliest and production may continue to decline until 2011. While falling oil revenue has not yet become a politicized issue, frustrations could boil over if government services are not delivered, especially in oil-rich but economically devastated Basra, Maysan, and Dhi Qar. ¶8. (C) In the oil-rich far southern provinces, which receive much less in government revenue than they produce, talks of region formation recur occasionally. The idea lacks support among major political parties, however. The recent failed attempt at one-province region formation by the unpopular outgoing governor in Basra -- combined with the Prime BAGHDAD 00000588 003 OF 003 Minister's popularity there -- will likely forestall any serious movement toward southern region formation in the near future. Regional aspirations in the south are not dead, however, and could resurface if the new provincial governments do not outperform the previous ones. -------------- Southern Man -------------- ¶9. (C) Prime Minister Maliki's support in the south and his success in maintaining it will greatly influence national Iraqi policy and our ability to manage key issues. Although Maliki is often admired by the U.S. and Iraqis for converting Da'wa from a secret Shi'a underground society to a moderately religious broad-based nationalist party, the Prime Minister's core national strategy is nonetheless highly sectarian. His is a strategy built on southern support, values and concerns. Maliki's current micromanagement of post-election provincial coalition-building in the south (Reftel),including concessions of some executive positions to rivals in provinces where State of Law won, suggests a careful strategy to bring together the Sadrists, ex-Prime Minister Ja'afari's Reform party, Fadhilah, Iraqiyah, and ISCI, roughly in that order, to create a new Shi'a alliance in advance of the national elections. ISCI appears unlikely to go along, however, given its cross-sectarian alliance at the national level with the Kurds and the Iraqi Islamic Party. If Maliki is not able to keep ISCI within the fold and attempts to govern without it, this will have important repercussions at the national level. It is likely that non-ISCI partners will be less amenable to compromise on core problems such as the Kurdish-Arab border disputes (on which ISCI plays a moderating role). Maliki, a more accurate representative of southern sentiments than ISCI and other Shi'a parties regarding the Kurds, Iran, security, and governmental powers, will feel little pressure from his electoral base to make concessions. BUTENIS