MAYSAN: SADRIST LEADER EAGER TO WORK WITH U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000587 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM IZ IR SUBJECT: MAYSAN: SADRIST LEADER EAGER TO WORK WITH U.S. Classified By: PRT Team Leader Dan Foote for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a Maysan PRT reporting cable. ¶2. (C/REL MCFI) Summary: The leader of the OMS-backed Tayar al-Ahrar (Free Independent Trend) party in Maysan, Fadil Na'ama Hussein al-Tammimi, expressed enthusiasm about the current direction of American policy in Iraq and an eagerness to cooperate with the PRT. In his March 2 meeting with the PRT, Fadil, a longtime Provincial Council (PC) member, validated previous reports that a comprehensive Da'wa/Sadr coalition, likely covering the southern Shi'a provinces, is being negotiated in Baghdad. Fadil sought to clarify the evolving strategy of Tayar al-Ahrar, which eschews violence in favor of a focus on promoting peace and reconstruction throughout Iraq. A key element of this new approach will be engagement with international partners, including the PRTs, who want to help the Iraqi people. Fadil partially credited the successful Security Agreement negotiations and President Obama's recent public commitment to an expeditious withdrawal from Iraq for the softening of the traditionally anti-Coalition Sadrist stance. End Summary. Da'wa/Sadrist Coalition Almost Complete -------------- ¶3. (C/REL MCFI) On March 2, the PRT met in Nasiriyah with Fadil Na'ama Hussein al-Tammimi, the current leader of the Sadrist Tayar al-Ahrar party in Maysan. We inquired about the status of negotiations among the four parties (Da'wa, ISCI, Tayar al-Ahrar, and National Reform Trend) that will compose the new Maysan PC. Like previous PRT contacts from other parties, Fadil acknowledged that those agreements were being cut in Baghdad, rather than at the provincial level. He felt that a Da'wa/Sadr coalition agreement for Maysan would be completed soon, with one party taking the Governor's seat and the other the PC chairmanship. According to Fadil, the party that assumes the PC Chair seat would also likely receive one of the two deputy governor positions. Fadil speculated that the other deputy governor position would be filled by ISCI, and deputy chair position on the PC would be awarded to Dr. Ja'afari's National Reform Trend. As a result of this complicated formulation, Fadil said that it would be more politically advantageous for his party to assume the PC chairmanship, thus increasing the party's chances of also taking one of the deputy governor slots. He said if Tayar al-Ahrar was awarded the governorship, it would preclude the party from taking any other top provincial executive positions. Fadil said the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) had yet to vet all of the newly elected PC members' educational credentials, the last step before the council can be seated. Sadrist Outlook Evolving -------------- ¶4. (C/REL MCFI) Fadil eagerly highlighted the Sadrists' new strategy and offered his full cooperation in working with the PRT. Fadil explained that the Sadrists were forced to change course following their third-place finish in the provincial elections - resulting in their loss of control of the province - and increasing popular support for governing competence over ideology. He said the Sadrists were seeking to change their strategy to better "clarify their message." Fadil noted that Tayar al-Ahrar ran a list of educated, peaceful candidates, who will be dedicated to the party's new program of peace, reconstruction, and cooperation with both the GOI and the international community. The Sadrists, Fadil said, are eager to work with anybody, whether GOI, Coalition Forces (CF),or the PRT, that will "look at Iraqi citizens QForces (CF),or the PRT, that will "look at Iraqi citizens like a father" and take care of them. He hoped that the PRT would implement training programs to build the capacity of his party and the entire provincial government. Fadil was worried that former Ba'athists were spreading false rumors about the Sadrists. ¶5. (C/REL MCFI) Fadil did acknowledge that "uneducated" people remain within the Sadrist ranks and cited them as a primary reason for wanting to meet with the PRT in Nasariyah rather than Amarah. He was adamant, however, that, per Muqtada al-Sadr's instructions, violent people are being purged from the movement and relationships with JAM Special Groups are being severed. Fadil actually gave credit to the June 2008 security operations in Amarah - Operation Good Tidings of Peace - for helping to rid the Sadrist camp of those who did not want to work peacefully for the good of the Iraqi people. Encouraged By Tone of New U.S. Administration -------------- ¶6. (C/REL MCFI) Fadil would not directly answer questions about his views on the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) BAGHDAD 00000587 002 OF 002 and Security Agreement (SA),but praised President Obama's recent speech on Iraq. The speech, Fadil said, has made the Iraqi government stronger. It would be "crazy," he said, to disagree with the President's views, and this new direction has the Sadrists "expecting good things." Specifically, Fadil cited the withdrawal schedule laid out in the speech as a critical building block for a strong U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationship. He even offered to sponsor conferences to explain to Maysanis that the U.S. is in Iraq to help. Wary Of Iranian Influence -------------- ¶7. (C/REL MCFI) Early in the meeting, Fadil shared his concern over the influence of "neighboring countries who take advantage of the Iraqi people." He said Sadrists were committed to educating Iraqis so that outside influences could not sway them to work against the true interests of Iraq. Despite his concerns about Iranian influence, Fadil was not opposed to a productive Iran-Iraq cooperation. He argued that it would be good for the USG to open a dialogue with Tehran to promote increased regional stability. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C/REL MCFI) Fadil's message, a mixture of cautious optimism and acknowledgment of past mistakes and future challenges, is further confirmation of a growing commitment among harder-line Sadrists to the political process and collaboration with the USG. This was a productive initial meeting with the more fundamentalist side of the Sadrist leadership in Maysan. As opposed to many of his Sadrist colleagues from the outgoing provincial government, Fadil did not lecture or obfuscate. Fadil at times appeared introspective, but was engaging and expressed what seemed to be a sincere desire to cooperate with the team for the good of the Maysani people. The President's message clearly struck a chord with Fadil and his colleagues. Assuming that the message and our implementation of it remain consistent, there is no obvious reason why the Sadrists cannot become full partners in the rebuilding of Maysan. End comment. BUTENIS