THE SUNNI ARAB CENTRAL PROVINCES: MORE STABLE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000579 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: THE SUNNI ARAB CENTRAL PROVINCES: MORE STABLE, RE-ENGAGED POLITICALLY, AND IN NEED OF DEVELOPMENT Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor John Fox for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). (U) This is one of a series of messages intended to provide background for policy-makers working on Iraq. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Anbar, Salah Ad Din (SAD),and Diyala, the three majority-Sunni Arab provinces stretching west to east across Iraq's center, have witnessed a dramatic reduction in violence over the past two years. Thanks to the Sahwa (Awakening)/Sons of Iraq (SOI) security programs, aggressive engagement by Coalition Forces (CF),Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),and the Embassy, calm has returned to the streets of Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, Samarra, and Ba'aqubah. While not by any means completely eradicated, the terror imposed by Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups in 2006-2007 has been contained in Anbar and SAD, and much reduced in Diyala. The challenge facing these provinces is to build upon these hard-won gains to reconstruct their cities and villages and to develop their economies so that Sunni Arabs feel they have a stake in post-Saddam Iraq and its institutions. It won't be easy -- enduring ethnic/sectarian tensions, ambivalence about reconciliation with the Government of Iraq (GOI),intra-Sunni fighting, and border problems could return destabilizing violence to these provinces. But peaceful provincial council elections in January, and encouraging signs of political re-engagement since then, give Sunni Arabs the opportunity to build promising futures in a new Iraq. END SUMMARY. -------------- ANBAR -------------- ¶2. (C) Anbar is a prized example of the return to security in Iraq. The Sahwa/Awakening movement was a homegrown, tribal-based effort in Anbar that put a stop to the chaos that ravaged Fallujah, Ramadi and other towns in the province. The USG took advantage of this phenomenon to create the SOI and Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) security programs throughout the predominantly Sunni-Arab areas of the entire country. By arming and paying local Iraqis to patrol their locales, these arrangements gave them a job, as well as responsibility for keeping the peace. Anbar's security benefited so much from these efforts that the Marines intend to withdraw from Anbar completely by the end of 2009 at the latest. U.S. Army forces will stay behind in the province, but at a reduced level that will be less visible to Anbaris. ¶3. (SBU) As in each of the three provinces, the recent Provincial Council (PC) elections in Anbar heralded a Sunni Arab re-engagement with the democratic political process. Anbaris cast over 300,000 votes in this election, as opposed to a few thousand in the 2005 provincial elections. Whereas the Sunnis boycotted in 2005, they campaigned in force this time: 35 political entities (lists, parties and individuals) competed in the election in Anbar. The previously dominant Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP -- the largest and oldest Sunni Arab political party),blamed by many for having failed to provide essential services, slipped to third place behind a tribal grouping associated with the SOI and a list led by a hard-line Sunni politician, but will remain a political force. Despite some initial post-election tension between tribal parties and the IIP over voting irregularities, it seems that intense coalition negotiations are now under way. The presence of seven different parties in the new PC should ensure that the body will have greater legislative competition than before, and the chance to engender wider popular support for local government in the province. Qpopular support for local government in the province. -------------- SALAH AD DIN -------------- ¶4. (C) Salah Ad Din (SAD) holds important symbolism to some Sunni Arabs as the birthplace and home of Saddam Hussein. It has also seen the return of relative calm, and signs of a popular inclination to engage with the Government of Iraq (GOI). Former Ba'athists, including current Deputy Governor Abdullah Jebara, the most powerful man in the provincial government, have signaled to the PRT a willingness to reconcile with the GOI. Newly elected PC members, whose affiliations span ten lists, profess an interest in forming a unity government PC. The disputed area of Tuz Khormatu is less tense than the other Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) that punctuate the border between the GOI and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The development of the Bayji refinery will be a source of great economic opportunity for the province. BAGHDAD 00000579 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) That said, any tension in Kirkuk province will reverberate in Tuz, and Bayji needs to shed its reputation as a teeming hive of corruption. The status of the Shi'a Golden Dome mosque in Samarra is a contentious issue in this predominantly Sunni province. In addition, high-level Iranian interest in the province causes concern. But as Saddam Hussein recedes from memory, and if Sunnis continue to be successfully incorporated into Iraqi political arrangements, tensions in the province should continue to decrease and prospects for the future should grow more hopeful. -------------- DIYALA -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Often described as "Iraq in microcosm" since it contains large numbers of Iraq's three main components, Sunni and Shi'a Arabs, and Kurds, Diyala is the most troubled of the three central and largely Sunni Arab provinces. The KRG claims the northern part of the province, including the strategic Kurdish-majority city of Khanaqin and a strip running south along the Iranian border that witnessed the ethnic cleansing of Faili Kurds during the Iran-Iraq war. A Fall 2008 clash between the Iraqi Army and Peshmerga forces in Khanaqin highlighted the potential for greater conflict over this area. Kurdish influence, including the presence of Kurdish security forces, both uniformed and plain-clothed, in other parts of the province, including the towns of Mandali and Jalula, inflames both Sunni and Shi'a Arab sensibilities. Diyala's border with Iran is frequently cited as a conduit for foreign fighters and materiel to enter Iraq. ¶7. (SBU) Yet like the other two provinces, Diyala has enjoyed an improvement in security. The Diyala SOI security program was transferred to GOI control in December 2008. Recent provincial elections were not only peaceful, but resulted in a broad representation of Kurds, Sunni and Shi'a Arabs in the new PC (although Sunni lists took first and third place, and more than half the seats). Initial discussions suggest that the leading electoral list, the Sunni Arab Tawafuq/IIP, is willing to work with the Kurdish and Shi'a Arab lists to ensure that provincial government offices are allocated among all three groups' political blocs. -------------- SUNNI ARABS AND THE REST OF IRAQ -------------- ¶8. (C) Although the three provinces are far from identical to one another in outlook and make-up, similarities can be discerned. They tend to be increasingly nationalistic, which finds expression in their emphasis on maintaining the unity of the Iraqi state and in uneasiness about Kurdish intentions. They share an almost neurotic fear of Iran, which sometimes extends to Iraqi Shi'a, often perceived as "agents" of Persian influence. The participation of large numbers of Sunnis in the recent elections, along with the rash of new Sunni Arab lists, suggests that political engagement is taking the place of rejectionism and violence. This will have national reverberations: Sunni Arab contacts suggest that national-level figures (e.g., Deputy Prime Minister Rafi Issawi--a Sunni Arab--and members of the GOI Presidency Council) are involved in discussions about provincial council offices. Baghdad-based Sunni politicians, in addition to taking an interest in the local politics of their provinces, are doubtless also thinking ahead to next year's national parliamentary elections. ¶9. (C) One and a half years of relative calm is changing the popular mindset in these provinces from mere survival to Qpopular mindset in these provinces from mere survival to reconstruction. Sunni Arab contacts realize they now have a chance to capitalize on the decrease in violence to rebuild their homes, businesses, and cities. When speaking with PRT and Embassy officers, Sunni Arabs contacts from the three provinces say they want a continued U.S. presence in Iraq, both as a hedge against the Maliki- and Shi'a-led GOI, and as a source of development assistance. The chaos of 2006-2007 crippled these provinces economically, and they need to restore the delivery of basic services for their citizens. ¶10. (C) As the Sunni Arab heartland, Anbar, SAD, and Diyala form a key part of the Iraqi puzzle. Their decision to turn on the insurgents that had once been their confederates, and to re-engage politically are hopeful signs for the future, both in the provinces and for Iraq in general. However, should GOI outreach to the Sunnis fail or falter, and should Sunni Arab abandon support for the political process as a result, these provinces could once again become a center of instability. BAGHDAD 00000579 003 OF 003 BUTENIS