BAATHISTS IN NORTHWEST BAGHDAD: 500 PARTIES, WHY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000548 E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: BAATHISTS IN NORTHWEST BAGHDAD: 500 PARTIES, WHY NOT 501? REF: A. BAGHDAD 4018 ¶B. 08 BAGHDAD 1005 Classified By: Deputy Polcouns John G. Fox, reasons 1.4 b/d. This is an ePRT Baghdad 5 Reporting Cable. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The Tarmiyah, Taji and Abu Ghraib "qadas" (rural counties) of northwest Baghdad Province are home to many former members of the Baath Party, Iraqi Army, and other security institutions of the former regime. Most were low-ranking members, but many remain unemployed and suspicious of the political process. Despite national-level efforts in 2008 and early 2009 to address some of their grievances, their reactions reveal continued frustration and a sense of exclusion. Several high-ranking Baathists living in this area wish to re-enter politics and even reinstate the Baath Party, but most low-ranking members tell us they simply want the current reinstatement procedures for former officers and civil servants to be implemented fairly. Apart from this issue, they maintain support for the current democratic system and the "nationalist" direction set by provincial elections. END SUMMARY. Elections Bring Out Views Regarding Former Baathists -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In the run-up to and after provincial elections, ePRT Baghdad 5 engaged with influential people across the rural qadas of Tarmiyah, Taji, and Abu Ghraib in northwest Baghdad Province to gauge the political effect of the elections on this mainly Sunni area. The area was central to Saddam,s military-industrial base and the wealthy Tigris River corridor remains home to many former members of the Baath Party, Iraqi Army, and other security institutions of the former regime. During our engagements with these people, as well as with Sunni sheikhs who were not necessarily Baath Party members, the treatment of former regime employees emerged as a top political concern, always tied to the need for "real Iraqis" to push the "Iranians" out of government. Sheikhs in our area expressed dismay at the scarcity of local candidates winning seats (27 candidates from Tarmiyah, but none elected),but all praised the elections as a step forward as their votes gained seats for Saleh Mutlak,s Iraqi National Project List and Ayad Allawi,s Iraqi National List, and helped diminish the number of seats held by the Islamic Supreme Council Iraq (ISCI) on the Baghdad Provincial Council (Ref A). Their primary reason for supporting these lists was almost always their "nationalist" credentials, but they remained skeptical that such an incremental shift in government might allow for the re-entry of local bread-winners into government jobs without outside pressure. Reinstatement: &Up to God or Maliki8 -------------- ¶3. (C) Former members of the Iraqi Army, including the Republican Guard, and intelligence services estimated that there are 45-60 officers of brigadier general's rank or higher on the West side of the Tigris River from Taji up through Tarmiyah, and about 500 other officers. They said they are currently receiving minimal pensions, ranging from 250,000 ID ($215) per month to 450,000 ID ($385) per month for a staff Brigadier General (BG),under the post-2003 regulations for former officers. Many are Sons of Iraq (SoI) leaders and take great pride in their achievement of drastically reducing Al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) attacks in an area it controlled in 2006. While they say they did this to bring security to their own communities, they feel that this work has not been adequately recognized by the GoI. Many of those we met were of low enough rank to be reinstated, but stated Qwe met were of low enough rank to be reinstated, but stated emphatically that the problem was not the laws and procedures so much as the political bias of those who are implementing them. For example, intelligence officers from Tarmiyah and Abu Ghraib said that, with the establishment of the new institutions in 2005, they had applied, along with thousands of their colleagues, to be reinstated. They saw old colleagues "from the South" re-hired through this process, but were themselves rejected without explanation. True or not, the widespread perception remains that sectarian bias in the Ministry of Interior (MoI),in particular Director General for Police Affairs Adnan Assidi, is the main obstacle to getting their jobs back. A potential breakthrough occurred when the most influential sheikh in Tarmiyah met with Minister of Interior Bolani three months ago, but there has been no progress on fulfilling promises that there would be locally-hired Iraqi Police and Iraqi National Police brigades for the area. Director of National Intelligence Mohammed Abdullah Sherwani was also mentioned as an obstacle (though he is Sunni Turkoman). ¶4. (C) While national numbers for the reinstatement of former Iraqi Army under the GoI initiative begun in September 2008 are good, most of those whom we met in our area explained that their attempts had been denied. One reported that a current BG had told him candidly that he had two ways to be reinstated: "God and Maliki." The older officers (Lt Col to BG) said the law currently under review in the Parliament for military pensions would adequately meet their demands with an 80% pension, but many of the younger officers wanted to go back to work to strengthen what is, in their view, a weak and unprofessional force. All the officers we met said they would support the referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) because it would protect Iraq from Iran and strengthen the ISF, but their first priority was the reinstatement of "nationalists" into government and support for the "political reform" amendment passed by the Parliament with the SOFA. While they were happy with provincial election results, they did not feel that it gave them the opportunity to openly pursue their main political objective of getting their jobs back. Indeed, they feared that pushing their issue too much would result in "false warrants" and "secret evidence" produced by the Minister of State for National Security, Sherwan al-Waeli, an organization that they deemed illegal. High Level Baathists More Politically Focused -------------- ¶5. (C) In separate meetings with three Baghdad Branch Level Baathists in Tarmiyah, Taji, and Abu Ghraib, a more calculated set of political views emerged. Sheikh Walid Al-Ayesh from Tarmiyah said that he has vowed not to return to politics and that most Baathists had done the same. He blamed the fall of the Baath Party, which he joined in 1960, on the takeover by a family both in Iraq and Syria. He said that most Baathists support Saleh al-Mutlak now, but that he himself will not publicly support political candidates. At the opposite extreme is Amer Hardan al-Dulaymi from Abu Ghraib and Walid,s fellow Baghdad Branch member, who seeks absolute reversal of de-Baathification. He defended the old regime and asked how democracy could be the basis for reconciliation when certain politicians and views are excluded. He recognized that this is not possible now, but believed that the United States must have seen its mistake with respect to putting the "Iranians" in power in Iraq and would eventually reverse course and restore Iraq,s ruling class. Somewhere in between Walid and Amer, Abid Irbahim Sharif from Taji has avoided open politics, but is champing at the bit to be cleared to run for office. Like Amer, he sees no irony in looking to the United States to re-instate the "nationalists" rather than pursuing a more inclusive Iraqi political system through Iraqis such as Mutlak, Allawi and even a more flexible Maliki. As Abid said, "There are 500 parties in Iraq; why not make it 501?" As a sign of Abid,s continued influence in the area, in a recent reshuffling of the Northwest Taji Sheikh Support Council, he alone received unanimous support from the sheikhs in the area to serve on the council. Abid said that he would be arrested if he even went to Baghdad by "Badr Corps." ¶6. (C) Influential Sunni Sheikhs in the area expressed surprising emotion and willingness to share their views about the importance of reinstating former Baathists and Iraqi Army, even when they themselves were not high-ranking Baathists. The love was not always returned, as Major General Taha al-Mashadani (ret.),a former Baathist, put it, "We are embarrassed that Sunni politics has become so tribal -- that is not Iraq, we are more sophisticated than that." In private he wore a suit and was happy to speak with us; in QIn private he wore a suit and was happy to speak with us; in public he went by "Sheikh," wore traditional dress, and was careful not to speak with us. He expressed support for the SOFA but, like others we met, strongly opposed the clause stating the GoI request for U.S. assistance in the conduct of operations against "remnants of the former regime." Like Abid, this general predicted that, if the Baath Party were allowed to run, it would win in the Taji area. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) In an area that has seen big security gains over the last two years, national-level politics still hold the key to whether suspended insurgent operations will lead to reconciliation. Among the many former Baathists and Army and Security officers in the area, the Maliki initiative to go after Shia militias, reinstate some officers, and speak more nationalistically with respect to the constitution and the security agreement, has given them hope. But the former Baathists we talked to say that it had not given them jobs, nor has it engendered among them real trust in the government. The vast majority of former Iraqi Army officers we met did not speak of ideology, but their frustration with the GoI makes them sympathetic to the Baathist claim that they are the real "nationalists." If local jobs, especially back in the military, become more plentiful as a result of provincial and national elections, the top-level Baathists in this area may lose their ability to play the "nationalism" card in building support for their reinstatement. In the interim, former Baathists and officers of all ranks here seek U.S. reassurance that a military drawdown will not leave them at the mercy of what is still, in their eyes, a Shia/Iranian government. BUTENIS