PRT KIRKUK: ARAB NATIONAL PARTIES SEEK FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000470 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2024 TAGS: PGOV EMIN KDEM IZ SUBJECT: PRT KIRKUK: ARAB NATIONAL PARTIES SEEK FOR PARTNERS TO COMPETE IN KIRKUK ELECTIONS REF: 08 BAGHDAD 3845 Classified By: PRT Kirkuk Leader Howard Keegan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). THIS IS A PRT KIRKUK REPORTING CABLE. ¶1. (C) Summary. While outside political parties continue to wield the most power and influence in Kirkuk, three Arab national parties are now attempting to get a foot in the door to compete in Kirkuk's elections. Since 2005, Kirkuk's Arab leaders have remained independent with minimal direction from the Iraqi Republican Gathering (IRG) based in Baghdad. In order to compete with the likes of Kurdistan-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Turkey-based Iraqi Turkomen Front (ITF),Sunni Arabs are contemplating with whom they can form alliances. In 2008, some IRG members formed the Kirkuk-based Arab Unity Bloc (AUB). The AUB is actively negotiating with Saleh Mutlak's Iraqi National Dialogue Front (INDF) that has large Arab support. The newly established National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) is considering the AUB as a coalition partner. However, VP Tariq al-Hashemi's Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) is unlikely to find a dance partner since it maintains close ties to the Kurds, did not perform well in the provincial elections and adheres to its non-secular views. End Summary. -------------- Arab Unity Bloc -------------- ¶2. C) Five of the six Arabs currently serving on Kirkuk's Provincial Council (PC) were elected in 2005 as part of the Iraqi Republican Gathering (IRG) list put together by Baghdad-based Saad Asim Janabi. The IRG pursues an "Arab" aQ@QX(Qnew political party that is slowly starting to gain traction in Kirkuk. NMRD General Secretary Dr. Jamal Nasser founded the party and currently resides in Amman, Jordan. The NMRD Chairman Faisal Mahmoud Karbuli and Public Relations Officer Aseel Abdulwahed al-Yaseri meet with the PRT monthly to discuss political developments. According to Aseel, the NMRD has a membership of 15,000 people in Kirkuk and they are growing. Surprisingly for an Arab party, the NMRD claims that forty percent of their membership is women. Much of their outreach through Aseel (female) is meant to galvanize Arab women in Kirkuk to become a factor in government. Other NMRD priorities include a focus on reconstruction, eradication of corruption, illegal Assayish detentions, and University outreach. The NMRD readily admits that some of its members previously engaged in insurgent activities shortly after the USA invasion. However, they say these people have realized the error of their ways and now want to join the political process. Dr. Jamal Nasser himself previously spent BAGHDAD 00000470 002 OF 003 some time in Coalition Forces detention. ¶5. (C) The NMRD, being a new party, has no members at the provincial level in Kirkuk. According to Faisal and Aseel the party performed "as expected" in provincial elections, and "better than expected" in Anbar province where they will likely pick up four or five seats on the provincial council. In particular, they are pleased with their performance in Diyala and Salahuddin winning where they expect to receive at least one seat in each of those provinces. Aseel admitted the NMRD was disappointed they did not get any seats in Ninewa, but they learned some lessons from their approach there and hope to apply that knowledge successfully in Kirkuk. ¶6. (C) The AUB is well aware of the NMRD in Kirkuk, and negotiations over a possible coalition between the two parties have continued off and on since October of 2008. The NMRD's respectable performance in provincial elections could give these negotiations new life. A common concern voiced by AUB leaders including Abu Saddam, Mohammed Khalil, and Sheikh Abdullah Sami al-Assi about the NMRD is the source of their funding. The NMRD appears to have significant financial resources in relation to their size. AUB leaders state that when they query the NMRD on the source of these finances the NMRD is only able to give vague answers - namely that Dr. Jamal Nasser is a rich man and owns many businesses. In response to the same question from the PRT, Faisal and Aseel stated that Dr. Jamal Nasser owns several import-export businesses and is able to finance his party through these businesses. The AUB is rightly concerned over getting entangled with a party whose membership contains ex-insurgents and has shady financial backing. If the NMRD is unable to form a coalition with the AUB it expects to run a separate list in Kirkuk the same as it did in the surrounding provinces. In this scenario the NMRD can realistically expect to win a one or two seats in the provincial council. This outlook could become rosier if the NMRD manages to woo a well known Kirkuki Arab to their side or if they manage to expand their membership by focusing their financial resources in Kirkuk. -------------- Iraqi National Dialogue Front -------------- ¶7. C) Saleh al-Mutlaq's INDF may be the largest Arab national party in Kirkuk and the one most likely to make an impact when Kirkuk holds its next provincial elections. According to INDF Kirkuk-based representatives Ahmed Mawlood Salih and Hassan Obeidi, INDF has been a behind-the-scenes player in Kirkuk politics since 2005 when they supported the IRG. Obeidi claims seventy percent of the Arabs support INDF in Kirkuk province. This claim may be political rhetoric, but the January provincial elections bear out that the INDF does receive broad support from Sunni Arabs in the surrounding provinces. The priority issues include joint administration in Kirkuk, removal of the Assayish, removal of illegal Kurdish trespassers, and the end of assassinations by Kurdish sponsored groups (likely another reference to the Assayish). The INDF currently operates offices in Hawija and Abassi with a new one to open shortly in Kirkuk City. ¶8. (C) Currently INDF has no seats on Kirkuk's PC. They claimed that they are in talks with several of Kirkuk's leading Arabs about membership. Hassan claimed that on 15 February PC member Mohammed Khalil was in Baghdad meeting QFebruary PC member Mohammed Khalil was in Baghdad meeting with Saleh al-Mutlaq to discuss this very topic. Hassan also claimed other possible converts are AUB Chairman Abu Saddam and PC member Sheik Abdullah Sami al-Assi. Hassan stated that INDF will not offer Deputy Governor Rakan Saeed because of his poor performance (NOTE: By most accounts Rakan is a popular and well respected Arab leader who has done a good job as Deputy Governor with limited powers offered him by the mainly Kurdish leadership. END NOTE). Hassan also stated that Sheik Burhan al-Assi would never be allowed in the INDF due to his recent provocative activities. ¶9. (C) According to Hassan and Ahmed, the INDF is interested in forming a coalition with the AUB. AUB Chairman Abu Saddam conceded that if INDF did well in provincial elections and they do have significant support in Kirkuk. He said he would like to create a grand coalition that would include the NMRD and the INDF so the Arab vote in Kirkuk could be consolidated. According to Abu Saddam, the main hold up is the fact that AUB senior and influential member Ahmed Obeidi has "personal issues" particularly with the INDF. Abu Saddam is planning on setting up a meeting in with both the NMRD and the INDF to iron out these differences so the stage can be set for this coalition to occur. Few doubt that the INDF will play a significant role in a future Kirkuk government. BAGHDAD 00000470 003 OF 003 -------------- IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY -------------- ¶10. (C) Of the three Arab national parties, IIP has the smallest footprint in Kirkuk and the bleakest outlook for future elections. In a 15 February meeting with the PRT, IIP Head Izzadeen Anwar claimed that the IIP has 3,000 members in Kirkuk province along with "many other followers." IIP does not have any representatives in Kirkuk's provincial government. Recognizing IIP's limited size, Izaadeen said that IIP is more than willing to form a coalition with other parties that share the same goals. According to Izzadeen, the IIP has a "good relationship" with the AUB, however they have not engaged in serious discussions about a coalition. Izzadeen admitted that the IIP will not likely to win any PC seats unless they form a coalition. Izzadeen characterized that IIP performed "fairly well" in Diyala, Anbar, and Salahuddin during January's provincial elections with the exception of Ninewa province. He stated that the main strategy for Kirkuk is to pursue tribal relationships and support; an area they consider to be neglected by the other political groups. In addition, Izzadeen stated that the IIP supports the implementation of Article 140, demonstrating a sharp break from the majority of the Kirkuk's Arab political leadership who often refer to Article 140 as "dead." Another policy initiative is to expanded ties with the U.S. ¶11. (C) Arab provincial leaders in Kirkuk seem to have an indifferent attitude towards the IIP. Some of this dates back to a July 2008 visit to Kirkuk by Iraqi Vice President and senior IIP member Tariq Hashimi. During this visit Hashimi held a closed door meeting with Arab members of the KPC. When several Arab KPC members raised complaints against the Kurds, Hashimi allegedly dismissed the complaints in a rude manner while making a comment to the effect that if the Arabs didn't like it they should have voted in 2005. Additionally, most Arabs in Kirkuk appear to prefer a secular government and tend to shun the Islamist parties. Neither the AUB nor any other political party present in Kirkuk has mentioned a possible coalition with the IIP to the PRT. Without such a coalition the IIP will likely remain an outsider in Kirkuk politics. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Kirkuk's Arab leaders have long prided themselves as the only ethnic group in the province that isn't influenced by outside forces. With provincial elections complete and Kirkuk still up for grabs this could change. The importance of Kirkuk is not lost on the national political parties that cater to Sunni Arabs. The PRT believes it will be difficult for the AUB to remain viable as the main Arab political force in Kirkuk unless it joins forces with one or more of these political parties. The AUB with Ahmed Obeidi as its main financier will not have the resources to compete with the national parties who, with elections complete throughout the rest of the country, can afford to focus their efforts in Kirkuk. The most likely coalition partner for the AUB appears to be the INDF because there are no significant ideological differences between the two. The INDF has a more anti-American bent, but this will likely be a non-factor as American forces prepare to depart Iraq. The NMRD is a less convenient fit. The NMRD is a new party and still carries many unknowns. Their financial resources are tempting, but right now there are too many unanswered questions for the AUB Qright now there are too many unanswered questions for the AUB to take the plunge. The NMRD, although interested in a coalition, appear to be content to go it alone if the deal isn't right. They believe they will gain representation in Kirkuk with or without a coalition. The secular views of Kirkuk's Arabs along with the perceived ineptitude of the IIP in the central government since 2005 give the party minimal chances for success in Kirkuk. BUTENIS