Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD447
2009-02-21 11:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

RRT ERBIL: THE KURDISTAN ISLAMIC UNION - KRG'S

Tags:  POL PGOV KDEM PINR IZ 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211114Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1805
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000447 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2024
TAGS: POL PGOV KDEM PINR IZ
SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: THE KURDISTAN ISLAMIC UNION - KRG'S
THIRD PARTY

REF: 07 BAGHDAD 1399

Classified By: Regional Coordinator Lucy Tamlyn for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) cable.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000447 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2024 TAGS: POL PGOV KDEM PINR IZ SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: THE KURDISTAN ISLAMIC UNION - KRG'S THIRD PARTY REF: 07 BAGHDAD 1399 Classified By: Regional Coordinator Lucy Tamlyn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) cable. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: As the "Third Party" in the Kurdistan Region, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) is a long way from threatening the tight patronage and emotional hold of the KDP and the PUK on the electorate. Nonetheless, with its strong anti-corruption message and popular media outlets, it appears to be growing in popularity with youth and workers. It also appeals to those who do not feel comfortable with the secular and modern face of the two leading parties and who see a growing divide between the "haves" and "have nots" of the Kurdish region. This cable examines the growing popularity of the KIU in the Kurdistan Region and discusses the views of KIU leader Saladdin Muhammad Bahaddin. END SUMMARY -------------- Background on the KIU -------------- ¶2. (U) The KIU has roots going back to the national party known as the Islamic Union (IU),which was formed in Iraq in 1951, but from which a nucleus left for Tehran in the 1980s. Current KIU President Saladdin Bahaddin was part of this Iranian contingent, and did educational outreach and political recruitment in the primarily Sunni Muslim Kurdish areas of Iran. In 1994, the group returned to Kurdistan, announced itself as an educational jihadist group, and formed the current KIU. (Note: The term educational jihadist group here means change through education and awareness, not through the use of weapons. End Note.) ¶3. (SBU) Besides its Iranian leanings, the KIU has political sympathies with the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun),an Egyptian-based movement which follows a rigid interpretation of Islam. KIU members in Kurdistan actively study this doctrine. Bahaddin's father, Muhammad Bahaddin, was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and both Muhammad Bahaddin and the late Mula Othman (the former leader of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan) were assigned by the Islamic Brotherhood to recruit people into the movement. The KIU has received undisclosed financial support from the United Islamists of Kurdistan (Alrabita Al-Eslamia Fi Kurdistan),which has collected funds from Gulf States and established hundreds of mosques, as well as various clinics. Through these pa
rty-controlled service outlets the KIU engages with Kurdistan's youth and those otherwise disenfranchised from services, jobs and education slots. KIU representatives in Sulaimaniyah have noted that the party also receives funding from the Islamic Relief Organization located in Saudia Arabia and the Islamic Union (IU) based in Manchester, U.K., through the influence of Dr. Ali Qaradaghi, a Kurd and senior member of the IU. Like other political parties affiliated with the KDP/PUK Kurdistan National Assembly bloc, the KIU also reportedly receives funding from the Kurdistan Regional Government. -------------- KIU Youth Outreach -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The KIU hosts its own website, www.kurdiu.org, which publishes content in Kurdish, Arabic and some English. Nizam Halabjayee, an Iraqi Kurdish writer in Sulaimaniyah who writes for the independent Awene newspaper, described the KIU,s youth recruitment strategy: "(T)he Islamic Union (KIU) has been concentrating on recruiting youngsters, from coaching children in the mosques to organizing student unions in the universities." According to a Kurdistan-based American Qin the universities." According to a Kurdistan-based American political scientist Denise Natali, there is a growing cachet among university students in identifying with the KIU, which students see as a more sincere political alternative to the two ruling secular parties. RRTOff has heard anecdotally that a high percentage of the better students (both men and women) in the Region's most prestigious universities identify with conservative Islamic values. -------------- KIU Media Presence -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The KIU has a strong, multi-faceted media presence which covers the Kurdistan Region. It publishes the newspaper Yekgirtu and operates Yekgirtu Radio and Yekgirtu TV. These media outlets openly identify themselves as the voice of the KIU. Yekgirtu newspaper is not a major player BAGHDAD 00000447 002 OF 004 in the Kurdistan Region's print media market, largely because it competes with the region's small group of better-known independent print outlets like Hawlati newspaper and Lvin magazine. However, Radio Yekgirtu is the number two radio station in the Kurdistan Region, second only to independent Radio Nawa. Yekgirtu TV is the Region's most popular television station. RRT contacts in the Kurdish media and the NGO community say that Yekgirtu TV is popular because it is the only local TV station not controlled by the KDP or PUK and people have far more confidence in the editorial objectivity of Yekgirtu's news and public affairs programs than similar programs on KDP-owned Kurdistan TV or PUK-owned KurdSat. -------------- KIU Political Membership -------------- ¶6. (SBU) A KIU politburo staffer told RRT staff that the KIU has approximately 50,000 registered general members. Registered party members are required to meet a minimum of once a week to study Islamic teachings in a group setting, as well as review Islamic Brotherhood doctrine. This takes place in mosques, as well as in private homes (women are much more likely to be involved in a home group.) The politburo staffer claimed the KIU received 250,000 to 300,000 votes in the 2005 elections. (Note: According to the local IHEC Director, the KIU received 195,754, (1.75 percent) out of 11,200,000 votes cast during the 2005 elections in all of Iraq. For Kurdistan, the total votes cast for the region was 2,750,000, of which the KIU secured 7 percent. End Note.) In Baghdad the KIU has control of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ),but, according to KIU Leader Bahaddin, the Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki does not accept KIU control of the MoJ, and seeks to get the position back. -------------- KIU Platform -------------- ¶7. (SBU) While the party uses a rallying cry of reform and anti-corruption, Bahaddin himself says the four pillars of his platform are reform of religion, nationalism, sectarian issues, and democracy. Bahaddin says that the KIU wants to include religion in politics, and use it as a model for daily living. The party's 14-point manifesto includes an activation call or "dawaa" for religion, and states that Islamic tenets should be used when organizing government institutions. Religion in Iraq is deeply-rooted, Bahaddin says. However, he feels that inculcating the imperatives of Islamic doctrine into daily life needs to be worked on by Kurdish Muslims. According to him, "if we don't take care of religion, it will collapse, or turn to extremism, so we must take care of religion." On nationalism and sectarian issues, Bahaddin believes that there should be mutual understanding among all sects. The party manifesto states that they support the role of women, and want to promote freedom of speech and support the rights of journalists. Bahaddin feels that citizens should identify with a group, and says "For a developing country, it is better to associate with the community, than to have a tribal identity." Another key goal of the party platform is to "make an effort to retrieve Kirkuk and the disputed areas back into the Kurdistan region." ¶8. (SBU) Bahaddin doesn't believe that "the Kurds understand what democracy is." He sees a primary role of the KIU in helping people focus on becoming better citizens. This strategy is particularly targeted toward younger members. The manifesto states that the peI*7|aQgI%Q95American was running as a candidate for president, and said this demonstrated the American system allowed participation by all people. He believes that Americans are intellectually aware of their civic responsibilities and citizenship, and appreciate differences in culture and nationality. ¶10. (C) During a second visit on November 13, 2008 following his visit to Iran with KRG President Barzani, Bahaddin seemed less reflective and was more interested in discussing corruption in the KRG. His prayer beads were still ever present, but throughout this visit he simply clutched them in his hand. He declined to comment on discussions in Tehran, and characterized his role there as simply to take pictures. He did say that Barzani hadn't visited Iran in a long time, that Iran had requested that he come, that the Iranians respect Barzani, and that this visit renewed their friendship. Bahaddin did offer advice to the U.S., and said there are 140,000 troops in Iraq, and that they spend the majority of their time trying to capture terrorists in remote villages. He believes we should remove the troops, and bring in 40,000 civil servants to fight corruption instead. -------------- The KRG in Crisis -------------- ¶11. (C) Bahaddin believes the KRG is in crisis today: the present leadership is thinking only for today, and there is no overall strategic plan. There are also problems between the KRG and Baghdad, but he admits both sides are to blame. He believes that the current environment permits unprincipled people to engage in unwholesome ways of making money, and that tribal or political connections are valued far above individual skills. Bahaddin says that reform is not easy, and that the KIU will challenge the KDP/PUK on rule of law. He acknowledges that the KIU currently has limited power to effect change, but he says the KIU will not surrender or be controlled. According to him, "They (the ruling parties) will not like us." -------------- Corruption in the KRG -------------- ¶12. (C) During both visits, Bahaddin asked the U.S. to help fight against the corruption he sees endemic in the two ruling Kurdish parties. Bahaddin has said that not only is the present government corrupt, but it also employs torture. He recounted episodes of Asayeesh attacking or arresting KIU members for participating in religious or professional activities. Bahaddin offered his opinion that people believe this persecution has the blessing of the U.S., and that the U.S. should prevent this torture. If we do not, according to him, history will hold the U.S. accountable for allowing torture to continue. Bahaddin was familiar with the U.S. Embassy's Anti-Corruption Coordination office (ACCO) in Baghdad and said that it should not be shy about exposing people. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (SBU) On January 10th, the KIU, as part of a coalition with three other minor opposition parties, (Toiler's party, Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, and Islamic Group of Kurdistan) released a report in which they criticized the performance of the current Kurdistan government. Recommendations include the merger of dual-party ministries; QRecommendations include the merger of dual-party ministries; a call to pass the Kurdistan constitution; better oversight and monitoring of government finances and activities; increased protection for human rights; a plea to reduce political party influence in government operations; a request to hold Kurdish elections at the proposed time; a reduction in centralization; and an increase in powers granted at the local level. Through this new bloc alliance, the KIU hopes to mount an anti-establishment, anti-corruption campaign to challenge the KDP/PUK in the upcoming May 19 legislative elections. ¶14. (C) The campaign presents competition to the KDP/PUK in areas where the coalition is vulnerable. It will be interesting to see how the new strategy of campaigning on a separate platform (rather than joining the Kurdistan list) plays out during the upcoming legislative elections in May BAGHDAD 00000447 003 OF 004 occurred over a relatively short period of history. Individuals and the U.S. government appeared very successful, and the most significant thing to him was that people had all manner of freedoms, and didn't put pressure on each other. He was particularly impressed that Senator Obama, an African-American was running as a candidate for president, and said this demonstrated the American system allowed participation by all people. He believes that Americans are intellectually aware of their civic responsibilities and citizenship, and appreciate differences in culture and nationality. ¶10. (C) During a second visit on November 13, 2008 following his visit to Iran with KRG President Barzani, Bahaddin seemed less reflective and was more interested in discussing corruption in the KRG. His prayer beads were still ever present, but throughout this visit he simply clutched them in his hand. He declined to comment on discussions in Tehran, and characterized his role there as simply to take pictures. He did say that Barzani hadn't visited Iran in a long time, that Iran had requested that he come, that the Iranians respect Barzani, and that this visit renewed their friendship. Bahaddin did offer advice to the U.S., and said there are 140,000 troops in Iraq, and that they spend the majority of their time trying to capture terrorists in remote villages. He believes we should remove the troops, and bring in 40,000 civil servants to fight corruption instead. -------------- The KRG in Crisis -------------- ¶11. (C) Bahaddin believes the KRG is in crisis today: the present leadership is thinking only for today, and there is no overall strategic plan. There are also problems between the KRG and Baghdad, but he admits both sides are to blame. He believes that the current environment permits unprincipled people to engage in unwholesome ways of making money, and that tribal or political connections are valued far above individual skills. Bahaddin says that reform is not easy, and that the KIU will challenge the KDP/PUK on rule of law. He acknowledges that the KIU currently has limited power to effect change, but he says the KIU will not surrender or be controlled. According to him, "They (the ruling parties) will not like us." -------------- Corruption in the KRG -------------- ¶12. (C) During both visits, Bahaddin asked the U.S. to help fight against the corruption he sees endemic in the two ruling Kurdish parties. Bahaddin has said that not only is the present government corrupt, but it also employs torture. He recounted episodes of Asayeesh attacking or arresting KIU members for participating in religious or professional activities. Bahaddin offered his opinion that people believe this persecution has the blessing of the U.S., and that the U.S. should prevent this torture. If we do not, according to him, history will hold the U.S. accountable for allowing torture to continue. Bahaddin was familiar with the U.S. Embassy's Anti-Corruption Coordination office (ACCO) in Baghdad and said that it should not be shy about exposing people. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (SBU) On January 10th, the KIU, as part of a coalition with three other minor opposition parties, (Toiler's party, Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, and Islamic Group of Kurdistan) released a report in which they criticized the performance of the current Kurdistan government. Recommendations include the merger of dual-party ministries; QRecommendations include the merger of dual-party ministries; a call to pass the Kurdistan constitution; better oversight and monitoring of government finances and activities; increased protection for human rights; a plea to reduce political party influence in government operations; a request to hold Kurdish elections at the proposed time; a reduction in centralization; and an increase in powers granted at the local level. Through this new bloc alliance, the KIU hopes to mount an anti-establishment, anti-corruption campaign to challenge the KDP/PUK in the upcoming May 19 legislative elections. ¶14. (C) The campaign presents competition to the KDP/PUK in areas where the coalition is vulnerable. It will be interesting to see how the new strategy of campaigning on a separate platform (rather than joining the Kurdistan list) plays out during the upcoming legislative elections in May BAGHDAD 00000447 004 OF 004 2009, and whether the KIU will garner more than the seven percent achieved in 2005. But our prediction is that the KIU is destined to be the eternal bridesmaid. As an unarmed movement, it lacks the security credibility which Kurds still assume a ruling party must muster. And despite the party's gains with youth and workers, it is nowhere near commanding the support that the KDP and PUK enjoy. But even if the gap closes, allowing an Islamic group to assume power would be anathema to the leaders of the KDP and PUK and we believe that they would resist it by all means. BUTENIS

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