ARAB-KURD RELATIONS: CURRENT TENSIONS THREATEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000446 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2024 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL IZ SUBJECT: ARAB-KURD RELATIONS: CURRENT TENSIONS THREATEN RESOLUTION OF A HOST OF IMPORTANT ISSUES REF: 08 BAGHDAD 2859 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Tension between Arabs and Kurds is historical, multifaceted, and currently fueled by unresolved conflicts over oil revenue sharing, disputed internal borders (DIBs),and the struggle for authority between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government (GOI). Prime Minister Maliki's intentions to move some troops from the 12 IA Division into the Kurdish occupied area north of Kirkuk has KRG leaders threatening civil war. Avoiding a military confrontation will require sustained USG engagement, support and mediation. Recent press statements by KRG leaders accusing the U.S. of planning to abandon the Kurds may be calculated to pry out USG policy toward the Kurds under the new Administration. End Summary. -------------- The War of Words -------------- ¶2. (SBU) KRG rhetoric in the press is in response to a number of outstanding conflicts between the KRG and GoI and rumors of Maliki's plan to expel the Pesh merga from the disputed areas. Apparently emboldened by Dawa's success in the provincial elections, PM Maliki has called for a review of the constitution aimed at reducing regional authorities and strengthening the central government, a popular position among many Arab politicians and on the streets outside of Iraqi Kurdistan. On February 18, KRG Deputy Speaker Kamal Kirkuki was quoted in the press saying, "al-Maliki is dangerous for Iraq, dangerous for democracy and is a second Saddam." In response, Dawa Parliamentary leader Ali Adeeb stated: "Some Kurdish politicians have aspirations that go beyond the limits of the Constitution." KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani then publicly warned of an Arab-Kurdish civil war if American forces withdraw from Iraq before the disputed areas (DIBs) are resolved. In recent meetings, the KRG PM has called for the appointment of a senior American envoy to Iraq to resolve Kurd-Arab issues. -------------- Oil Law - When? -------------- ¶3. (C) The lack of a hydrocarbons law fuels the Kurds' frustration with central government, and contributes to GOI suspicions that the KRG wants full control of oil and gas fields within the KRG,s current (and possibly future) boundaries. The Kirkuk oil fields are part of this picture, but many Arab leaders accuse the KRG of encroachment beyond the current 'Green Line' to lay claim to other hydrocarbon assets, and not simply, as Kurd leaders proclaim, to reclaim traditional Kurdish lands taken from them by Saddam,s regime. Turkey is pushing to do business on a gas pipeline but cannot move forward until revenue sharing is resolved. The KRG wants to negotiate a revenue sharing agreement with the GoI so that they can fulfill the terms of their agreements with international oil companies; two oil fields are already producing and the firms involved are anxious for a deal to be reached on revenue sharing that will permit exports and allow them to begin to recoup the costs of development. ¶4. (C) Minister of Oil (MoO) Hussein Shahristani has repeatedly stated that he considers these KRG contracts illegal. Following meetings with PM Barzani in November, Shahristani said he is willing to permit export from the first two oil fields, but only on terms that apply to all Iraqi exports, i.e., revenues accrue to the central government, with the KRG receiving a 17% share, out of which Qgovernment, with the KRG receiving a 17% share, out of which they would have to compensate the producing firm (the production sharing agreements signed with the KRG call for the firms to receive considerably higher payments). Since November there do not appear to have been any serious negotiations between the KRG and Baghdad to reach a compromise on revenue sharing, nor to move the hydrocarbons legislation forward. A separate compromise that Barzani and Shahristani reached in November permitted the GOI to move forward with work on the disputed Khurmala Dome (part of the Kirkuk oil field),but this agreement collapsed in January and work has not yet resumed. -------------- Provincial Elections, DIBs -------------- ¶5. (C) According to Iraq's constitution, the KRG's southern BAGHDAD 00000446 002.7 OF 003 border should be determined by the Article 140 process, which KRG President Barzani adamantly supports in the face of widespread Arab opposition. While that process remains largely moribund, the presence of Kurdish Pesh merga and other KRG security forces operating in the disputed areas remains a point of bitter contention for Maliki (and an irritant for many Iraqi Arabs, especially those who live in the disputed areas under de facto KRG control). The Iraqi Constitution allows the KRG to operate its own security forces inside the KRG and outside the KRG upon invitation from the central government. Article 107 of the Iraqi constitution allows the Prime Minister to order Iraqi Army (IA) into areas below the Green Line (referred to as the line of March 19, 2003) that are controlled by Kurdish security forces. In some cases the GOI had requested the Pesh merga to enter certain disputed areas to provide additional security, and the KRG has argued that the GoI delegated security responsibility over to the KRG, and there is no need to alter that arrangement except through the resolution of the disputed areas according to Article 140. As a matter of constitutional law (Article 107),the Prime Minister has the right to order the IA into disputed territory without coordinating with the KRG or Pesh merga forces on the ground and order them to leave. The PM did just that in August 2008 in Khanaqin. Only the immediate and effective intervention by MNF-I and the Embassy prevented an armed confrontation. As a result, MNF-I formed a senior-level Security Coordinating Committee (SCC) comprised of U.S., Iraqi and Kurd senior military officers to meet regularly and de-conflict Pesh merga and IA in the disputed areas. ¶6. (C) Additionally, it is unclear from the Provincial Powers Law what authority a provincial governor has to order the Pesh merga to withdraw from his/her province. In this regard, al-Hadba leader (and putative Ninewa province governor) Athiel al-Najaifi's statement that he will nullify Article 140 and expel the Pesh merga from Ninewa province has raised Kurdish hackles in a province that contains many of the disputed districts and a sizeable Kurd minority population. Al-Najaifi's party won the majority of provincial council (PC) seats in Ninewa province, displacing Kurdish PC control. Fueling Masoud Barzani's fears is the possibility that PM Maliki might ally with Athiel al-Najaifi to push the Kurds out of Ninewa. -------------- Kirkuk - Civil War? -------------- ¶7. (C) KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani was recently quoted in the press saying, "We love America but they (American leadership) do not care." On February 17, he warned of an Arab-Kurd civil war if U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq. This evocative rhetoric is a replay of what happened in Khanaqin in August 2008 (Ref A). Military sources leaked to Hawlati press on February 18 that the 12th IA in Kirkuk is 90% Shia Arabs from the PM's Da'wa Party and that Kurdish officers have been transferred from Kirkuk to Tikrit. Barzani has told us that he believes that the GoI's efforts to drive the KRG from Khanaqin was the first step toward confronting the Kurds in Kirkuk and even Erbil. There is now evidence that 12th IA commander General Abdul Amir is preparing to move his non-Kurdish troops into areas north of Kirkuk city. We have been repeatedly assured by PM Maliki and the Minister of Defense that 12th IA will not be ordered further north QDefense that 12th IA will not be ordered further north without consultations between the KRG and GoI, but commanders in the field are preparing the ground, and this could be enough to spark a KRG reaction. Barzani told us that he is aware of Maliki's plans and that Kirkuk is a red-line beyond which the IA cannot go without KRG okay. Barzani wants to avoid military confrontation, but warned that he is ready to fight back. -------------- -------------- What is the USG doing to curb Arab-Kurd hostilities? -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Our highest priority is to reduce the threat of armed confrontation. Currently, given the 12th IA movements and threatening rhetoric, Kirkuk is the most likely potential flashpoint. U.S. military command is actively engaged through the SCC in on-the-ground deconfliction. The SCC was used effectively during the provincial elections and the U.S. military is working with the SCC to continue coordination and reduce tensions involving KRG and GOI forces. We will continue to fully support UNAMI's DIBs process and press the CoR's Article 23 Committee to arrive at a formula for conducting elections in Kirkuk. MNF-I and the Embassy are planning a joint conference on Arab-Kurd Tensions to discuss the full range of issues confronting the KRG and GoI on BAGHDAD 00000446 003.8 OF 003 Monday, February 23. We will report on our findings and recommendations for possible further action to help mitigate the threat of an Arab-Kurd clash. ¶9. (C) Comment. The Kurds are feeling isolated, nervous, and defensive, particularly given troop movements in Kirkuk, combined with stalled oil legislation, Dawa's success in the provincial elections, perceived USG indifference to their concerns, and Maliki's attempts to amend the constitution and dilute KRG autonomy. PM Maliki reflects the general Arab view that it is time to push back on the Kurds and replace KRG "facts on the ground" in disputed areas with the IA and security forces. In this year of elections, we can expect Maliki and other Arab nationalist politicians to play the Kurd card often. Masoud Barzani has accused us of abandoning the Kurds and strengthening Maliki. Arab nationalists repeat their accusations that the U.S. was largely responsible for "allowing" the Pesh merga to move south of the Green Line, and we should insist that the KRG pull its forces back. Barzani reminds Embassy officials that the Pesh merga assisted the U.S. in toppling Saddam and that he was the first to publicly support the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. We are stuck in the middle of this dispute politically and our military is deeply involved with both sides trying to keep them at bay. We are not at the precipice of war yet, and there are many processes out there to resolve Kurd-Arab differences peacefully. We need to press both sides to use them. End Comment. BUTENIS