ISCI ACCEPTS ELECTION RESULTS BUT COMPLAINS MALIKI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000401

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: ISCI ACCEPTS ELECTION RESULTS BUT COMPLAINS MALIKI
UNFAIRLY SWAYED OUTCOME

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 380

B. B) BAGHDAD 376

C. C) BAGHDAD 306

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John Fox for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
leaders tell us they were shocked by their poor showing in
the January 31 provincial elections and complain Prime
Minister Maliki's Da'wa party, their main rival, unfairly
swayed the results. However, ISCI does not plan to protest
publicly and has in fact already praised the election. With
the loss of provincial governments, ISCI's remaining asset is
its strong position in parliament and national-level alliance
with the Kurds and some Sunnis. To regain Shia votes before
national elections, ISCI will have to prevent this valuable
alliance from turning away nationalist Arabs and its Shia
Islamist base. End Summary.

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ISCI Shocked at Election Results
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2. (C) Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) leaders and
advisors have told Ambassador Crocker and Poloffs since the
January 31 provincial elections that they are shocked by
ISCI's worse than expected performance. ISCI Chairman Abd
al-Aziz al-Hakim, his son and likely successor Ammar, and
Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi each told the Ambassador
they never expected ISCI to fare so poorly because it was so
well-organized. Raja al-Khalili, Mahdi's advisor and
longtime friend, on February 8 told Poloff that Maliki's
State of Law received three times more votes, and ISCI only a
third, of what ISCI had predicted. (Note. Preliminary
results show that ISCI ranked second or third in most
southern provinces and sixth in Baghdad. End note.) In
summer 2008, ISCI leaders were confident enough in their
election prospects that they rebuffed Maliki's overtures to
form a joint election list. Their defeat has left them
humbled and searching for scapegoats. Khalili told Poloff
that ISCI has begun an internal review to examine the causes
of their defeat.

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Convinced of Irregularities But Accepting the Results
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3. (C) ISCI leaders have offered Emboffs a common list of
grievances, most of them vague, about the January 31
provincial elections and have blamed Maliki and his Da'wa
party for using the instruments of government to tip the
elections. Nonetheless, ISCI officials and ISCI-affiliated
clerics have already publically praised the elections and
accepted the results. ISCI contacts tell us they will not
vehemently protest the results because doing so would
undermine confidence in Iraq's political process.


4. (C) Without offering specifics, Ammar al-Hakim told the
Ambassador on February 9 that the Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC) had been tilted in favor of Maliki (ref A).
VP Mahdi hinted that Maliki, because he is in power, was
able to manipulate the elections (ref B). After the
elections, however, Mahdi quickly issued a conciliatory
public statement in order, he claimed, to instill confidence
in Iraq's democratic process and to block his more aggressive
ISCI colleagues from protesting the outcome. On February 4,
Mahdi was quoted in the press calling the elections a "good
experience" and Maliki "a friend and brother."


5. (C) Tahsin al-Azawi, the deputy of the ISCI-affiliated
Badr Organization in parliament, and Haitham al-Husseini,
senior advisor to Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, complained to Poloffs
on February 11 that the Maliki government had used its
authority over the Education and Trade Ministries (both led
Qauthority over the Education and Trade Ministries (both led
by Da'wa),the security services, and the Independent High
Electoral Commission (IHEC) to manipulate the election
results to disfavor ISCI. According to Azawi, the government
depressed turnout in ISCI strongholds: the Education Ministry
confused voters by switching some polling locations the day
before the election; security services intimidated some
voters away from the polls; and IHEC simply failed to
register up to 10 percent of the electorate, perhaps because
the Trade Ministry, which administers the public distribution
system (PDS) ration card that doubled as a voter registry,
withheld some names, they claimed. Poloffs noted the
certainty and indignation with which Azawi and Husseini
listed these grievances. Husseini recalled that Abd al-Aziz,
when campaigning in Baghdad and the south, was received by
large crowds, "who freely chose to come out and show their
support." Where were these people on election day, he
rhetorically asked, unable to fathom that ISCI's southern

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machine and well-known leadership had failed to deliver a
victory.


6. (C) In a separate meeting, Mahdi advisor Raja al-Khalili
also complained of election irregularities caused by Da'wa's
control of the Education and Trade Ministries and the
"illegal" tribal support councils that, Khalili estimates,
contributed to Maliki's win. Khalili told Poloff that ISCI
received fewer votes in some areas than it had members,
concluding irregularities must have occurred. At the same
time, Khalili acknowledged these probably played a minor
role. He conceded ISCI suffered from a backlash against
provincial government incumbents and against parties viewed
as too religious. Raja said the Iraqi people had exhausted
much of their post-Saddam religious fervor, therefore ISCI's
overtly religious "Shahid al-Mihrab" (Martyrs of the Pulpit)
coalition turned away votes.

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Comment: ISCI Left with Green Zone Politics
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7. (C) ISCI's loss of provincial governments and related
patronage networks is the latest in a series of strategic
setbacks: it has lost the implicit backing of Iraq's Shia
clerical establishment it enjoyed in 2005 because of the
current reluctance of the clerics to pick electoral winners;
its former militia, the Badr Corps, has folded itself into
the Iraqi Security Forces and has seen its influence among
the officer corps diluted as the ISF grew under Maliki's
watch; and ISCI's relationship with Iran has increasingly
become a burden as the Iraqi people's attitude toward the
Iranian government has soured.


8. (C) ISCI's main remaining asset is its strong position in
parliament and its national-level alliance with the Kurds,
the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),and Qasim Daoud's Shia
Solidarity Party. This grouping -- based on a common desire
to constrain Maliki and promote federalism -- can control
about 125 seats in parliament (of 275) or more if Ayad
Allawi's Iraqi National List joins, as some Iraqi officials
now speculate it will. Time is short, however, for ISCI to
translate Green Zone politics into success in national
elections planned for late this year or early next.


9. (C) To regain Shia votes, ISCI will have to prevent its
valuable alliance with the Kurds (and lingering ties to Iran)
from turning away nationalist Arabs, a constituency Maliki
has been able to gain. For example, VP Mahdi, Azawi and
Husseini all told Poloffs that ISCI will continue to push for
federalism (valuable to the Kurds),even though Maliki and
other nationalists argue Iraq needs a strong center.


10. (C) ISCI will also have to decide whether to accept a
diminished role in a revised Unified Iraqi Alliance (UIA).
Now that Maliki is stronger in the provinces, VP Mahdi told
the Ambassador, the PM might try to exert excessive influence
over the UIA. Khalili, the Mahdi advisor, told Poloff that
ISCI cares most about national politics, not the outcome of
provincial elections. He argued that even if Maliki repeats
his success in national elections, he still will lack a
majority in parliament to become prime minister. ISCI might
then position itself as a cross-sectarian bridge and hope a
Kurd-Sunni-Shia alliance will select the next head of
government. Doing this while being part of a Maliki-led UIA
and maintaining its base of devote Shia will be a difficult
balancing act. End Comment.
BUTENIS