ISCI ACCEPTS ELECTION RESULTS BUT COMPLAINS MALIKI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000401 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: ISCI ACCEPTS ELECTION RESULTS BUT COMPLAINS MALIKI UNFAIRLY SWAYED OUTCOME REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 380 ¶B. B) BAGHDAD 376 ¶C. C) BAGHDAD 306 Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John Fox for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) leaders tell us they were shocked by their poor showing in the January 31 provincial elections and complain Prime Minister Maliki's Da'wa party, their main rival, unfairly swayed the results. However, ISCI does not plan to protest publicly and has in fact already praised the election. With the loss of provincial governments, ISCI's remaining asset is its strong position in parliament and national-level alliance with the Kurds and some Sunnis. To regain Shia votes before national elections, ISCI will have to prevent this valuable alliance from turning away nationalist Arabs and its Shia Islamist base. End Summary. -------------- ISCI Shocked at Election Results -------------- ¶2. (C) Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) leaders and advisors have told Ambassador Crocker and Poloffs since the January 31 provincial elections that they are shocked by ISCI's worse than expected performance. ISCI Chairman Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, his son and likely successor Ammar, and Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi each told the Ambassador they never expected ISCI to fare so poorly because it was so well-organized. Raja al-Khalili, Mahdi's advisor and longtime friend, on February 8 told Poloff that Maliki's State of Law received three times more votes, and ISCI only a third, of what ISCI had predicted. (Note. Preliminary results show that ISCI ranked second or third in most southern provinces and sixth in Baghdad. End note.) In summer 2008, ISCI leaders were confident enough in their election prospects that they rebuffed Maliki's overtures to form a joint election list. Their defeat has left them humbled and searching for scapegoats. Khalili told Poloff that ISCI has begun an internal review to examine the causes of their defeat. -------------- -------------- Convinced of Irregularities But Accepting the Results -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) ISCI leaders have offered Emboffs a common list of grievances, most of them vague, about the January 31 provincial elections and have blamed Maliki and his Da'wa party for using the instruments of government to tip the elections. Nonetheless, ISCI officials and ISCI-affiliated clerics have already publically praised the elections and accepted the results. ISCI contacts tell us they will not vehemently protest the results because doing so would undermine confidence in Iraq's political process. ¶4. (C) Without offering specifics, Ammar al-Hakim told the Ambassador on February 9 that the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) had been tilted in favor of Maliki (ref A). VP Mahdi hinted that Maliki, because he is in power, was able to manipulate the elections (ref B). After the elections, however, Mahdi quickly issued a conciliatory public statement in order, he claimed, to instill confidence in Iraq's democratic process and to block his more aggressive ISCI colleagues from protesting the outcome. On February 4, Mahdi was quoted in the press calling the elections a "good experience" and Maliki "a friend and brother." ¶5. (C) Tahsin al-Azawi, the deputy of the ISCI-affiliated Badr Organization in parliament, and Haitham al-Husseini, senior advisor to Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, complained to Poloffs on February 11 that the Maliki government had used its authority over the Education and Trade Ministries (both led Qauthority over the Education and Trade Ministries (both led by Da'wa),the security services, and the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to manipulate the election results to disfavor ISCI. According to Azawi, the government depressed turnout in ISCI strongholds: the Education Ministry confused voters by switching some polling locations the day before the election; security services intimidated some voters away from the polls; and IHEC simply failed to register up to 10 percent of the electorate, perhaps because the Trade Ministry, which administers the public distribution system (PDS) ration card that doubled as a voter registry, withheld some names, they claimed. Poloffs noted the certainty and indignation with which Azawi and Husseini listed these grievances. Husseini recalled that Abd al-Aziz, when campaigning in Baghdad and the south, was received by large crowds, "who freely chose to come out and show their support." Where were these people on election day, he rhetorically asked, unable to fathom that ISCI's southern BAGHDAD 00000401 002 OF 002 machine and well-known leadership had failed to deliver a victory. ¶6. (C) In a separate meeting, Mahdi advisor Raja al-Khalili also complained of election irregularities caused by Da'wa's control of the Education and Trade Ministries and the "illegal" tribal support councils that, Khalili estimates, contributed to Maliki's win. Khalili told Poloff that ISCI received fewer votes in some areas than it had members, concluding irregularities must have occurred. At the same time, Khalili acknowledged these probably played a minor role. He conceded ISCI suffered from a backlash against provincial government incumbents and against parties viewed as too religious. Raja said the Iraqi people had exhausted much of their post-Saddam religious fervor, therefore ISCI's overtly religious "Shahid al-Mihrab" (Martyrs of the Pulpit) coalition turned away votes. -------------- Comment: ISCI Left with Green Zone Politics -------------- ¶7. (C) ISCI's loss of provincial governments and related patronage networks is the latest in a series of strategic setbacks: it has lost the implicit backing of Iraq's Shia clerical establishment it enjoyed in 2005 because of the current reluctance of the clerics to pick electoral winners; its former militia, the Badr Corps, has folded itself into the Iraqi Security Forces and has seen its influence among the officer corps diluted as the ISF grew under Maliki's watch; and ISCI's relationship with Iran has increasingly become a burden as the Iraqi people's attitude toward the Iranian government has soured. ¶8. (C) ISCI's main remaining asset is its strong position in parliament and its national-level alliance with the Kurds, the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),and Qasim Daoud's Shia Solidarity Party. This grouping -- based on a common desire to constrain Maliki and promote federalism -- can control about 125 seats in parliament (of 275) or more if Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National List joins, as some Iraqi officials now speculate it will. Time is short, however, for ISCI to translate Green Zone politics into success in national elections planned for late this year or early next. ¶9. (C) To regain Shia votes, ISCI will have to prevent its valuable alliance with the Kurds (and lingering ties to Iran) from turning away nationalist Arabs, a constituency Maliki has been able to gain. For example, VP Mahdi, Azawi and Husseini all told Poloffs that ISCI will continue to push for federalism (valuable to the Kurds),even though Maliki and other nationalists argue Iraq needs a strong center. ¶10. (C) ISCI will also have to decide whether to accept a diminished role in a revised Unified Iraqi Alliance (UIA). Now that Maliki is stronger in the provinces, VP Mahdi told the Ambassador, the PM might try to exert excessive influence over the UIA. Khalili, the Mahdi advisor, told Poloff that ISCI cares most about national politics, not the outcome of provincial elections. He argued that even if Maliki repeats his success in national elections, he still will lack a majority in parliament to become prime minister. ISCI might then position itself as a cross-sectarian bridge and hope a Kurd-Sunni-Shia alliance will select the next head of government. Doing this while being part of a Maliki-led UIA and maintaining its base of devote Shia will be a difficult balancing act. End Comment. BUTENIS