DHI QAR: APPOINTMENT OF POLICE CHIEF RAISES LEGAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000344 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ SUBJECT: DHI QAR: APPOINTMENT OF POLICE CHIEF RAISES LEGAL ISSUES AND DA'WA-ISCI TENSIONS REF: A. BAGHDAD 301 ¶B. BAGHDAD 192 Classified By: Acting POLITICAL Counselor John Fox for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. At a recent meeting with PRT Team Leader, Dhi Qar Provincial Police Commander MG Sabah al-Fatlawi stated that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki had abandoned previous plans to transfer Sabah to Baghdad, and instead had appointed him permanently to his current position as Chief of Police. Since his temporary appointment in May 2008, Sabah has been an effective crime fighter in the province. However, he has also taken steps to consolidate control of the local Iraqi Police (IP) -- most notably the Tactical Support Units (TSU),which were formerly controlled by the ISCI-affiliated governor -- into the hands of the Da'wa party. His permanent appointment, undertaken quietly shortly before the provincial elections, mirrors steps taken in other provinces and raises troubling questions about how the Prime Minister and his allies apply the rule of law in the Iraqi Security Forces. End summary. Sabah Quietly Appointed -------------- ¶2. (C) In a January 25 meeting, MG Sabah told PRT Team Leader that the Prime Minister had issued an order earlier in the month to install him as permanent Provincial Chief of Police in Dhi Qar. MG Sabah was initially appointed for a three-month period to fill a vacancy left when the previous police chief resigned, allegedly under pressure from Governor Aziz Kadhum Alwan (ISCI). This period was extended for an additional three months as the Provincial Council (PC) deliberated on a permanent appointment and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) reportedly rejected several of their nominees. Over ISCI Objections -------------- ¶3. (C) Sabah's appointment was vigorously resisted by Governor Aziz, who hoped to replace the previous police chief with an ISCI man. When Sabah first arrived, with his substantial bodyguard in tow, the governor ordered the previous TSU commander to surround the Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) and prevent Sabah from entering and taking up his office. A tense standoff ensued, as Sabah spent several days at the Iraqi Army 10th Division headquarters before the TSU stood down on May 30. ISCI continued its efforts to remove Sabah. On different occasions, Sabah has told the PRT that he had been offered the position of police chief of Baghdad by ISCI leader Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim as an inducement to allow smuggled militants and weapons from Iran to transit through Dhi Qar, and that the Prime Minister was also considering sending him to Baghdad to fill the same position. ¶4. (C) The rift between Sabah and the Governor continued throughout the last several months. At a PRT function, Sabah speculated that the Governor would be voted out of office, and he was quite confident that, once that happened, people would feel safe enough to come forward with evidence that would lead to the Governor's indictment, arrest and trial for numerous crimes. (Note: the first part of his prediction appears to have come true, since the ISCI-backed list placed third in the elections, well behind both the Prime Minister's State of Law list and the Sadrists. End note.) Sabah provided no specifics about potential crimes but he expressed his opinion that the victims currently feel too intimidated to make allegations against the Governor. There have been several attempts on Sabah's life in the past six months, all of which he blames on the Governor and ISCI's Badr militia. Changes in Dhi Qar -------------- Q ¶5. (C) Since his arrival, MG Sabah has surrounded himself with trusted officers that he brought with him from Hillah. These include COL Bakri, whom he placed in charge of police intelligence; MAJ Khalid, Sabah's right-hand man who commands the fearsome TSU, also known as the 5th Emergency Response Battalion, and who has recently been given command of the Dhi Qar I-SWAT team as well; and LTC Falah, who replaced COL Abd-al-Rahim as the officer in charge of the Dhi Qar Provincial Joint Coordination Center. Sabah claims that this has helped him instill more discipline in the police. (Comment: His assertion is not without merit: the improved performance of the Dhi Qar IP over the last several months is quite visible. End comment.) ¶6. (C) Shortly after his arrival, Sabah transferred TSU from provincial control to his own (under MoI),further inflaming BAGHDAD 00000344 002 OF 002 his relationship with the Governor and his party. In addition, Sabah maintains ties with the Dhi Qar tribal Support Councils, which are linked to the Prime Minister's Office, and he has asked the Brigade Combat Team and International Police Advisers to focus their training and mentoring efforts on MAJ Khalid's TSU and on the I-SWAT team, who double as Sabah's personal bodyguard. Many members of the I-SWAT team came from Hillah with Sabah, and are often seen wearing the scorpion badge, which was previously not seen among Dhi Qar's police. Legality of the Appointment -------------- ¶7. (C) MG Sabah's recent announcement that he has been "permanently" appointed to his position by the Prime Minister is troubling since such an appointment would violate Iraqi law. Under CPA Order 71 (the governing law for any such appointment prior to the provincial elections and the seating of the new Provincial Councils),MoI must advertise the vacancy nationally and review applications to determine which candidates are "fully qualified"; the names of such candidates are then sent to the PC, which selects the chief by a majority vote. The new provincial police chief is then appointed to a three-year term. In this case, it appears that the PC was not consulted at all, let alone given the chance to vote on Sabah's appointment. ¶8. (C) The Provincial Powers Law, however, will empower the new PC to remove the police chief by a majority vote at the request of the Governor or the PC. Therefore, Sabah's appointment might not be permanent at all; the new Governor and PC could dismiss him, although the new provincial government will have a strong Da'wa presence and is unlikely to use that authority. Any replacement would be appointed by MoI from a list of nominees submitted by the PC, not directly appointed by the Prime Minister. This would severely limit the Ministry's ability to replace him without the approval of the provincial government. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Sabah has been an excellent resource to the PRT and continues to provide IP escorts for all our moves in Nasiriyah. In the next couple of months, we may see another power play as the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) is officially mandated by MoI to secure the Ancient City of Ur when it is turned over to Iraqi control by Coalition Forces. Our understanding is that the FPS reports directly to the MoI in Baghdad, but it will be interesting to see how Sabah perceives this and whether or not he will assume more direct involvement in securing the site, which includes the Ziggurat and two State Board of Antiquities and Heritage buildings renovated with CERP funds. Since its inception, the FPS has a long history of corruption, sectarianism, and overall incompetence. End comment. CROCKER