IRAQI PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: IRANIAN LOSS

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000342 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KDEM IR IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: IRANIAN LOSS REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 306 ¶B. B. BAGHDAD 274 Classified By: Political-Military Minister Counselor Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b-d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Despite pre-election concerns about Iranian-sponsored violence and fraud in the January 31 provincial elections, observers found no indication of significant Iranian interference on election day. The first-place showing of PM Maliki's State of Law list in most of southern Iraq, and Baghdad came mostly at the expense of the Tehran-groomed Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ref A). Iranian Consul in Basra Naseer Baghban tried to put a good face on it, telling the British that he was pleased with the results because coordination between Basra and Baghdad would improve. But the media outcry resulting from Baghban,s attempts to enter polling stations without observer credentials was indicative of continuing popular suspicions of Iran. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) In the weeks leading up to Iraq,s provincial elections on January 31, reports, rumors, and speculation were rife about Iranian attempts to produce fake ballots, smuggle fake ballot boxes into Iraq, infiltrate voters with false identifications over the border, and sponsor political assassinations and other violence to skew the election results. According to sensitive reports, candidates whispered that their opponents were taking Iranian bribes (and some apparently were) while accusations of American ties were not prevalent. Some voters and candidates have complained about isolated cases of fraud and disenfranchisement; these complaints are being investigated by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). Yet IHEC and international observers, including a robust poll-watching contingent from Embassy Baghdad and the PRTs, have found no reason to call the results into question (ref B). Some illustrative anecdotes: ¶3. (S/NF) In one example of suspected fraud in Najaf, MNF-I units assisting with election security said they were monitoring a white Mercedes semi-truck reportedly filled with fraudulent ballot boxes full of ISCI votes. The alleged plan was to exchange the truck with fraudulent ballots for a truck with real ballots after the election. The report was similar to others from Basra and elsewhere in southern Iraq in the days before the election, but we have no indication that such swaps took place. If they had, we believe IHEC procedures would probably have detected the fraud. ¶4. (C) Similarly, border officials at the Iraq-Iran Port of Entry (POE) at Shalamsha told a visiting USG delegation on February 2 that they had been instructed by Baghdad to keep an eye out for fake ballots and Iranians carrying false Iraqi identification coming over the border in the weeks before the election. The border officials reported that none were found. ¶5. (S/NF) In Basra, when Iranian Consul Naseer Baghban attempted to observe the elections and enter polling stations on election day without having first obtained IHEC credentials (a requirement USG and other international observers respected),media and Iraqi politicians criticized him sharply for interfering in Iraqi affairs. Bagban later claimed to a British official that he was pleased with the outcome of the elections because coordination between Basra and Baghdad would improve, and in fact the election will result in the ouster of anti-Iranian Basra governor Waeli. ¶6. (C) Comment: Despite much speculation about the damage Iranians would do to Iraq,s Provincial Elections, the concerns appear to be unfounded. The poor ISCI showing in Basra and elsewhere is a clear setback for Iran. Some politicians beholden to Iran will no doubt assume new provincial council seats, and the Iranians will doubtless attempt to sink their hooks into council newcomers and nonaligned. But the national results - and the proliferation of fraud reports with an anti-Iranian tinge - were more indicative of popular suspicions of Iran than of successful Iranian attempts to affect the outcome. It is also notable that for candidates, a perception of being close to Iran appeared to be more of a political liability than a perception of being close to the United States. CROCKER