CHURNING IN NORTH BAGHDAD'S SUBURBAN GOVERNMENTS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003374

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR IZ
SUBJECT: CHURNING IN NORTH BAGHDAD'S SUBURBAN GOVERNMENTS


1. (U) This is a Baghdad ePRT North message.


2. (U) Summary: Sub-provincial public managers and councils
in North Baghdad's districts (qadas) of Tarmiyah, Taji, and
Istiqlal, with a combined population of roughly 1.2 million,
are unsure of their roles vis-a-vis the provincial and
national governments under the Provincial Powers Law (PPL),
yet are asserting themselves in ways that will influence
future relationships. Institutions and processes are
developing rapidly. The local district manager (qa'im makam)
now faces challenges from citizens as well as top-down
accountability, and must work closely with national ministry
officials assigned to the province or district. The
prospective effect is uncertain, with contradictory
tendencies toward and away from democracy. The functioning
of local government has improved, but corruption still
exists. End Summary.


3. (U) Prior to 2003, officials at all levels of Iraqi
government were highly dependent on the national government
for policy direction, funding, and implementing rules and
regulations. In North Baghdad's suburban districts (qadas),
as elsewhere outside of large urban areas, the district
manager or qa'im makam (an office that has existed since
Ottoman rule in Iraq) was the local executor of policies and
procedures handed down from the power centers in the
provincial and national capitals. The qa'im makam was
questioned from above, but seldom from below, and citizen
input was discouraged.

DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS AND CITIZENS ASSERTING NEEDS
-------------- --------------


4. (U) Baghdad ePRT North has witnessed residents publicly
questioning local administrators and politicians, council
members questioning council chairs and qada managers, and
local officials questioning provincial officials on a regular
basis. The Abayachi local (nahiya) council chairperson,
Layth Ahmed Al-Faraji, told PRToffs that the council sent a
letter to the Governor of Baghdad asking him to replace
Mohammed Jassim, the qa'im makam of Tarmiyah. (Note:
Nahiya-level officials typically do not have clear political
affiliations, though Layth is a former Ba'athist. End note.)
This council believes the qa'im makam is not doing his job
because he is not able to compel ministerial representatives
to attend the nahiya council meetings, as has been openly
discussed at several nahiya council meetings. At numerous
meetings of the Tarmiyah Qada Council, council members have
directly accused the qa'im makam of corruption and so he
stopped attending the majority of these meetings. In
particular they have stated repeatedly that he is renting out
properties that are supposed to be used for public purposes
and keeping the money for himself. The Taji Qada Council
voted unanimously to change its chairperson because they felt
he was not strong enough at advocating their interests at the
provincial and national levels. Such expressions of
discontent with the actions of governmental officials and
institutions are clearly stronger than in many decades.


5. (SBU) The perceived power of chairing the local councils
is high, partly because of their ability to abuse power. In
Tarmiyah, Sheikh Sa'ed Jassim (another former Ba'athist),who
was the council chairman, briefly chose to forfeit a
lucrative GOI retirement package in order to continue to hold
his position as chairman. This "strong man" leader, overtly
threatened individuals, groups, and potential challengers,
and stated that he could run qada security without the Iraqi
Army or U.S. forces. Other people were allowed to speak at
council meetings, but observers noted that he made the
Qcouncil meetings, but observers noted that he made the
decisions even in the face of strongly worded opposing views.
Nevertheless, more openness appears to exist than prior to
the PPL because people could call Jassim corrupt and question
the lack of progress in essential services at public council
meetings. Despite a steady decline in his legitimacy among
local residents, Jassim ran uncontested and was re-elected by
a unanimous vote of the qada council members. The sheikh's
forceful performance at the meeting in which the election was
held, and the Baghdad Provincial Council's unwillingness to
enforce its rules prohibiting retirees from holding public
positions, convinced qada council members that opposition was
futile. Several months after Jassim's re-election, he
stepped down and Qasim Khalifa was elected chairman by a
split vote. Qasim is showing signs of being much like his
predecessor.

LOCAL ELECTIONS DELAYED TO FALL 2010
--------------


6. (U) Sub-provincial elections appear to have been delayed
until at least fall 2010, pending a national census and
clarification of local jurisdictional boundaries. Meanwhile
Iraq's constitutional commitment to decentralize and

BAGHDAD 00003374 002 OF 003


subsequent statutory enactments, including the Law of
Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region (No. 21 of 2008)
and Article 18 from the 2009 Budget Law, have the potential
to turn local governments into significant actors. The qa'im
makams and local directors (mudeers),though not appointed by
the local councils, must now work closely with these councils
because Section Two of the PPL provides the councils with an
oversight role. In particular qada councils are given power
with regard to roads, educational activities, local budgets,
utilization of public lands, and other functions typical of
local governing bodies in other parts of the world but
atypical of the history of Iraq. The qada councils are also
directed by the PPL to work with nahiya councils to "ensure
the welfare of the community." Only time will tell how
deeply these authorities develop, but it is already clear
that institutions at the sub-provincial level are eager to
test their new authorities. If local elections take place
this process might accelerate and a greater sense of local
democracy could emerge.


7. (U) What used to be a rigidly centralized ministerial
system now charges the qa'im makams with overseeing
ministerial officials, thus ensuring coordination at the
local level. Specifically, the manager of each municipality
for the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MMPW)
must now work in tandem with the mudeer and qa'im makam
before moving significant project ideas forward through
ministerial channels. The system is truly both nonlinear
and hierarchical in the way it is designed and the way it
appears to be functioning right now. Last summer, PRT noted
that the MMPW manager for Tarmiyah loaned equipment to the
MMPW manager in Sab al Bour for an intensive community trash
cleanup project. This local-local reciprocity within MMPW
might seem natural, but it is not inherent to the Iraqi
system and occurred in part because of pressure from
sub-provincial officials to "get the job done."


8. (U) The local administrators (i.e., governor, qa'im
makam, mudeer) are explicitly made the "highest executive
employees in their respective administrative units" in the
PPL, with the governor being equivalent to a "deputy minister
as regards rights and service." However, they do not control
the central ministries -- only 9 percent of the 2009
Government of Iraq budget is dedicated to non-KRG
sub-national units of government. Article 18 of the 2009
Budget Act may eventually change this dynamic as it states
that "...the Council of Ministers shall prepare a draft law
to amend the Iraqi ministries law, indicating disassociation
of the local departments in the governorates from federal
ministries and financially and administratively join them to
the governorates. This shall come into effect from 2010."
In other words, the next two to five years might see the
delivery of local services transferred from national to
provincial institutions if the Council of Representatives
follows through on Article 18, although significant federal
control could still exist with regard to policies and
budgets. The draft 2010 budget shows this process is
beginning as Social Protection Network (SPN) funding from the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) is being moved
into the provincial budgets.


9. (U) The provincial councils, upon proposal from the
governor, determine the administrative boundaries of any
subunits with the governorate (i.e., qadas, nahiyas,
villages, districts, etc.). This is specific to "merger,
creation, and renaming" and the "consequential administrative
Qcreation, and renaming" and the "consequential administrative
formations" within the boundaries of the governorate. The
ability to eliminate subunits is implied but not specifically
stated; however, these actions all would have required
central action prior to the implementation of the PPL, and
therefore represent an explicit shift in authority in the
direction of a more decentralized decision making structure.
Istiqlal was formally established as a qada by the Baghdad
provincial council on June 23 and the council reaffirmed
Taji's qada status on July 14.


10. (SBU) While the changes outlined above are significant,
one should note that old attitudes could still cause this
decentralization to backslide because some die hard central
planners are still in powerful positions. Kassim Enaia,
Director General of the Investment Budget in the Ministry of
Planning, stated that "we determine the growth percentage in
the national economy and then decide how each sector should
grow, such as agriculture, education, and so on." When asked
by Baghdad ePRT North about the apparent conflict between the
PPL and his view of centralized planning, Enaia said that the
provinces need to identify projects of local significance
that fit the national investment plans and that they should
not think too big. When asked if the provinces should
generate their own revenues he stated, "No. We provide their
funds and they don't have the experience or management
ability to handle this."

BAGHDAD 00003374 003 OF 003




11. (U) Comment. As federal, provincial and local
governments define the boundaries of their respective spheres
of power and authority under the PPL, USG efforts should be
focused on building the capacity of sub-provincial public
officials to operate in a transparent and accountable manner
within whatever system ultimately emerges as Iraqis implement
the PPL. PRTs and ePRTs would be well advised to continue
supporting efforts that link officials at the local-local,
local-provincial, and local-national levels, yet to avoid
using the language of decentralization. The language of
enhancing and supporting vertical and horizontal linkages
would be most effective. End comment.
FORD