CHURNING IN NORTH BAGHDAD'S SUBURBAN GOVERNMENTS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003374 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR IZ SUBJECT: CHURNING IN NORTH BAGHDAD'S SUBURBAN GOVERNMENTS ¶1. (U) This is a Baghdad ePRT North message. ¶2. (U) Summary: Sub-provincial public managers and councils in North Baghdad's districts (qadas) of Tarmiyah, Taji, and Istiqlal, with a combined population of roughly 1.2 million, are unsure of their roles vis-a-vis the provincial and national governments under the Provincial Powers Law (PPL), yet are asserting themselves in ways that will influence future relationships. Institutions and processes are developing rapidly. The local district manager (qa'im makam) now faces challenges from citizens as well as top-down accountability, and must work closely with national ministry officials assigned to the province or district. The prospective effect is uncertain, with contradictory tendencies toward and away from democracy. The functioning of local government has improved, but corruption still exists. End Summary. ¶3. (U) Prior to 2003, officials at all levels of Iraqi government were highly dependent on the national government for policy direction, funding, and implementing rules and regulations. In North Baghdad's suburban districts (qadas), as elsewhere outside of large urban areas, the district manager or qa'im makam (an office that has existed since Ottoman rule in Iraq) was the local executor of policies and procedures handed down from the power centers in the provincial and national capitals. The qa'im makam was questioned from above, but seldom from below, and citizen input was discouraged. DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS AND CITIZENS ASSERTING NEEDS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (U) Baghdad ePRT North has witnessed residents publicly questioning local administrators and politicians, council members questioning council chairs and qada managers, and local officials questioning provincial officials on a regular basis. The Abayachi local (nahiya) council chairperson, Layth Ahmed Al-Faraji, told PRToffs that the council sent a letter to the Governor of Baghdad asking him to replace Mohammed Jassim, the qa'im makam of Tarmiyah. (Note: Nahiya-level officials typically do not have clear political affiliations, though Layth is a former Ba'athist. End note.) This council believes the qa'im makam is not doing his job because he is not able to compel ministerial representatives to attend the nahiya council meetings, as has been openly discussed at several nahiya council meetings. At numerous 
meetings of the Tarmiyah Qada Council, council members have directly accused the qa'im makam of corruption and so he stopped attending the majority of these meetings. In particular they have stated repeatedly that he is renting out properties that are supposed to be used for public purposes and keeping the money for himself. The Taji Qada Council voted unanimously to change its chairperson because they felt he was not strong enough at advocating their interests at the provincial and national levels. Such expressions of discontent with the actions of governmental officials and institutions are clearly stronger than in many decades. ¶5. (SBU) The perceived power of chairing the local councils is high, partly because of their ability to abuse power. In Tarmiyah, Sheikh Sa'ed Jassim (another former Ba'athist),who was the council chairman, briefly chose to forfeit a lucrative GOI retirement package in order to continue to hold his position as chairman. This "strong man" leader, overtly threatened individuals, groups, and potential challengers, and stated that he could run qada security without the Iraqi Army or U.S. forces. Other people were allowed to speak at council meetings, but observers noted that he made the Qcouncil meetings, but observers noted that he made the decisions even in the face of strongly worded opposing views. Nevertheless, more openness appears to exist than prior to the PPL because people could call Jassim corrupt and question the lack of progress in essential services at public council meetings. Despite a steady decline in his legitimacy among local residents, Jassim ran uncontested and was re-elected by a unanimous vote of the qada council members. The sheikh's forceful performance at the meeting in which the election was held, and the Baghdad Provincial Council's unwillingness to enforce its rules prohibiting retirees from holding public positions, convinced qada council members that opposition was futile. Several months after Jassim's re-election, he stepped down and Qasim Khalifa was elected chairman by a split vote. Qasim is showing signs of being much like his predecessor. LOCAL ELECTIONS DELAYED TO FALL 2010 -------------- ¶6. (U) Sub-provincial elections appear to have been delayed until at least fall 2010, pending a national census and clarification of local jurisdictional boundaries. Meanwhile Iraq's constitutional commitment to decentralize and BAGHDAD 00003374 002 OF 003 subsequent statutory enactments, including the Law of Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region (No. 21 of 2008) and Article 18 from the 2009 Budget Law, have the potential to turn local governments into significant actors. The qa'im makams and local directors (mudeers),though not appointed by the local councils, must now work closely with these councils because Section Two of the PPL provides the councils with an oversight role. In particular qada councils are given power with regard to roads, educational activities, local budgets, utilization of public lands, and other functions typical of local governing bodies in other parts of the world but atypical of the history of Iraq. The qada councils are also directed by the PPL to work with nahiya councils to "ensure the welfare of the community." Only time will tell how deeply these authorities develop, but it is already clear that institutions at the sub-provincial level are eager to test their new authorities. If local elections take place this process might accelerate and a greater sense of local democracy could emerge. ¶7. (U) What used to be a rigidly centralized ministerial system now charges the qa'im makams with overseeing ministerial officials, thus ensuring coordination at the local level. Specifically, the manager of each municipality for the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MMPW) must now work in tandem with the mudeer and qa'im makam before moving significant project ideas forward through ministerial channels. The system is truly both nonlinear and hierarchical in the way it is designed and the way it appears to be functioning right now. Last summer, PRT noted that the MMPW manager for Tarmiyah loaned equipment to the MMPW manager in Sab al Bour for an intensive community trash cleanup project. This local-local reciprocity within MMPW might seem natural, but it is not inherent to the Iraqi system and occurred in part because of pressure from sub-provincial officials to "get the job done." ¶8. (U) The local administrators (i.e., governor, qa'im makam, mudeer) are explicitly made the "highest executive employees in their respective administrative units" in the PPL, with the governor being equivalent to a "deputy minister as regards rights and service." However, they do not control the central ministries -- only 9 percent of the 2009 Government of Iraq budget is dedicated to non-KRG sub-national units of government. Article 18 of the 2009 Budget Act may eventually change this dynamic as it states that "...the Council of Ministers shall prepare a draft law to amend the Iraqi ministries law, indicating disassociation of the local departments in the governorates from federal ministries and financially and administratively join them to the governorates. This shall come into effect from 2010." In other words, the next two to five years might see the delivery of local services transferred from national to provincial institutions if the Council of Representatives follows through on Article 18, although significant federal control could still exist with regard to policies and budgets. The draft 2010 budget shows this process is beginning as Social Protection Network (SPN) funding from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) is being moved into the provincial budgets. ¶9. (U) The provincial councils, upon proposal from the governor, determine the administrative boundaries of any subunits with the governorate (i.e., qadas, nahiyas, villages, districts, etc.). This is specific to "merger, creation, and renaming" and the "consequential administrative Qcreation, and renaming" and the "consequential administrative formations" within the boundaries of the governorate. The ability to eliminate subunits is implied but not specifically stated; however, these actions all would have required central action prior to the implementation of the PPL, and therefore represent an explicit shift in authority in the direction of a more decentralized decision making structure. Istiqlal was formally established as a qada by the Baghdad provincial council on June 23 and the council reaffirmed Taji's qada status on July 14. ¶10. (SBU) While the changes outlined above are significant, one should note that old attitudes could still cause this decentralization to backslide because some die hard central planners are still in powerful positions. Kassim Enaia, Director General of the Investment Budget in the Ministry of Planning, stated that "we determine the growth percentage in the national economy and then decide how each sector should grow, such as agriculture, education, and so on." When asked by Baghdad ePRT North about the apparent conflict between the PPL and his view of centralized planning, Enaia said that the provinces need to identify projects of local significance that fit the national investment plans and that they should not think too big. When asked if the provinces should generate their own revenues he stated, "No. We provide their funds and they don't have the experience or management ability to handle this." BAGHDAD 00003374 003 OF 003 ¶11. (U) Comment. As federal, provincial and local governments define the boundaries of their respective spheres of power and authority under the PPL, USG efforts should be focused on building the capacity of sub-provincial public officials to operate in a transparent and accountable manner within whatever system ultimately emerges as Iraqis implement the PPL. PRTs and ePRTs would be well advised to continue supporting efforts that link officials at the local-local, local-provincial, and local-national levels, yet to avoid using the language of decentralization. The language of enhancing and supporting vertical and horizontal linkages would be most effective. End comment. FORD