NSC ADVISOR ON ELECTIONS, FAKKA OIL WELL DISPUTE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003372

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: NSC ADVISOR ON ELECTIONS, FAKKA OIL WELL DISPUTE,
AND RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Iraqi NSC Advisor Dr. Safa al-Sheikh told
A/DCM December 29 that the post-election period will be a
difficult, challenging period, in terms of formation of the
new government and caretaker government performance, which
could impact Iraqi security capability and decision-making.
He described the Iranian foray at Fakka oil well as a serious
miscalculation which had put "Iran's friends" in Iraq in a
very difficult position. Regarding relations with
neighboring countries, al-Sheikh singled out SAUDI ARABIA as
particularly important for Iraq's future in the region. He
noted that the GOI has tried to make "informal contacts" to
improve the bilateral relationship but indicated that the
efforts had not succeeded. He surmised that there would not
be an opportunity to improve relations until after the
elections and the formation of a new government. Regarding
the maritime boundary with Kuwait, al-Sheikh noted that many
Iraqis -- particularly those from Basra -- resented it,
especially because of the common view in Iraq that the
waterway is vital for Iraq but not used or needed by the
Kuwaitis. Al-Sheikh highlighted senior working level contact
in the past between the two sides -- involving navy
commanders -- over access issues on the Khor Abdullah,
describing the meetings as important for helping the two
sides sort out their interests and redlines. End SUMMARY.


2. (C) Acting Iraqi NSC advisor Dr. Safa al-Sheikh told
A/DCM December 29 that the recently passed election law was a
landmark event. In his view, especially because of the open
list provision, it will encourage higher voter turnout. He
described the current Iraqi election process as headed in the
right direction, despite the "silly season" soon to become
evident with the opening of the campaign period (January 5).
Al-Sheikh felt that security incidents will have some impact
on elections but will not be decisive.


3. (C) Al-Sheikh said that the post-election period will be
a difficult, challenging period, both in terms of formation
of the new government and the caretaker government's
performance, which could impact Iraqi security capability and
decision-making.. He underscored that there were now a
greater number of competitive political blocs, which will
make it more difficult to obtain consensus. Al-Sheikh
predicted June as the earliest month for the new GOI to be
seated. Taking into account the time required to get new
ministers settled in, one could assume a year "of slow
progress." New government formation has already begun
between various political factions, according to al-Sheikh.


4. (C) Al-Sheikh offered several theories about Iranian
motivations for what he described as a provocation on the
border, while cautioning that he was uncertain about the
Iranian government's ultimate motives. Possible explanations
included deflecting attention from internal dissent in Iran
and "making a statement" about Iran's continuing ability to
have influence in Iraq (including playing a disruptive role),
in the wake of Iraq's successful second round of oil bids,
which did not include Iran. He described the Iranian foray
as a serious miscalculation which had put "Iran's friends" in
Iraq in a very difficult position. In his view the current
Iraqi course of action -- balanced, deliberate, and
non-inflammatory -- was the correct one.


5. (C) Regarding relations with neighboring countries,
al-Sheikh singled out SAUDI ARABIA as particularly important
for Iraq's future in the region. He noted that the GOI has
Qfor Iraq's future in the region. He noted that the GOI has
tried to make "informal contacts" to improve the bilateral
relationship but indicated that the efforts had not
succeeded. He surmised that there would not be an
opportunity to improve relations until after the elections
and the formation of a new government. At that time,
however, he thought the Saudis would make a move to mend
fences, even if Maliki wins the PM job again, since they
would view the post-election situation as a firmly
established reality they need to come to terms with.
Al-Sheikh said he sensed in the SAUDI attitude jealousy about
Iraq's future regional role, given SAUDI competition with
Iran for regional influence, and SAUDI sensitivities about
Sunni-Shia faultlines.


6. (C) Al-Sheikh elaborated at length about challenges posed
by the Kuwait-related Chapter VII resolutions. Regarding the
maritime boundary, al-Sheikh asserted that the UN Boundary
Commission in the early 1990's had divided the Khor Abdullah
between the two countries but had given Iraq "the shallow
water." which many Iraqi's resented, especially because of
the common view in Iraq that the waterway is vital for Iraq
but not used or needed by the Kuwaitis. At another point in
the conversation, the NSC Advisor underlined that "people in
Basra" don't like UNSCR 833 at all, but refused to be drawn
out further on whether particular political parties or

ethnosectarian groups (in particular the Shia, largely based
in the south) had more pronounced feelings on this issue.
Al-Sheikh urged the U.S to offer advice to the GOI on how
other countries had resolved such issues. He also expressed
concern about the crucial politicizing role that Kuwait's
influential and vocal Parliament could play in blocking
progress on this and other Kuwait-related resolutions.
Kuwait's important relation with the U.S. could also have a
moderating impact on the GOK position, al-Sheikh noted. When
urged by A/DCM to support GOI re-affirmation of 833,
al-Sheikh questioned whether such a statement had any
significance, in a legal sense, since the GOI had long since
accepted the resolution. A/DCM noted that it was important
for a post-Saddam government make that affirmation.
Al-Sheikh underscored the claim made to us by other Iraqi
officials, including PM Maliki, that this issue will have to
await the next Iraqi government.



7. (C) Al-Sheikh highlighted senior working level contact
between the two sides -- involving navy commanders -- over
access issues on the Khor Abdullah, describing the meetings
as important for helping the two sides sort out their
interests and redlines. Such "technical level" contact, to
solve periodic access problems, indirectly contributed to
finding a broader solution, said al-Sheikh, since it helped
the two sides broaden their perspectives and see the other's
side of the issue. (NOTE: Al-Sheikh did not clarify if such
meetings were still being held. END NOTE.) One of the
issues the two sides had discussed was the raising of flags.
The Kuwaitis "had been tough" on the issue, insisting that
Iraqi ships fly the Kuwait flag when in Kuwaiti waters, or,
in the face of Iraqi objections, no flag. A/DCM and
Al-Sheikh concurred that such change-of-flag procedures were
not required by international law and waterway convention.
He also noted that a draft UNSCR he had seen mentioned
forming a more formal joint commission to examine these sorts
of access issues. Al-Sheikh questioned whether UNSCR 833
stated explicitly that any Iraqi vessel has right of access
through the deep-water channel of Khor Abdullah waterway
(much of which winds through Kuwaiti territorial waters).
A/DCM answered in the affirmative.


FORD