FOLLOW UP ON THE WMD DEMARCHE AT MFA, BORDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003367 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP ON THE WMD DEMARCHE AT MFA, BORDER DISPUTE WITH IRAN REF: A. STATE 130342 ¶B. BAGHDAD 3320 ¶C. BAGHDAD 3343 Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Senior MFA officials December 29 responded positively to follow-up on the WMD points contained in ref A. They seemed initially to favor the second option presented, pursuing a Security Council resolution that would automatically terminate Chapter VII WMD restrictions under UNSCRs 687 and 707 once the IAEA determines that Iraq is implementing the measures required and is fully cooperating with the IAEA, but the MFA officials did not commit, promising an answer in the coming days. Regarding the border dispute with Iran, they said the two sides had agreed to begin work "next month" on a joint technical committee focused on border demarcation and noted that long-delayed GOI financing for this effort had finally been unblocked after FM Zebari's December 23 appearance before the Council of Representatives. They also expected the assignment of some 100 new Iraqi ambassadors, charges, and consuls general in the coming three months. END SUMMARY. MFA POSITIVE ABOUT POSSIBLE OPTIONS AT UNSC ON WMD -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Dep Pol/C followed up with Deputy Foreign Minister for Multilateral Relations Mohammed al-Haj Hamoud December 29 on the WMD points contained in Ref A. Also present was Ambassador Mohammed al-Hamameidi, MFA Chief for International Organizations. Haj Hamoud welcomed the follow-up and the two committed to getting back to the Embassy within days with an answer on the GOI's preferred option. They seemed to favor option two, prompting Dep Pol/C to reiterate his caution that the Presidential Statement would likely pose fewer delays and less resistance from the Council. WANTING TO BE SURE COUNCIL AND KUWAITIS ON BOARD -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Haj Hamoud said the approach in ref A, focusing solely on getting the WMD Chapter VII restrictions lifted, partially reflected his view that the Kuwait-related issues needed to be isolated at present and dealt with after the Iraqi elections. He asked whether other issues, such as Oil-for-Food (OFF),should be included in the present approach. Hamameidi interjected that it was not necessary to raise OFF issues in the WMD approach since the recently pass UNSC resolution (1905) implied GOI action in resolving outstanding OFF contracts. Haj Hamoud questioned whether the Council and "the Kuwaitis" were amenable to dealing only with the WMD issue initially. Dep Pol/C reiterated the basic guidance in ref A, and underscored the Department's recommendation that a letter from the GOI to the President of the Council and the DG of the IAEA focused solely on WMD would be a feasible way to improve the prospects for Security Council action on this issue, without creating obstacles to raising other Chapter VII issues subsequently. Haj Hamoud expressed support for the time-frame laid out in ref A. REFERRING IRAQ-IRAN DISPUTE TO A TECHNICAL COMMITTEE -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Regarding the border dispute with Iran, Haj Hamoud said he believed the issue was on its way to resolution. He said the two sides had agreed to begin work "next month" on a joint technical committee focused on border demarcation. Referring to the financial obstacles for the GOI side, mentioned by the FM in ref C, Haj Hamoud mentioned that the Ministry of Finance had contacted the MFA the day before and informed them "the check for the half million dollars" was Qinformed them "the check for the half million dollars" was ready. Haj Hamoud reported that FM Zebari, in his appearance before the Council of Representatives December 23, had highlighted the Ministry of Finance's long-standing refusal to fund the work of the Iraqi side on the joint technical committee. Those comments had embarrassed the Minister of Finance and created the necessary pressure to force MinFin action. ¶5. (C) On a related note, Hamameidi interjected that the Iranians were still present in Iraqi territory, so the "problem still exists" in the short term. Haj Hamoud added, however, that once the border committee did its work and re-established the fixed border pillars properly, it would be clear that the Fakka oil well and the surrounding area in question are in Iraqi territory. Haj Hamoud dismissed reports of an arbitration commission to handle the current dispute, reiterating that there was only the technical committee. ¶6. (C) Haj Hamoud and Hamameidi offered several possible explanations for why the Iranians had chosen the present moment to create a border issue, including the following: -- express unhappiness with being left out of the recently completed second round of oil bids, which created a narrative that Iraq was beginning to demonstrate the financial and political strength to chart an independent regional course, without Iranian domination; -- weaken PM Maliki politically in the run-up to the elections, to express continued displeasure with his decision not to form a coalition with ISCI; and -- (repeating a theory that many Iraqis have trotted out) possibly "test the Americans." APPOINTING NEW IRAQI AMBASSADORS: A WORK IN PROGRESS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Touching briefly on the appointment of new Iraqi ambassadors to various capitals, Haj Hamoud said that the FM had been in a sustained "political dialogue" with the PM on this issue. He said that the FM had not submitted any "formal request" but that a list of candidates was under discussion. Haj Hamoud said that the formal request to the PM -- signifying that consensus between the FM and the PM had been reached -- should be submitted soon. Recently, the FM sent out letters to a significant number of currently assigned ambassadors, notifying them that they should expect their assignments to end in the next three months, with re-assignment to the MFA in Baghdad. Haj Hamoud said he expected the assignment of some 100 new ambassadors, charges, and consuls general in the coming months. He did not specify if an Iraqi ambassador to Kuwait would be included on the list. FORD