KRG SEEKS TO BALANCE RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND PKK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003364 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR PREF IZ TU SUBJECT: KRG SEEKS TO BALANCE RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND PKK REF: BAGHDAD 3221 Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In recent meetings in Erbil, KRG interlocutors told the Ambassador's Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq (SANI) that the Turkish constitutional court's recent decision to outlaw the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) in Turkey, together with the insistence by leaders of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) that they participate in negotiations with the Turkish government, were unhelpful. The PKK leaders' perspective was unhealthily narrow; they had pushed too hard in characterizing the return of Turkish Kurds from Makhmour refugee camp in Iraq as a victory, making the Erdogan government's task more difficult. The KRG's intelligence chief was clear in saying the KRG would not participate in military action against the PKK and did not believe a military solution to the problem was viable. He suggested the KRG would be reluctant to provide intelligence on the PKK to the Turkish government. The KRG thought it had made headway in convincing PKK leaders that political violence was not the right approach. However, recent developments suggested that influential elements in the Turkish and PKK camps wanted the conflict to continue. Concerned that efforts to promote improved KRG-Turkey relations have been threatened by recent events in Turkey, the KRG is struggling to maintain a delicate balance between its competing equities. END SUMMARY. DTP DECISION AND PKK STANCE ON NEGOTIATIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) SANI met with KRG Deputy Prime Minister Azad Barwari and Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP) Speaker Kamal Kirkuki on December 20, and with KRG Director of National Security (intelligence) Masrur Barzani on December 21. Barwari told SANI on December 20 that while relations with Turkey were "okay", the Turkish constitutional court's decision to outlaw the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) party in mid-December had been "ill-timed and unhelpful". (Note: As reported reftel, the fourth ministerial meeting of the Turkey-Iraqi-U.S. trilateral security dialogue took place in Baghdad on December 20, the day SANI met with Barwari, with a follow-on visit to Erbil by the Turkish and Iraqi delegations on December 21. End note.) Turkish PM Erdogan's government had been "close to solving the Kurdish problem" in Turkey, Barwari said. The Turkish constitutional court's decision on the DTP had disrupted that and complicated efforts to foster strong, productive Turkish-KRG relations. ¶3. (C) A further problem, Barwari said, was that the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) insisted on participating in negotiations with the Turkish government, an approach the latter had so far rejected. Stressing that there was no military solution to the PKK problem or the broader issue between Turkey's government and its Kurdish population, Barwari said that the PKK should accept a diplomatic solution, but would only do so if it were part of the negotiations. Including the PKK in such negotiations was politically difficult for Erdogan, who was already exposed to attacks that he had betrayed the ostensibly ethnically homogeneous Turkish state. Barwari offered that Turkey's Kurds "should not put too much pressure on Erdogan", saying QKurds "should not put too much pressure on Erdogan", saying they would ultimately help their own cause if they avoided pressuring him publicly. PKK LEADERS'S PERSPECTIVE UNHEALTHILY NARROW -------------- ¶4. (C) Responding to SANI's question as to whether PKK cadres in Iraq understood the benefits of a politically negotiated agreement with Turkey and the opportunities for economic development it could entail, Barwari flatly said they did not. PKK leaders are fighters who believe they've earned the right to participate in negotiations with Turkey's government; however, the GOT had rejected that and had not used the KRG as effectively as an intermediary with PKK leaders as it could have. In a separate meeting on December 21, KRG Director of National Security (intelligence) Masrur Barzani told SANI that " ... the more we (the KRG) talk with the Turks, the better". Noting that Turk-Kurd reconciliation in Turkey was not proceeding as smoothly as the KRG had hoped, Barzani expressed frustration that Turkish and Kurdish actors were "working day and night" to thwart such efforts. The PKK was only seeing the problem "through the lens of (PKK BAGHDAD 00003364 002 OF 002 leader) Ocalan's small prison cell". Its parochial approach to reconciliation had complicated PM Erdogan's already difficult task. KRG UNWILLING TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST PKK -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Both KRG DPM Barwari and IKP Speaker Kirkuki told SANI that the Turkish parliamentary delegation that recently visited Erbil had not/not raised specific complaints about PKK actions or the KRG's efforts to contain cross-border action by PKK forces (details on other aspects of the Kirkuki and Barwari meetings septel). Per reftel and Embassy Ankara reports, Post understands that Turkish domestic political exigencies (the PKK's December 7 attack and the Turkish constitutional court's decision to outlaw the DTP) compelled the Turkish delegation to the trilateral talks to press for meetings in Erbil to urge greater action by the KRG against the PKK. According to open sources, KRG President Barzani expressed support for the GOT's new National Unity Project initiative, designed in part to blunt the PKK's appeal. Privately, the Turkish delegation pressed KRG officials on what they were doing to generate actionable intelligence on PKK elements. ¶6. (C) Responding to SANI's question about Turkey's complaints that the KRG had not done enough to contain the PKK, intelligence director Barzani dismissed them as "nothing new". The KRG did what it could, but had been clear that it would not participate in military operations against the PKK. He suggested the KRG would also be reluctant to provide intelligence to facilitate Turkish operations. The KRG does not believe a military solution to the problem is tenable. Stressing that the KRG's leaders "know how hard it is to fight in the mountains of Kurdistan", Barzani asked how the KRG could reasonably be expected to contain the PKK when Turkey, with its vast military capabilities, had been unable to seal its border. Characterizing the PKK as "a Turkish problem that has come to the IKR", he underscored that the KRG could not intervene in a way that could be seen to interfere in Turkey's sovereign domestic affairs. RECENT EVENTS SUGGEST PKK AND SOME TURKS WANT MORE VIOLENCE -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Barzani said the KRG thought it had made headway in convincing PKK leaders that political violence was not the right approach; however, recent developments suggested that influential elements in the Turkish and PKK camps wanted the conflict to continue. The KRG could mediate and help, but could not become a party to the conflict. SANI asked whether Turkey had, in Barzani's estimation, made a mistake in how it received Turkish Kurds recently returned from Iraq's Makhmour refugee camp. Barzani said he thought Turkish forces had allowed too much latitude for demonstrations by Kurdish DTP and PKK elements, who unwisely sought to capitalize on the incident for short-term political gain. In trying to portray the return of the refugees as a victory for Kurds and a defeat for Turkey, they "went beyond the limit of celebrating" and destroyed the fragile trust that had developed between the two sides. Turkish hardliners accused the government of betraying Turkey's constitution and unity. Qthe government of betraying Turkey's constitution and unity. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Masrur Barzani was clear in saying the KRG would not participate in military operations against the Kurds, and would be reluctant to provide intelligence. Clearly concerned that efforts to promote improved KRG-Turkey relations have been threatened by recent events in Turkey, the KRG is likely to continue advising the PKK that violence is not a tenable solution and to maintain a delicate balance between its competing equities. FORD