DPM ISSAWI ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS, ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003363 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ IR SUBJECT: DPM ISSAWI ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS, ELECTIONS AND IRANIAN INFLUENCE Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: DPM Rafi al-Issawi told the POL M/C and MG Lanza the Iraqia Alliance (IA) of which he is a part, and which includes significant Shi'a (including Sadrist Trend) elements will be formally announced in early January. Negotiations over possible post-election government coalitions were already well underway; Issawi believed ISCI, which is "pragmatic and honors agreements", would be a better partner for the IA than Da'wa, which was dictatorial and capricious. Issawi said he and IA leader Iyad Allawi agreed that a strong possible government coalition would comprise the Kurdish Alliance List (KDP/PUK),ISCI and the IA. He predicted that Iranian interference would continue to negatively impact Iraq's security, but questions about the stability of the current regime in Tehran could undermine its political influence. Issawi said while the constitution was unclear, he doubted anyone would challenge the right of the PM and his government to continue exercising their authorities in the interval between elections and government formation. The U.S. could help with elections and government formation by: 1) helping ensure a strong international observer cohort; 2) encouraging IHEC to announce final election results as quickly as possible, and; 3) urging political actors to continue a consensus-based (vice majority-rule) approach to governance. Details on Issawi's mediation between the (Sunni) al-Hadba Gathering and (Kurdish) Ninewa Fraternal League in Ninewa are reported septel. END SUMMARY. IRAQIA ALLIANCE TO FORMALLY ANNOUNCE IN EARLY JANUARY -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting with POL M/C and USF-I CJ-9 Director MG Lanza on December 28, DPM Issawi discussed upcoming elections and the subsequent process of government formation. Issawi explained that the Iraqia Alliance (IA) of which his Future Gathering Party is a part is headed by (secular Shi'a) Iyad Allawi and (Sunni) Saleh al-Mutlaq. The IA intends to formally announce itself as a coalition on January 5 or 7 (January 6 is the anniversary of the founding of the Iraqi armed forces) and comprises about 20 parties, ten of which are Shi'a. Notably, Issawi said several of the Shi'a parties were affiliated with the (Shi'a) Sadrist Trend. Saleh al-Mutlaq (who co-leads the Iraqi National Movement, a constituent party of the IA) initially tried to centralize the IA's decision-making; however, Issawi said other prominent IA personalities had successfully advocated a more inclusive "team" approach. PLATFORM TO FOCUS ON SERVICES AND NATIONAL UNITY -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Asked what the IA's platform would be, Issawi said two key planks would be: 1) providing better basic services, and; 2) adopting a non-sectarian political approach rooted in national unity. Iraqis were tired of divisive sectarian politics; he instead argued for a "liberal, secular approach" focused on fostering Iraqis' national identity. He noted that Allawi's non-sectarian message had resonated with ordinary Iraqis and helped bolster Allawi's credibility and political popularity. On foreign policy, Issawi said the IA perceived a need for a more balanced approach to relations with Iraq's neighbors. Citing PM Maliki's repeated attacks on alleged Syrian interference in Iraqi affairs and apologies for Iran, he argued against "ideological selectivity" in Qfor Iran, he argued against "ideological selectivity" in Iraq's foreign policy and predicted a majority of Sunnis and Shi'a would endorse such an approach. KURD/ISCI/IRAQIA ALLIANCE POSSIBLE (IF IRAN PERMITS) -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Responding to POL M/C's question about the status of post-election government coalition negotiations, Issawi said they had started "very early" and were already well underway. Citing experience with the current legislative and executive branches, Issawi assessed that of the Shi'a groups, the IA was more likely to develop productive working relationships with ISCI than with Da'wa. ISCI had proven to be "highly pragmatic" and "honored agreements", while Da'wa under PM Maliki had become dictatorial and capricious. Issawi said he and Allawi (whom he characterized as a close friend) agreed that a strong possible government coalition would comprise the Kurdish Alliance List (KDP/PUK),ISCI and the IA. The recent decline in ISCI's criticism of the IA reflected close coordination between Allawi and ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim, who were working to lay the groundwork for such a coalition. BAGHDAD 00003363 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) While Issawi thought a Kurd/ISCI/IA coalition was a strong possibility, he cautioned that Iran could disrupt it by pressuring the Shi'a parties (ISCI, State of Law alliance, other Da'wa elements and the Sadrists) to come together after the election to recapitulate a strong Shi'a-led government. Issawi predicted that any Shi'a-led government that did not include secular, nationalist groups would not last four years, and said he had told ISCI and Da'wa they needed to stop viewing non-Shi'a parties as enemies and start viewing them as potential partners. IRANIAN POLITICAL INFLUENCE POTENTIALLY DIMINISHED -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Issawi said all of the Shi'a-led parties were under considerable pressure from Iran. Unless Maliki's SLA fared poorly in the elections, he doubted Maliki would agree to return to a Shi'a grand coalition under ISCI's leadership. He predicted that Iranian interference would continue to negatively impact Iraq's security, but said questions about the stability of the current regime in Tehran could undermine its political influence. Asked whether Iran' seizure of an oil well on Iraqi territory at al-Fakkah had hurt its influence, Issawi mentioned ongoing anti-regime protests in Tehran and said Iran was "well-known" for "exporting their domestic political crises". Responding to MG Lanza's question about the GOI's expectations of U.S. forces' role in al-Fakkah situation, Issawi said the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) clearly said the GOI had to formally request assistance before U.S. forces would have a locus for intervention. With the exception of Minister of Interior Bolani, who had argued for a strong response, there was "a great deal of reluctance" among senior GOI officials to directly confront or even criticize the Iranian forces. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY BETWEEN ELECTIONS & GOV'T FORMATION -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) On the issue of who will have executive and legislative power in the interval between elections and government formation, Issawi said while the constitution was unclear, he doubted anyone would challenge the right of the PM and his government to continue exercising their authorities until a new government was seated. As an example, he expected the PM would retain the authority to issue orders to the military. He stressed the need to form a new government as quickly as possible and urged the U.S. to begin conversations now with key political actors on the need for quick government formation and continuing a consensus-based approach to governance. Referencing the difficult process of adopting an election law, he observed that Iraq was not politically mature enough to adopt majority rule, and would need to continue a consensus-based approach for at least the next several years to ensure the country's political viability. Unless there are political parties that include Iraq's various ethno-sectarian groups, the government would need to take a consensus-based approach to its make-up and decision-making mechanisms. PM Maliki's criticism earlier this year of a consensus-based approach, he noted, had been seen by many Iraqis as an attempt to exert sectarian domination. HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP WITH ELECTIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Responding to the POL M/C's question on how the U.S. could help, Issawi identified two key operational needs: 1) a Qcould help, Issawi identified two key operational needs: 1) a strong international observer cohort, and; 2) announcing final election results as quickly as possible. IHEC expected the interval between elections and announcement of certified results to be four to six weeks. In Issawi's view, that left too much time for potential malign influences, including Iran, to work. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Issawi's comments on the advanced state of post-election government coalition negotiations are consistent with what we have heard from other contacts, as was his characterization of Maliki's Da'wa as being difficult to work with. His claim that ISCI and Da'wa had tacitly agreed not to criticize each other strongly as a hedge in case they decided to come back together after the election also accords with what we have heard elsewhere. In that regard, he clearly believed that recapitulating the ISCI/Da'wa alliance would be controversial and would undermine the coalition's ability to govern. Issawi was optimistic that the parliament could quickly work through the legislative process of extending the Presidency Council "if there was political agreement to do so", but was more BAGHDAD 00003363 003 OF 003 palpably concerned than in previous meetings that government formation could be a lengthy process. FORD