DPM ISSAWI ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS, ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003363

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ IR
SUBJECT: DPM ISSAWI ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS, ELECTIONS
AND IRANIAN INFLUENCE

Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: DPM Rafi al-Issawi told the POL M/C and MG
Lanza the Iraqia Alliance (IA) of which he is a part, and
which includes significant Shi'a (including Sadrist Trend)
elements will be formally announced in early January.
Negotiations over possible post-election government
coalitions were already well underway; Issawi believed ISCI,
which is "pragmatic and honors agreements", would be a better
partner for the IA than Da'wa, which was dictatorial and
capricious. Issawi said he and IA leader Iyad Allawi agreed
that a strong possible government coalition would comprise
the Kurdish Alliance List (KDP/PUK),ISCI and the IA. He
predicted that Iranian interference would continue to
negatively impact Iraq's security, but questions about the
stability of the current regime in Tehran could undermine its
political influence. Issawi said while the constitution was
unclear, he doubted anyone would challenge the right of the
PM and his government to continue exercising their
authorities in the interval between elections and government
formation. The U.S. could help with elections and government
formation by: 1) helping ensure a strong international
observer cohort; 2) encouraging IHEC to announce final
election results as quickly as possible, and; 3) urging
political actors to continue a consensus-based (vice
majority-rule) approach to governance. Details on Issawi's
mediation between the (Sunni) al-Hadba Gathering and
(Kurdish) Ninewa Fraternal League in Ninewa are reported
septel. END SUMMARY.



IRAQIA ALLIANCE TO FORMALLY ANNOUNCE IN EARLY JANUARY
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2. (C) In a meeting with POL M/C and USF-I CJ-9 Director MG
Lanza on December 28, DPM Issawi discussed upcoming elections
and the subsequent process of government formation. Issawi
explained that the Iraqia Alliance (IA) of which his Future
Gathering Party is a part is headed by (secular Shi'a) Iyad
Allawi and (Sunni) Saleh al-Mutlaq. The IA intends to
formally announce itself as a coalition on January 5 or 7
(January 6 is the anniversary of the founding of the Iraqi
armed forces) and comprises about 20 parties, ten of which
are Shi'a. Notably, Issawi said several of the Shi'a parties
were affiliated with the (Shi'a) Sadrist Trend. Saleh
al-Mutlaq (who co-leads the Iraqi National Movement, a
constituent party of the IA) initially tried to centralize
the IA's decision-making; however, Issawi said other
prominent IA personalities had successfully advocated a more
inclusive "team" approach.

PLATFORM TO FOCUS ON SERVICES AND NATIONAL UNITY
-------------- ---


3. (C) Asked what the IA's platform would be, Issawi said two
key planks would be: 1) providing better basic services, and;
2) adopting a non-sectarian political approach rooted in
national unity. Iraqis were tired of divisive sectarian
politics; he instead argued for a "liberal, secular approach"
focused on fostering Iraqis' national identity. He noted
that Allawi's non-sectarian message had resonated with
ordinary Iraqis and helped bolster Allawi's credibility and
political popularity. On foreign policy, Issawi said the IA
perceived a need for a more balanced approach to relations
with Iraq's neighbors. Citing PM Maliki's repeated attacks
on alleged Syrian interference in Iraqi affairs and apologies
for Iran, he argued against "ideological selectivity" in
Qfor Iran, he argued against "ideological selectivity" in
Iraq's foreign policy and predicted a majority of Sunnis and
Shi'a would endorse such an approach.

KURD/ISCI/IRAQIA ALLIANCE POSSIBLE (IF IRAN PERMITS)
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Responding to POL M/C's question about the status of
post-election government coalition negotiations, Issawi said
they had started "very early" and were already well underway.
Citing experience with the current legislative and executive
branches, Issawi assessed that of the Shi'a groups, the IA
was more likely to develop productive working relationships
with ISCI than with Da'wa. ISCI had proven to be "highly
pragmatic" and "honored agreements", while Da'wa under PM
Maliki had become dictatorial and capricious. Issawi said he
and Allawi (whom he characterized as a close friend) agreed
that a strong possible government coalition would comprise
the Kurdish Alliance List (KDP/PUK),ISCI and the IA. The
recent decline in ISCI's criticism of the IA reflected close
coordination between Allawi and ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim,
who were working to lay the groundwork for such a coalition.

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5. (C) While Issawi thought a Kurd/ISCI/IA coalition was a
strong possibility, he cautioned that Iran could disrupt it
by pressuring the Shi'a parties (ISCI, State of Law alliance,
other Da'wa elements and the Sadrists) to come together after
the election to recapitulate a strong Shi'a-led government.
Issawi predicted that any Shi'a-led government that did not
include secular, nationalist groups would not last four
years, and said he had told ISCI and Da'wa they needed to
stop viewing non-Shi'a parties as enemies and start viewing
them as potential partners.

IRANIAN POLITICAL INFLUENCE POTENTIALLY DIMINISHED
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Issawi said all of the Shi'a-led parties were under
considerable pressure from Iran. Unless Maliki's SLA fared
poorly in the elections, he doubted Maliki would agree to
return to a Shi'a grand coalition under ISCI's leadership.
He predicted that Iranian interference would continue to
negatively impact Iraq's security, but said questions about
the stability of the current regime in Tehran could undermine
its political influence. Asked whether Iran' seizure of an
oil well on Iraqi territory at al-Fakkah had hurt its
influence, Issawi mentioned ongoing anti-regime protests in
Tehran and said Iran was "well-known" for "exporting their
domestic political crises". Responding to MG Lanza's
question about the GOI's expectations of U.S. forces' role in
al-Fakkah situation, Issawi said the Strategic Framework
Agreement (SFA) clearly said the GOI had to formally request
assistance before U.S. forces would have a locus for
intervention. With the exception of Minister of Interior
Bolani, who had argued for a strong response, there was "a
great deal of reluctance" among senior GOI officials to
directly confront or even criticize the Iranian forces.

GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY BETWEEN ELECTIONS & GOV'T FORMATION
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7. (C) On the issue of who will have executive and
legislative power in the interval between elections and
government formation, Issawi said while the constitution was
unclear, he doubted anyone would challenge the right of the
PM and his government to continue exercising their
authorities until a new government was seated. As an
example, he expected the PM would retain the authority to
issue orders to the military. He stressed the need to form a
new government as quickly as possible and urged the U.S. to
begin conversations now with key political actors on the need
for quick government formation and continuing a
consensus-based approach to governance. Referencing the
difficult process of adopting an election law, he observed
that Iraq was not politically mature enough to adopt majority
rule, and would need to continue a consensus-based approach
for at least the next several years to ensure the country's
political viability. Unless there are political parties that
include Iraq's various ethno-sectarian groups, the government
would need to take a consensus-based approach to its make-up
and decision-making mechanisms. PM Maliki's criticism
earlier this year of a consensus-based approach, he noted,
had been seen by many Iraqis as an attempt to exert sectarian
domination.

HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP WITH ELECTIONS
--------------


8. (C) Responding to the POL M/C's question on how the U.S.
could help, Issawi identified two key operational needs: 1) a
Qcould help, Issawi identified two key operational needs: 1) a
strong international observer cohort, and; 2) announcing
final election results as quickly as possible. IHEC expected
the interval between elections and announcement of certified
results to be four to six weeks. In Issawi's view, that left
too much time for potential malign influences, including
Iran, to work.


9. (C) COMMENT: Issawi's comments on the advanced state of
post-election government coalition negotiations are
consistent with what we have heard from other contacts, as
was his characterization of Maliki's Da'wa as being difficult
to work with. His claim that ISCI and Da'wa had tacitly
agreed not to criticize each other strongly as a hedge in
case they decided to come back together after the election
also accords with what we have heard elsewhere. In that
regard, he clearly believed that recapitulating the
ISCI/Da'wa alliance would be controversial and would
undermine the coalition's ability to govern. Issawi was
optimistic that the parliament could quickly work through the
legislative process of extending the Presidency Council "if
there was political agreement to do so", but was more

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palpably concerned than in previous meetings that government
formation could be a lengthy process.
FORD