PM ADVISOR ON PRESIDENCY COUNCIL, IHEC, ADDITIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003340 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM UNSC KJUS IZ SY SUBJECT: PM ADVISOR ON PRESIDENCY COUNCIL, IHEC, ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL, AND AMCIT CIVIL CLAIMS REF: A. BAGHDAD 3311 ¶B. STATE 105413 Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Advisor Sadiq Rikabi told A/DCM December 21 that according to the Iraqi constitution, the Presidency Council would expire with the current government and that any constitutional fix to extend it would be extremely difficult. He expressed uncertainty about whether the President, under the constitution, would continue to wield a veto. Rikabi expressed doubt that the recent killing of an IHEC employee was related to his work on elections. The PM Advisor reported that Iraq's Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement had gone through two readings in the Council of Representatives (COR) and that further action was up to the Speaker. Regarding Saddam-era Amcit civil claims, Rikabi reiterated a demand he made with NEA A/S Feltman and previously, asking the Embassy to provide "the principles" that the USG had used in putting together the settlement offer of $650 million. He insisted that such information would be critical in obtaining COR approval and deflecting its inevitable criticisms. END SUMMARY. PRESIDENCY COUNCIL SEEN TO DISAPPEAR -------------- ¶2. (C) In a December 21 meeting with A/DCM, PM Advisor Sadiq Rikabi shared his views on the powers of the Presidency once the current term of the Council of Representatives (COR) expires and a new government is formed. In Rikabi's reading of the Iraqi Constitution, the Presidency Council goes away, replaced by a single President. He termed this a positive development. On a related note, he expressed uncertainty about whether the President would continue to wield a veto. Rikabi took down an Arabic language version of the Constitution and pointed to Article 73, para. 3, to observe that the President would have the power to "approve" ("ratify" in the official English translation) and "issue the laws enacted by the Council of Representatives." (NOTE: There appear to be differing interpretations of Constitution Article 73 and the future of veto authority, among contacts across the political spectrum. Septel forthcoming. END NOTE.) Rikabi criticized the manner in which the three current members of the Presidency Council are allowed to individually exercise the veto, insisting that Article 138 of the Constitution, if properly understood, only allowed the veto to be exercised if all three members of the Presidency Council were in agreement. In Rikabi's view, Vice President's Hashemi's recent veto of the election law was unconstitutional. ¶3. (C) When asked if it would be possible to amend the Constitution to extend the life of the Presidency Council, given the uncertainty about the future existence of the veto for a single president and the problems for coalition building that the loss of two key vice-presidential posts might entail, Rikabi responded that such an amendment was "a practical impossibility." In his view, it would be impossible to obtain the constitutionally required majority approval in the COR and approval in a referendum by a majority of voters (where two-thirds opposition by voters in three provinces would defeat it). (COMMENT: Given that the Kurds and Sunnis are likely supportive of such an amendment, Rikabi seemed to be intimating with this argument and his criticism of the Presidency Council in general, that Shia politicians and voters would not look favorably on extending this powerful check on majority-rule government. END COMMENT.) QCOMMENT.) IHEC'S TRAVAILS -------------- ¶4. (C) Responding to reports that a mid-level employee of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) had been assassinated and family members of two other employees had been kidnapped, Rikabi said it was very important to find out the facts in each case before jumping to the conclusion that such crimes were attempts to intimidate IHEC. He acknowledged that IHEC employees were feeling threatened, but described the circumstances surrounding the recent crimes as ambiguous and in his view more likely related to a series of unrelated common crimes. (COMMENT: Facts surrounding the murder are still unclear but it now appears that the kidnappings were unrelated to the IHEC employees' status. END COMMENT.) Rikabi criticized senior IHEC officials for "releasing" such information and commenting on the incidents in a way that exacerbated these fears. Responding to A/DCM's description of the IHEC employees' demand that they be given civil service status (which would provide them with more protections and benefits if they suffered harm because of their work),Rikabi said such action by the COR would be BAGHDAD 00003340 002 OF 002 difficult at the current time. He took on board A/DCM's suggestion that it might be easier to amend their current at-will contracts to include, for example, a civil-service-equivalent death benefit, one of the protections IHEC personnel were seeking. THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND COR ACTION -------------- ¶5. (C) Rikabi told A/DCM that the Maliki government had done its job in moving the Additional Protocol (AP) to the COR some months ago. Based on his conversation with Badr bloc leader and COR Security and Technical Committee Chair Hadi al-Ameri, he thought the AP had gone through two readings at the COR, although he admitted that he was unsure if al-Ameri was correct. Rikabi rejected criticism by Speaker Sammarra'i -- reported by A/DCM -- that the Maliki government had not done enough to highlight the importance of COR action on the AP. "This is Sammarra'i's job, he knows it's important, " said Rikabi, noting that the Maliki government had done its part when the Council of Ministers had referred the AP to the COR for ratification. He indicated that further pressing by the government on the COR could be counterproductive, hinting that there was latent resistance to giving the Maliki government "a political victory" it could claim credit for in the run-up to elections. SADDAM-ERA CIVIL CLAIMS -------------- ¶6. (C) Regarding Saddam-era Amcit civil claims, the PM's advisor reiterated a demand he made with A/S Feltman (ref A) and previously, asking the Embassy to provide "the principles" that the USG had used in putting together the settlement offer of $650 million (ref B). Rikabi rejected A/DCM's points that there was no set formula and that the figure resulted from a range of factors, including the demands from plaintiffs' attorneys. According to Rikabi, the key issue on the Iraqi side is the need for COR approval of the settlement. In his view, there will be intense criticism from the COR for such a large settlement, given the disparity between what the American victims would receive and what Iraqi victims' families had received when their loved ones had been killed by the American side: "Five to ten thousand dollars" in the case of Iraqi fatalities versus "millions" for Amcits who had been held hostage for "a short period," claimed Rikabi. He insisted that a fuller explanation of the principles or elements that had helped shape the settlement offer would help GOI officials defend the settlement. Said Rikabi, "I will never go to the COR to defend such an agreement" without a better explanation of what the money is for. A/DCM responded firmly that such an explanation from the USG or the plaintiffs' attorneys would not be forthcoming. He urged the GOI to establish its own principles to shape the counter-offer, which the USG would certainly review carefully. Rikabi pressed once more, insisting that in civil lawsuits, plaintiffs' attorneys had to provide an explanation to the court for the damages claimed and harm suffered. ¶7. (C) Rikabi also noted that the COR would attack the settlement because it was not comprehensive, since it did not include the 9/11 and the Oklahoma City bombing cases. A/DCM pointed out that in the Oklahoma case, is well on its way to dismissal. He urged the GOI to get in contact with its lawyer in New York regarding the 9/11 cases, to urge a stronger effort. A/DCM made the point that the settlement offer had not included the cost of settling these two sets of cases because the State Department believes it is in the Qcases because the State Department believes it is in the GOI's interest to litigate those cases in court, a view borne out by the recent success in the Oklahoma case, where plaintiffs have not opposed the GOI motion to dismiss. FORD