DIYALA GOVERNOR HIGHLIGHTS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003335 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: DIYALA GOVERNOR HIGHLIGHTS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE IN PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS WITH A/S FELTMAN REF: BAGHDAD 2937 Classified By: Acting PRT Team Leader Ricardo Singleton for reasons: 1. 4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Growing tension between Baghdad and provincial governments was highlighted during NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feldman,s meeting with Diyala Governor Abd al-Nasir al-Mahdawi on December 16 in Baqubah. The Governor raised his concern that the central government of Iraq was not implementing the articles of the Constitution and Provincial Powers Law in good faith. Al-Mahdawi asked A/S Feltman whether the USG could pressure the GOI to allow the provincial government its legal autonomy and authorities. A/S Feltman suggested that governors across Iraq work together to push back on Baghdad. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Tensions Between Diyala Provincial Government and Central GOI - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) On December 16th, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Asian Affairs Jeffrey Feltman met with the Diyala Governor, Dr. Abd-al-Nasir al Muntsir al-Mahdawi in Baqubah, Diyala, during a visit that included briefings at the PRT and a visit to a PRT-funded project. The Governor argued that while the Iraqi Constitution was sound, the central government of Iraq was not implementing the articles of the constitution and Provincial Powers Law in good faith. He noted his desire to have a strong, unified Iraq and asked the USG to pressure the central government to allow the provincial government its legal autonomy and authorities. (NOTE: The Provincial Powers Law, enacted in 2008, empowered Provincial Councils (PC) to play a role in both the appointment and removal of officials occupying senior positions within the governorate. The GOI disputed Diyala PC,s dismissal of the provincial-level Director General of Oil for corruption. This dispute has escalated and has been replicated in several other provinces across the country (Septel). END NOTE.) -------------- Negative Iranian Influence in Diyala -------------- ¶3. (C) Governor Al-Mahdawi, a Sunni, asserted a key challenge facing Diyala is its position as the portal through which Iranian influence enters Iraq. He remarked on the significant Iranian influence in Diyala on multiple levels, from commerce to politics. The Governor wanted a positive relationship with Iran, but only if it does not exacerbate or create problems in Diyala. He asserted Iran was supporting various insurgent and political groups within Diyala, and exerting influence that undermined the economy and essential services. Moreover, it was hard to control this influence because of a porous border. The Governor asserted that Iranian agents had infiltrated the security forces monitoring the border, enabling the passing of weapons and explosives into Diyala. The Governor had visited Iran and set up a joint committee to address related grievances and areas for cooperation. He added his belief that it was the responsibility of the United States to mitigate the issues between Iraq and Iran. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Shi,a Dominance/Manipulation of Iraqi Security Forces - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) The Governor told A/S Feltman that another major challenge facing Diyala was the predominantly Shi,a composition of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),especially the Iraqi Police (IP). The Governor commented that sectarian sensitivities were bound to arise when the security forces Qsensitivities were bound to arise when the security forces were comprised almost solely from one sect. (NOTE: The Iraqi Army Fifth Division, which is responsible for Diyala, has the highest percentage of Shi'a troops amongst IA divisions at 67 percent, with 27 percent Sunni and 5 percent Kurdish. END NOTE.) The Governor had established a security committee to investigate the detainee situation, and the committee had reported that 90 percent of the detainees were in prison through false allegations. Al-Mahdawi said that the IP chief had tried to make changes, but alleged that he was hindered by the heavy presence of IP tied to Iranian special groups. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Central GOI Undermining Provincial Leadership Through Arrests - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Al-Mahdawi then declared that members of the central government were purposefully undermining Diyala's leadership and that the law was unjustly enforced. The provincial BAGHDAD 00003335 002 OF 002 government was very concerned about unidentified ISF units coming into Diyala from Baghdad to arrest people without prior provincial government notification (reftel). He also asserted that many strong leaders in Diyala had been killed or detained without cause. He added that he had specific information about people who work for the Prime Minister and who threaten and bribe to people to force arrests of influential leaders ) some of whom the Governor claimed had later been killed in prison. He further claimed that the IP often used torture to convince people to give false confessions and allegations against government officials. The Governor planned to craft a letter to the Prime Minister regarding this problem. ¶6. (C) The Governor went on to note that many Sons of Iraq (SOIZ) had helped stabilize Iraq, contributing to the current removal of 90 percent of AQI from Diyala. He lamented, however, that many of the SOIZ leaders were also being targeted ) with assassination by AQI, and for arrest by the central government and an ISF that was heavily infiltrated by Iranian special groups. He added that Iranian infiltration often kept the IPs from investigating instances of blatant terrorism. He noted a specific instance where an IP member was setting up an IED in Muqdadiyah when it exploded, killing him and wounding an accomplice. Instead of the IP arresting his accomplice they had sent him to Najaf, and there had been no follow-up investigation. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Elections Unlikely to Improve Situation in Diyala - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Although Sunni and Shi'a peacefully had co-existed in Diyala for many years, the Governor pessimistically predicted that since sectarian tensions have been ignited, they would remain ) especially since AQI and Iranian special groups continued to stoke tensions. He also felt that election period was likely to bring with it additional instability, with the return of internally displaced (IDP) families to vote on election day. Al-Mahdawi stated that while it was positive that the central government had established a high commission on IDPs, he was concerned that the IDP committees were biased in support of the PM's Da'wa party. He also added that while security had been re-established in some areas, many IDPs (Sunni) did not return for fear that the ISF would target them. It was essential to provide IDPs with housing and job incentives to return. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Arab/Kurd Tensions in Disputed Areas - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) The Governor reported continuing tensions in the disputed areas (DIBs). Kurds saw Khanaqin as another Kirkuk. The Kurds believe that Khanaqin belongs to them. In Mandali, the local mayor was increasing tensions between the ethnic groups; but Governor Al-Mahdawi was loathe to remove him as it would just cause more fighting. On a positive note, however, tensions had improved in the DIBs areas with the involvement of the Iraqi Army, and he noted there was now some communication between Arab and Kurd tribes. ¶9. (U) A/S Feltman has cleared on this cable. FORD