NEA A/S FELTMAN'S MEETING WITH DPM AL-ISSAWI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003314 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM UNSC IZ SUBJECT: NEA A/S FELTMAN'S MEETING WITH DPM AL-ISSAWI REF: BAGHDAD 3157 Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with visiting NEA A/S Feltman on December 14, Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Rafi al-Issawi said that while erosion of the Kurdish, Shi'a and Sunni blocs that had dominated the last national election potentially opened opportunity for a more cross-sectarian, nationalist and secular approach, the process of government formation after elections was still likely to be lengthy and difficult. A key sub-text to the effort to adopt a new, more inclusive political process would depend to a large extent on whether the new government moved quickly to address political reconciliation issues in a meaningful way. Reconciliation issues also heavily affected security. Security and voting procedures were key concerns in connection with the elections; Issawi advised the U.S. to urge the newly-elected parliament to begin its work quickly to avoid a constitutional vacuum, but conceded that members would not take their seats until a consensus agreement was reached on who would encumber the offices of president, prime minister and speaker of parliament. Issawi hoped the new government would adopt a less "Saddam-esque" and confrontational foreign policy with Iraq's neighbors, and worried that further progress to end the (Kurdish) Ninewa Fraternal League's boycott of Ninewa's Provincial Council (PC) because of a power-sharing dispute with the (Sunni) al-Hadba Gathering might have to wait until after government formation. On the Northern Security Initiative, Issawi suggested that he and MNF-I Commanding General Odierno jointly brief members of Ninewa's PC to allay their concerns about how joint checkpoints (JCPs) and patrols would be structured and operate. End summary. ELECTION LAW, ELECTIONS AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Acknowledging A/S Feltman's congratulations on adoption of a new election law (reftel),Issawi noted that the proposed fallback position of adopting the 2005 law was fraught with constitutional problems and that political consensus had been "the only way forward." Adoption of the law had given the Iraqi people some hope, although government formation after the elections would also be "very difficult." Everyone "hoped" it would take less time than in 2006; however, Issawi was not optimistic. ;¶3. (C) Responding to A/S Feltman's observation that the Kurdish, Shi'a and Sunni groups that dominated in 2005 had since fractured to varying degrees, Issawi said the current situation potentially allowed for greater cross-sectarian cooperation. He noted that the Iraqi National Movement, of which his Future Gathering Party is a part, was cross-sectarian and focused on a nationalist, liberal and secular message. Iraqi politicians could not afford to totally ignore sectarian politics, but Issawi believed a majority of Iraqis had seen the limits of that approach and desired something different and "more politically mature". He endorsed the idea of a national unity government (NUG) after the elections, and called on the U.S. and UNAMI to urge the new Council of Representatives (COR) to commence its work as soon as possible after elections to avoid a political vacuum. He conceded, however, that "no one will sit in the COR until a consensus agreement had been reached on who would encumber the positions of president, prime minister and COR speaker." He assessed that it would be difficult to preserve Qspeaker." He assessed that it would be difficult to preserve the Presidency Council (comprising a President and two Vice-Presidents representing Kurds, Shi'a and Sunnis, each of whom has the right to veto legislation). NATIONAL RECONCILIATION KEY TO POLITICAL PROGRESS, SECURITY -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Asked what message Iraqi voters wanted to hear, Issawi said they wanted a clearly unified Iraq, not one riven by "soft divisions" along sectarian lines. National reconciliation would play a key - and perhaps determinative - role in facilitating or retarding the development of a cross-sectarian, nationalist political approach. Many of the most emotive political issues in Iraq - Sons of Iraq/Sahwa, de-Ba'thification, government hiring policies, sectarian bias in hiring - were linked to national reconciliation. The current government had focused on a purely security-focused approach, ignoring the underlying political dynamics that fostered continuing violence. "Real reconciliation" would have to be addressed in a meaningful way by the new government if Iraq was to move forward; however, the imperative for political coalitions to win prompted them to adopt hardline rhetoric that adversely impacted their ability BAGHDAD 00003314 002 OF 003 to promote reconciliation. ¶5. (C) Issues like de-Ba'thification were complicated, Issawi said, but vacillation by politicians like PM Maliki and ISCI's Ammar al-Hakim on whether any Ba'thists could be rehabilitated had exacerbated Sunni-Shi'a sectarian tensions. Maliki had in the space of two months argued both for and against the idea that some Ba'thists could be rehabilitated and considered for government positions again. Further practical steps to facilitate reconciliation before the March elections would be "very difficult", but unless reconciliation was quickly addressed in a meaningful way by the new government, Iraq's political process would "not be fixed enough" to be durable. (Comment: As one of the most senior and recognizable Sunni politicians in the executive branch, Issawi is particularly sensitive to the issue of reconciliation. End comment.) SECURITY, VOTING PROCEDURES MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR ELECTIONS -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Issawi said Iraqi security officials and leaders, especially PM Maliki, were "worried" about security during the run-up to the March 7 elections. Referring to the recent removal of the Baghdad Operations Command director after the December 8 multiple bombing attacks, he speculated that there could be further changes in Baghdad's security command in the coming weeks. Seconding reports that security forces had been infiltrated by extremists, Issawi said vetting newly-hired members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was a challenge, but that the GOI needed to do better. ¶7. (C) Responding to A/S Feltman's question about what the U.S. could do to help facilitate government formation, Issawi advised the U.S. to urge Iraqi leaders to avoid creating a constitutional vacuum by delaying government formation. It was important for the U.S. to avoid giving the appearance that the drawdown of its military forces entailed reduced political engagement. Claiming no Iraqi had confidence in the integrity of the voting process, Issawi stressed the importance of international observers to lend credibility to the elections. Political parties were entitled to have observers in polling stations; however, curfews, election day transportation restrictions, and doubts about their professionalism limited the public's confidence in them. While initial results were counted at individual polling stations, final results were only confirmed at central ballot collection points, leaving room for "manipulation". FOREIGN RELATIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Asked how the new Iraqi government might shift Iraq's relations with its neighbors, Issawi stressed that the new government needed three things: 1) to continue a consensus-based approach to governance to avoid sectarian strife; 2) to hire greater numbers of qualified technocrats for ministry positions, and; 3) to move quickly to change Iraq's foreign policy with respect to its neighbors. Currently, one group of Iraqis (Sunnis) criticize Iran for interfering in Iraqi affairs, while another (Shi'a) criticizes Saudi Arabia and Syria. Iraq needed to build productive relations with all of her neighbors; a national unity government could help that effort. A big challenge for the new government was to reverse the "Saddam-esque" accusatory manner in which PM Maliki had engaged Iraq's neighbors. NINEWA RECONCILIATION EFFORT -------------- ¶9. (C) Issawi briefed A/S Feltman on the status of his effort Q9. (C) Issawi briefed A/S Feltman on the status of his effort to promote reconciliation between feuding factions - the Sunni al-Hadba Gathering (AHG) and Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal League (NFL) - of Ninewa's Provincial Council. The goal was for the NFL to end its boycott of the PC, which had been prompted by a refusal of the AHG to share any provincial leadership positions with the NFL after the January 2009 provincial elections. Issawi had formed a "Higher Committee of Ninewa" to promote the effort, which comprises subcommittees on judiciary, economic, security and political issues. It was necessary to demonstrate tangible results before AHG-NFL reconciliation could move forward. Together with recouping Ninewa provincial funds that were not disbursed in FY 2006-2008 due to the security situation, Issawi said recruiting approximately 14,000 individuals from Ninewa Province into the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army was critical to demonstrate concrete benefits of the initiative. ¶10. (C) Issawi conceded that the national election season BAGHDAD 00003314 003 OF 003 complicated his Ninewa reconciliation effort. Neither the AHG nor the NFL wanted to concede anything now for fear it would be used against them in the election campaign. He speculated that he might have to postpone further AHG-NFL reconciliation efforts until after the March elections. Noting that between elections and government formation, many months could be lost, A/S Feltman urged Issawi to try to find ways to maintain momentum in the reconciliation effort. ¶11. (C) On the Northern Security Initiative, which encompasses a joint security architecture for the disputed internal boundary (DIBs) areas in the northern provinces of Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala, Issawi suggested that he and MNF-I Commanding General Odierno jointly brief members of Ninewa's Provincial Council. The goal was to allay PC members' concerns about how joint checkpoints (JCPs) and patrols would be structured and operate (Ninewa PC members fear the JCPs will effectively confirm the presence of Kurdish Peshmerga and Assayesh elements south of the Green Line). ¶12. (U) A/S Feltman cleared on this message. FORD