A/S FELTMAN DISCUSSES CHAPTER VII ISSUES WITH MFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003313 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PREL PBTS IZ KU SUBJECT: A/S FELTMAN DISCUSSES CHAPTER VII ISSUES WITH MFA REF: BAGHDAD 3311 Classified By: CDA Robert S. Ford, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Acting Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed al-Haj Hamoud told visiting NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman on December 17 that the GOI accepts the border as demarcated in 833, noting "We must accept it," but also making clear in a sustained series of exchanges that the GOI had issues with both the land border and the maritime boundary. Hamoud called for the establishment of a joint commission to re-verify that the land border as demarcated in 833 is correct. MFA officials also called for a commission that would examine maritime access issues and establish an access regime that treated the Khor Abdullah as an international waterway. A/S Feltman urged the Iraqis to focus on access issues and noted that GOI re-affirmation of 833 should not be conditional on the work of any commission focusing on either the land border or maritime boundary. Haj Hamoud noted that with regard to the border issues, he had the sense that these issues would likely be left to the new Iraqi government formed after the March elections. Feltman also urged the Iraqis to close out remaining Oil-for-Food contracts, to ensure Council support for the DFI extension the Iraqis had just requested in writing to the UNSC. Hamoud, reacting to Feltman's urging that the GOI ratify its Advanced Protocol (AP) for nuclear safeguards, described the WMD issue as "easy, but not right now," hinting that Council of Representatives action might not be quick. End Summary. ¶2. (C) NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman met with MFA officials December 17 to discuss Chapter VII issues, including the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) extension and Oil-for-Food (OFF) claims, WMD, and Kuwait-related issues. The Iraqi side was led by acting DFM Mohammed al-Haj Hamoud and included Zebari's COS Sroud Najib, Ambassador Taha Abassi, and Ambassador Mohammed al-Hamameidi. A/S Feltman expressed condolences for the August bombing of the MFA and the more recent bombings in Baghdad and congratulated the MFA for its successful recovery from the attack. He referred to his productive meeting in Manama with FM Zebari a few days earlier and noted that he planned to return to Baghdad in late January to co-chair the Diplomatic Joint Coordinating Committee (JCC) with the FM. Feltman also highlighted the utility of Iraq joining the Policy Planning Quint meeting in Jordan in mid-January. GENERAL APPROACHES ON CHAPTER VII -------------- ¶3. (C) Regarding Iraq's Chapter VII status in general, Feltman underlined the USG's sincere commitment to helping Iraq exit this status as soon as possible. Haj Hamoud described the Chapter VII issues as ranging in difficulty, with the Kuwait-related resolutions as the most challenging and the OFF/DFI issues as the easiest. He and Hamameidi noted that the MFA had submitted comprehensive recommendations to the PM's office for the resolution of the Kuwait-related issues months earlier, focusing in particular on border issues, and it was still waiting for the PM's response. DFI and OFF -------------- ¶4. (C) A/S Feltman expressed appreciation for the GOI letter that the UNSC had recently received, requesting a one-year extension of DFI immunities. On the related OFF claims, he urged the GOI to reach out to the Russians to settle these remaining contracts within a reasonable period before the UNSC ordered the UN to pay them off in full. Hamameidi responded that the MFA had received the draft DFI resolution, which listed "some options" and indicated that the MFA had Qwhich listed "some options" and indicated that the MFA had limited suggestions to make, primarily non-substantive, and would forward them to the UNSC within 48 hours. Haj Hamoud affirmed that the GOI needed to take action as soon as possible to be done with the OFF issue. (After the meeting Ministry Chief of Staff Najib pulled DCM aside to reiterate that Iraq would agree to finalize payment on remaining OFF contracts by March.) WMD --- ¶5. (C) On WMD, Hamameidi made the point that the GOI has done everything necessary to settle this issue and comply with UNSCR's 687 and 707, given that it has no WMD and no intention to obtain them. He also noted that the GOI is a party to all key non-proliferation conventions. "So we must table this issue," said Hamameidi. At a separate point in the discussion, Haj Hamoud, reacting to Feltman's urging that the GOI ratify its Advanced Protocol (AP) for nuclear safeguards, described the WMD issue as "easy, but not right BAGHDAD 00003313 002 OF 003 now," hinting that Council of Representatives action might not be quick. In response to A/S Feltman's question, Haj Hamoud acknowledged that if the current COR completed its term before taking action on the AP, the new Council of Ministers' would need to take up the issue anew before the COR could take action. Hamameidi asked the group to consider other ways to address the WMD sanctions, even before COR ratification of the AP. Kenna said the group would consider alternative approaches and that the Embassy would relay them to the MFA. POSTPONING FORMAL ACTION ON BORDER ISSUES -------------- ¶6. (C) Haj Hamoud noted that with regard to the border issues, he had the sense that despite the MFA recommendations to the PM months ago, these issues would likely be left to the new Iraqi government formed after the March elections. NEA/I Deputy Office Director Kenna said that we understand the political sensitivities surround the Kuwait resolutions, but stand ready to discuss this package at the appropriate time. At another point in the discussion Haj Hamoud insisted that the GOI accepted the border as demarcated in 833. "We must accept it." BUT NOTING RESERVATIONS ON LAND BORDER -------------- ¶7. (C) Regarding the land border, Haj Hamoud said the GOI "has the feeling" that the line is not drawn correctly. "It is not a just one;" it is "far from reality." He indicated that the Iraqis want to discuss it with the Kuwaiti side, although they recognize "it is a difficult issue" for Kuwait. Later in the discussion, Hamoud returned to this issue and noted two problems. First, there are no agreed coordinates for the border, unlike, for example the Iraq-Iran border, where coordinates had been agreed since 1913. For the Iraq-Kuwait border, there were only rough physical descriptions of the border line in few historical documents, such as in 1932 and 1963. These descriptions "could be understood differently" by each side. Secondly, said Hamoud, the 1991-93 UN Boundary Commission did its work without Iraqi participation. The DCM reminded that the Iraqi side had been invited to participate, prompting Hamoud to acknowledge that the Iraqis had participated in the first three meetings before deciding to boycott the rest of proceedings. According to Hamoud, because Iraq did not participate in most of the proceedings, the GOI now wanted to "re-verify" the land border with a technical group of experts. Citing one problem, Hamoud raised the issue of the three piers at Um Qasr, noting that the border as drawn cut three piers in two, essentially preventing Iraqi military from moving from land to water or vice versa, they cannot do so. "We need a certain distance to allow people to move." ACCESS ISSUES OR SOMETHING MORE FUNDAMENTAL? -------------- ¶8. (C) NEA Special Advisor for Iraq Slotkin called this "an access issue" and noted that it really pertained to the maritime border. Responding to probing from A/S Feltman about what the Iraqis sought from such a verification process, Hamoud answered at one point that "we don't have a problem with the border" itself, but "it is a domestic political problem. We need to convince the Kuwaitis to sit down and talk to us about it." A/S Feltman mused aloud that the Iraqis seemed to be seeking a verification process, involving Iraqi participation, but really focused on access issues. Slotkin sought clarification on whether merely standing up such a commission, with Iraqi participation -- to demonstrate Iraqi buy-in and to essentially verify the Qdemonstrate Iraqi buy-in and to essentially verify the current border demarcation -- would be enough. "Wouldn't such a commission set up expectations that it would change the land border," asked Slotkin. Hamoud responded that it depended on what the experts found. Slotkin also questioned how the Iraqis could say that they accept 833 but still demand a commission to examine the land border. Kenna noted that while discussions of access would likely be acceptable, any suggestion that the Iraqis seek to reopen the land border would be very difficult. MFA ISSUES WITH THE MARITIME BOUNDARY -------------- ¶9. (C) Regarding the maritime border, Haj Hamoud returned to the idea of a joint commission. (COMMENT: While addressing the land border and maritime boundary sequentially, it was not completely clear if Hamoud was referring to one joint commission to address both sets of issues, or separate commissions. END COMMENT.) He noted that the commission should focus on problems arising from navigation. Hamoud also inquired about the possibility of having American and British experts to assist with these issues. A/S Feltman BAGHDAD 00003313 003 OF 003 inquired whether the GOI's concerns related primarily to issues of sovereignty and national symbolism, or involved concrete access issues and elaborated that he thought there were no actual maritime access issues. Hamoud explained that the Khor Abdullah is an international waterway, like a strait, and that in the GOI's view, the Law of the Sea and international maritime custom pertaining to straits were applicable. "We need to convince the Kuwaitis" to accept an access regime governed by these precepts, Hamoud added. ¶10. (C) Hamoud complained that the Kuwaiti government required Iraqi ships to fly a Kuwaiti flag in parts of the Khor and to "accept their nationalistic guidance." At another point in the conversation, Hamoud added that there had been problems with the Kuwaitis harassing Iraqi fishermen. Hamameidi added that the P-3 draft resolution he had seen on the GOI re-affirming 833 had in his view shown an understanding of these issues. It called on the UNSYG to establish a panel to review and in his words "mediate" issues arising from the maritime border. Kenna responded that the USG understood that the panel proposed would be a technical committee that would examine access issues. A/S Feltman again urged the Iraqis to focus on access issues and noted that GOI re-affirmation of 833 should be separate from -- or not conditional on -- the work of any border commission. Otherwise Iraqi politicians would inevitably create political pressure for the Iraqi members to insist that the border be re-adjusted. Hamoud reiterated near the end of the conversation that the GOI side preferred to postpone this issue until after the elections and formation of a new government, although he indicated it might be possible to start creating the process now. A/S Feltman urged the Iraqis to appoint an ambassador to Kuwait as soon as possible, since it might help facilitate discussion of some of these issues. FORD