A/S FELTMAN, PM ADVISOR DISCUSS CHAPTER VII

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003311 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PREL PREF IZ KU SUBJECT: A/S FELTMAN, PM ADVISOR DISCUSS CHAPTER VII ISSUES, AMERICAN CIVIL CLAIMS, REFUGEES Classified By: Acting DCM Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman told PM Advisor December 17 that the U.S. is committed to a long-term partnership with Iraq. Rikabi welcomed the commitment but signaled frustration about the lack of progress on some issues and called for the two sides to establish some "milestones" and timetables to ensure progress. On Chapter VII issues, Rikabi somewhat reluctantly acknowledged that it was the GOI's wish to postpone consideration of the Kuwait-related issues until after formation of the new Iraqi government post-elections, but nonetheless faulted the USG for not offering more help to Iraq on these issues since PM Maliki's July 2009 Washington visit. Regarding WMD, Rikabi claimed that Deputy Secretary Steinberg had committed to him in October to take action "before Christmas," a promise that he argued had not been fulfilled. Rikabi bridled at the requirement of GOI ratification of the Additional Protocol and claimed the GOI found itself in the embarrassing position in front of the Iraqi people of absolutely no movement on any Chapter VII resolutions. Focusing on the Oil-for-Food issue, Rikabi underlined that many of the outstanding contracts had a dubious history, with elements of corruption evident, but he committed to settling them expeditiously. Rikabi parried A/S Feltman's request for a GOI counteroffer to the USG settlement figure for Saddam-era Amcit legal claims, requesting that the U.S. supply the GOI with the "legal principles" used to calculate the USG settlement figure. Rikabi committed to taking action on payment of the USS Stark settlement and said that he was waiting to hear White House official Samantha Power about USG plans for IDPs in Iraq. He could not confirm PM Maliki's plans to visit Erbil but noted the PM would travel to Cairo in the coming week. End Summary. A LONG-TERM PARTNERSHIP IN THE WORKS -------------- ¶2. (C) NEA A/S Feltman assured PM Advisor Sadiq Rikabi in their December 17 meeting that the U.S. is committed to a long-term partnership with an Iraq that we view as an emerging regional economic and political power as well as a democracy. Rikabi welcomed the assurances, noted a strong desire for a deeper long-term relationship with the U.S., but noted that the two sides needed to develop a roadmap, with goals, to achieve better political, economic, military, and security cooperation, and which elaborated on the obstacles to progress. Hinting at a degree of frustration about lack of progress on a range of issues, Rikabi questioned whether the two sides could move forward unless it established "milestones" that would indicate the concrete steps -- and in some instances, timetables -- necessary for progress in the relationship. A DIPLOMATIC JCC IN LATE JANUARY -------------- ¶3. (C) Feltman said the U.S. could not dictate the type of relationship the two sovereign countries develop but said he expected close, cooperative bilateral relations. Pointing to the U.S. relationship with Egypt as a possible model in some respects, he said he expected the relationship to be transparent, with sometimes significant differences on particular issues, but with strategic understanding of the need to work through those differences and to coordinate positions where possible. He described the structure provided by Higher Coordinating Committee (HCC) and Joint Coordinating Committees (JCC's) as the key elements needed to establish the architecture for a strong, enduring Qestablish the architecture for a strong, enduring relationship between governments that are civilian-led. A/S Feltman also noted that the two sides were not starting from a blank slate. There were already a series of important guideposts for developing the longer-term relationship, constituting important elements of a roadmap for the bilateral relationship, including: -- the Security Agreement; -- the Strategic Framework Agreement; -- the timing elements for draQown of U.S. forces mentioned in the President's February Iraq speech; and -- the commitments on Chapter VII included in the Security Agreement. GOK NOT READY TO MOVE ON KUWAIT-RELATED RESOLUTIONS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Moving to specific Chapter VII issues, A/S Feltman said he had spoken to the Kuwait FM in Manama (as he assumed Rikabi had) and had been briefed on the series of discussions the Ambassador and others had had with GOI officials about the Kuwaiti-related resolutions. His sense was that the GOI did not want to deal with these issues until after the new BAGHDAD 00003311 002 OF 003 government was formed. ¶5. (C) Rikabi tentatively agreed that it was probably better to postpone the Kuwait-related issues, and to treat them "as a package," but added at one point that it would be possible to discuss general principles for resolving this cluster of issues. He noted that there had been a long meeting on the Kuwait issue in Washington in July, when the PM met the Secretary, and hinted that consensus had been reached in some areas, but that since that time, "we didn't move forward at all." He suggested as an approach that the two sides could each list their views and the U.S. - because it is trusted by both sides -- could facilitate the discussion by suggesting compromise views, to help the two sides resolve these issues. He urged the U.S. to play a mediating role and, more generally, underlined that GOI leaders needed to show the Iraqi people that the U.S. - Iraqi alliance was useful. While there is good cooperation on the security side, Rikabi complained that, despite agreement on helping Iraq exit from Chapter VII status, there has been no forward movement. ¶6. (C) A/S Feltman pushed back, insisting that Rikabi was not giving the USG enough credit for the efforts it had made to help Iraq on Chapter VII, and in particular noted the difficulties in making progress on the Kuwait issues. DFI AND WMD -------------- ¶7. (C) On Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) A/S Feltman indicated that the Iraqis had communicated a conflicted message to the U.N. They had communicated the general sentiment that they wanted to be out from under all the strictures of Chapter VII, but were still seeking some of the benefits (DFI immunities preventing seizure of Iraqi assets to satisfy Saddam-era legal claims),a message that some Security Council members had seized on to block forward movement. On WMD, A/S Feltman acknowledged that it seemed simple to Iraqis that since they had no (and no intention of seeking) WMD, resolutions 687 and 707 should be canceled. However, the world had changed its standards since passage of those resolutions in the early 1990's and the UNSC (with IAEA) was pushing for an updated common standard. Given that Iraq's Additional Protocol was already with the Council of Representatives, Feltman told Rikabi he had urged GOI leaders such as Speaker Iyad Sammarraie to take prompt action to ratify it, underlining that it "cost" the Iraqis nothing to take such action. Such action would help the USG press the IAEA Board of Governors and UNSC members to acknowledge GOI compliance with its inteQational non-proliferation obligations. ¶8. (C) A/S Feltman also explained that focusing primarily on DFI and WMD at the UNSC would help create the right atmosphere for progress. NEA/-Pol Deputy Director Kenna concurred that it made sense to take an issue-by-issue approach at the UN. Rikabi insisted he was not trying "to blame or accuse the U.S.," but wanted to move things into a more productive mode. On WMD, Rikabi claimed that Deputy Secretary Steinberg had committed to him in October to take action "before Christmas." to get this issue resolved. Rikabi also said that he had discussed the requirement of the Additional Protocol with UN officials and had been told this was "not really for us" but represented an imperative for U.S. Iran policy. More generally, Rikabi reported that the GOI had staked a great deal on its alliance with the U.S. and now if found itself in the embarrassing position in front of the Iraqi people with no movement on any Chapter VII resolutions. AGREEING TO SETTLE OIL-FOR-FOOD CONTRACTS QAGREEING TO SETTLE OIL-FOR-FOOD CONTRACTS -------------- ¶9. (C) Regarding the Oil-for-Food (OFF) contracts, a key issue with some Security Council members for extension of DFI immunities, A/S Feltman urged the GOI to settle the outstanding claims as soon as possible. He expressed appreciation for the GOI letter requesting an extension, which had reached the Council just days earlier. A/S Feltman warned that, unlike in previous years, if the GOI did not move to settle these claims within a reasonable period (90 days),the Council was likely to take action and pay the claims out of Iraqi OFF funds currently being held for that purpose. Rikabi underlined that many of these contracts had a dubious history, with elements of corruption evident, but for the first time he committed to settling them expeditiously. NO COUNTEROFFER ON AMCIT CIVIL CLAIMS -------------- ¶10. (C) Regarding the issue of Saddam-era civil claims, A/S BAGHDAD 00003311 003 OF 003 Feltman urged the GOI to make a serious counter-offer, a move that would allow the State Department to talk to key Congressional representatives and possibly forestall legislation that could make it easier for U.S. claimants to pursue further legal action against the GOI. Rikabi acknowledged the Congressional pressure but insisted that the Maliki government also faced parliamentary pressure on this issue. "We need to sell this agreement to the Council of Representatives and convince our people" that it is legally justified. Repeating a demand he made earlier with the DCM (reported septel),Rikabi requested that the U.S. side supply the GOI with the "legal principles" that had been used to compile the initial USG settlement figure. A/S Feltman replied that the settlement figure the U.S. had supplied was all the Iraqi side was likely to get. "That's our position. We need to have your counteroffer," the A/S reiterated. ¶11. (C) NEA Special Advisor Slotkin reminded Rikabi that one way to manage Iraqi public concerns was to settle the claims at the same time the GOI closes out of OFF, since money remaining after settlement from that OFF account, once transferred back to the GOI, could be used to settle the civil claims. This idea, originally broached in Deputy Steinberg's meeting with Rikabi in October, could make it easier to "sell" the settlement to the COR. NEA Deputy Office Director Kenna added that the GOI could expect to receive some USD 770 from closing out OFF contracts, which would easily cover the civil claims. Rikabi took issue, noting that the issue of how much the GOI should pay for these claims was separate from the issue of where the GOI would get the money to settle them. However, he noted in closing that he followed this issue closely and was eager to close the file. CUTTING THE CHECK ON USS STARK CLAIM -------------- ¶12. (C) A/S Feltman raised the issue of payment of the USS Stark claim and urged the GOI pay the approximately two and a half million dollar figure (including interest) that had long been agreed. Rikabi agreed to take the necessary action and see that payment was made. IDP'S: RIKABI CLAIMS BALL IN US COURT -------------- ¶13. (C) In response to A/S Feltman's observation that White House coordinator for Iraqi refugees and IDP's Samantha Power seemed satisfied with her November visit to Iraq, Rikabi described the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a "big issue" that will take time to resolve. Given the need for a gradual, step-by-step process, he had suggested starting with Diyala, with a plan to be implemented by the National Committee for Reconciliation and Follow-up. Both sides had budget limits in dealing with the issue and needed to work together on it cooperatively, he explained. Rikabi said he had shared the elements of the GOI plan with Power, noting that it was focused on determining how many families could be helped, how many shelters could be built, and what the GOI could do from its side. He said that that he had asked Power what the USG side could do and had not yet received a reply. A/S Feltman took this message on board. UPCOMING PM TRAVEL AND EFFORTS TO CONTAIN IRAQ -------------- - ¶14. (C) Regarding Pol M/C's inquiries about possible PM travel to Erbil, Rikabi said he had seen the reports in the press but did not think that a definite date had been set. Rikabi confirmed that the PM would travel to Cairo in the coming week on an official visit. Rikabi welcomed the Qcoming week on an official visit. Rikabi welcomed the breakthrough with Egypt but made the point that Iraq's neighbors are concerned about the regional role Iraq will play, for example in light of the successful second round of oil contract awards, and were intent on trying to limit that role and contain Iraqi influence to the maximum degree. ¶15. (U) The A/S has cleared on this message. FORD