PM MALIKI, A/S FELTMAN DISCUSS IRAN, SYRIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003301 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PREL IZ IR SY SUBJECT: PM MALIKI, A/S FELTMAN DISCUSS IRAN, SYRIA, ELECTIONS ISSUES Classified By: Acting DCM Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: NEA Assistant Secretary Feltman congratulated Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki December 14 on the recently passed election law and expressed confidence that the upcoming elections would facilitate fair representation of all Iraqi segments of society. Maliki acknowledged the importance of the election law but also expressed concern that sectarian issues would overly color candidates' campaigns and propaganda. A/S Feltman expressed condolences for the recent series of bombings targeting government ministries and indicated that the USG would continue to provide requested assistance, including support in investigations. Maliki expressed hope that the Higher Coordinating Committee (HCC) and the Joint Coordinating Committees (JCCs) would be tools for developing relations between Iraq and the U.S. A/S Feltman underscored the importance of the Diplomatic JCC, which he said he had discussed with Iraqi FM Zebari in Manama. According to A/S Feltman, holding the diplomatic JCC would buttress USG efforts to emphasize to the neighboring countries, particularly in the Gulf, that their relations with Iraq would be a critical element in how the U.S. judged its relations with them. Regarding Iran, Maliki acknowledged that there could be divisions in the leadership in Tehran that was making decision-making difficult but he underlined the difficulty of understanding Iranian political decision-making. The PM said he knew the Syrians better than the Iranians and described them as more clever in the way they had interfered in Iraq -- "on a serious scale" -- while avoiding much acknowledgment of such actions. End Summary. CONGRATULATIONS ON THE ELECTIONS LAW -------------- ¶2. (C) In a December 14 meeting, NEA Assistant Secretary Feltman congratulated Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki on the recent passage of the elections law and expressed hope that the law would facilitate robust participation and equitable representation of all Iraqis in the upcoming March national elections. A/S Feltman was accompanied by NEA Special Advisor on Iraq and Regional Issues Deputy Director of NEA/I-Political. Maliki acknowledged the importance of the election law and broad Iraqi participation in the electoral process but signaled that greater political challenges lay ahead in the run-up to elections. He expressed concern that sectarian issues would overly color candidates' campaigns and propaganda. The PM implicitly compared his own coalition and its efforts to emphasize national themes and transcend a sectarian focus, with those of other parties and coalitions, which in his view still leaned heavily in an overtly sectarian direction. RECOGNIZING IRAQ AS AN EMERGING REGIONAL POWER -------------- - ¶3. (C) A/S Feltman noted that robust political debate and ultimately successful building of consensus on the election law demonstrated the increasing maturity of Iraqi democracy, a point that he had underlined with his Arab interlocutors on the margins of the Manama Dialogue. He told the PM that he had emphasized to a range of Arab leaders he met with that Iraq would be an economic and political power in the region in the coming years and it was time for the region to start dealing with that emerging reality. Maliki pointed to the huge progress Iraq had made, noting that now, as opposed to several years earlier, Iraq had developed its institutions and was exercising its national sovereignty. While there were still periodic bombings that attempted unsuccessfully to Qwere still periodic bombings that attempted unsuccessfully to put Iraq's sovereignty into question and shake public confidence, they were not succeeding, and he agreed that Iraq's neighbors needed to re-examine their refusal or half-hearted attempts to establish relations with Iraq. CONDOLENCES FOR THE BOMBINGS -------------- ¶4. (C) A/S Feltman expressed condolences for the recent series of bombings that targeted government ministries and related symbols of national sovereignty and indicated that the USG would continue to provide assistance, including support in investigations, as requested by the GOI. Maliki expressed appreciation for the assistance and noted that there had been good cooperation in the investigations, including active USG participation in some cases. THE HCC AND A JANUARY DIPLOMATIC JCC -------------- ¶5. (C) Elaborating on the theme of cooperation, the PM noted that Secretary of State Clinton chairs the Higher Coordinating Committee (HCC) which overseas the various Joint BAGHDAD 00003301 002 OF 003 Coordinating Committees (JCCs). Maliki expressed hope that both would be tools for developing relations between Iraq and the U.S. in fields such as energy and education. A/S Feltman underscored the importance of the Diplomatic JCC, which he said he had discussed with Iraqi FM Zebari in Manama. He informed Maliki that the two had discussed convening this JCC under their joint chairmanship in Baghdad in the second half of January. A/S Feltman said that this bilateral strategic dialogue on regional issues also sent a powerful signal to Iraq's neighbors, putting them on notice that the USG was initiating a dialogue on the type of regional architecture that was needed to re-integrate Iraq. Iraq's Arab neighbors need to be a part of that dialogue, finding ways to deal with Iraq in a more positive way. Maliki expressed appreciation for this emphasis in U.S. policy. DIFFICULTIES IN UNDERSTANDING IRANIAN DECISION-MAKING -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) A/S Feltman told the Prime Minister he was interested in hearing his views on two countries, Iran and Syria, that posed particular challenges for U.S. policy in the region. Maliki said that he had not discussed the nuclear issue with Iranian leaders at any level but noted more generally that what he heard from them most often, in terms of a motivation that could explain their nuclear ambitions, was the depth of their fears of Israel, rather than the U.S. The PM underlined the difficulty of understanding Iranian political decision-making. It is possible, he observed, that there are divisions that are causing some paralysis in internal decision-making. But "it is not easy to understand the way the Iranians think about politics," warned Maliki. FEARS ABOUT INCREASING TENSIONS WITH IRAN -------------- ¶7. (C) Maliki pointed to an increase in regional tensions with Iran in the past several months. He attributed this to Iranian paranoia about what they perceived to be American and British intervention during and after the June elections and to Iranian fears that Israel would strike their nuclear facilities. He urged the U.S. to consider using Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN, to find ways to "calm the situation" and assuage Iranian fears. Then there could be some improvement in the situation. At present, given Iranian fears and the traditional stubbornness that Iranian leaders demonstrate when under heavy pressure, the situation posed certain dangers for the region. Iraq for its part was fearful about any escalation that might lead to military conflict. While all Gulf countries would be heavily affected by a conflict that might close the Straits of Hormuz, the lifeline for oil exports and most imports for the region, Iraq would be the hardest hit. Such conflict could also lead to further interference in Iraq's internal affairs, another unwelcome development, the PM noted. Maliki told the A/S that Iraq could intervene with the Iranian leadership, if that was desired, to try to calm their fears and tell them there is an opportunity to reach an agreement. ASSESSING SYRIAN INTENTIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Regarding Syria, A/S Feltman noted that the U.S. is attempting to re-engage, after years of a relatively sterile diplomatic freeze in relations. PM Maliki said that he knew the Syrians much better than the Iranians, noting that he had lived in Syria for 16 years and spoke the common language of Arabic. He pointed to some similarities between the Iranians and Syrians, assessing that both liked to amass and play Qand Syrians, assessing that both liked to amass and play political cards. However, the two reacted differently to intense pressure. In his view the Iranians become very stubborn while the Syrians listen carefully, try to evade the pressure, and wait for a more opportune moment to re-engage with their exposed activities. He said he used to hear lectures from the Syrians about how effective they were with the Americans, piling up political cards to play. MORE CLEVER THAN THE IRANIANS IN IRAQI INTERFERENCE -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Maliki described the Syrians as more difficult to deal with than the Iranians. Iran in his view has never been able to deny that it was interfering in Iraq's internal affairs. But Syria, the country that had perhaps intervened the most, was able without serious scrutiny to portray itself publicly (and in the media) as if it was the country that exercised the most caution about such interference. He noted that during his last trip to Damascus, in mid-August, the Syrian leadership had embraced his offer of political and economic incentives for bilateral engagement, but had subsequently refused to stop offering facilitation to foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria and support for terrorism BAGHDAD 00003301 003 OF 003 inside Iraq. The PM also highlighted the pan-Arab Baathist ideology that remained a pillar of the Assad regime in Damascus and created some of the motivation for Syrian interference to destabilize the current non-Baathist regime in Iraq. "It is an ideology that does not respect borders," he noted. While Saddam shared this basic ideology, the Syrians are much smarter than he was, said Maliki. They are in a country without significant resources, but are intervening across borders in key places throughout the region. ¶10. (C) A/S Feltman's cleared on this message. FORD