PM MALIKI, A/S FELTMAN DISCUSS IRAN, SYRIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003301

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PREL IZ IR SY
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI, A/S FELTMAN DISCUSS IRAN, SYRIA,
ELECTIONS ISSUES

Classified By: Acting DCM Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: NEA Assistant Secretary Feltman
congratulated Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki December 14 on the
recently passed election law and expressed confidence that
the upcoming elections would facilitate fair representation
of all Iraqi segments of society. Maliki acknowledged the
importance of the election law but also expressed concern
that sectarian issues would overly color candidates'
campaigns and propaganda. A/S Feltman expressed condolences
for the recent series of bombings targeting government
ministries and indicated that the USG would continue to
provide requested assistance, including support in
investigations. Maliki expressed hope that the Higher
Coordinating Committee (HCC) and the Joint Coordinating
Committees (JCCs) would be tools for developing relations
between Iraq and the U.S. A/S Feltman underscored the
importance of the Diplomatic JCC, which he said he had
discussed with Iraqi FM Zebari in Manama. According to A/S
Feltman, holding the diplomatic JCC would buttress USG
efforts to emphasize to the neighboring countries,
particularly in the Gulf, that their relations with Iraq
would be a critical element in how the U.S. judged its
relations with them. Regarding Iran, Maliki acknowledged
that there could be divisions in the leadership in Tehran
that was making decision-making difficult but he underlined
the difficulty of understanding Iranian political
decision-making. The PM said he knew the Syrians better than
the Iranians and described them as more clever in the way
they had interfered in Iraq -- "on a serious scale" -- while
avoiding much acknowledgment of such actions. End Summary.

CONGRATULATIONS ON THE ELECTIONS LAW
--------------


2. (C) In a December 14 meeting, NEA Assistant Secretary
Feltman congratulated Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki on the recent
passage of the elections law and expressed hope that the law
would facilitate robust participation and equitable
representation of all Iraqis in the upcoming March national
elections. A/S Feltman was accompanied by NEA Special
Advisor on Iraq and Regional Issues Deputy Director of
NEA/I-Political. Maliki acknowledged the importance of the
election law and broad Iraqi participation in the electoral
process but signaled that greater political challenges lay
ahead in the run-up to elections. He expressed concern that
sectarian issues would overly color candidates' campaigns and
propaganda. The PM implicitly compared his own coalition and
its efforts to emphasize national themes and transcend a
sectarian focus, with those of other parties and coalitions,
which in his view still leaned heavily in an overtly
sectarian direction.

RECOGNIZING IRAQ AS AN EMERGING REGIONAL POWER
-------------- -


3. (C) A/S Feltman noted that robust political debate and
ultimately successful building of consensus on the election
law demonstrated the increasing maturity of Iraqi democracy,
a point that he had underlined with his Arab interlocutors on
the margins of the Manama Dialogue. He told the PM that he
had emphasized to a range of Arab leaders he met with that
Iraq would be an economic and political power in the region
in the coming years and it was time for the region to start
dealing with that emerging reality. Maliki pointed to the
huge progress Iraq had made, noting that now, as opposed to
several years earlier, Iraq had developed its institutions
and was exercising its national sovereignty. While there
were still periodic bombings that attempted unsuccessfully to
Qwere still periodic bombings that attempted unsuccessfully to
put Iraq's sovereignty into question and shake public
confidence, they were not succeeding, and he agreed that
Iraq's neighbors needed to re-examine their refusal or
half-hearted attempts to establish relations with Iraq.

CONDOLENCES FOR THE BOMBINGS
--------------


4. (C) A/S Feltman expressed condolences for the recent
series of bombings that targeted government ministries and
related symbols of national sovereignty and indicated that
the USG would continue to provide assistance, including
support in investigations, as requested by the GOI. Maliki
expressed appreciation for the assistance and noted that
there had been good cooperation in the investigations,
including active USG participation in some cases.

THE HCC AND A JANUARY DIPLOMATIC JCC
--------------


5. (C) Elaborating on the theme of cooperation, the PM noted
that Secretary of State Clinton chairs the Higher
Coordinating Committee (HCC) which overseas the various Joint

BAGHDAD 00003301 002 OF 003


Coordinating Committees (JCCs). Maliki expressed hope that
both would be tools for developing relations between Iraq and
the U.S. in fields such as energy and education. A/S Feltman
underscored the importance of the Diplomatic JCC, which he
said he had discussed with Iraqi FM Zebari in Manama. He
informed Maliki that the two had discussed convening this JCC
under their joint chairmanship in Baghdad in the second half
of January. A/S Feltman said that this bilateral strategic
dialogue on regional issues also sent a powerful signal to
Iraq's neighbors, putting them on notice that the USG was
initiating a dialogue on the type of regional architecture
that was needed to re-integrate Iraq. Iraq's Arab neighbors
need to be a part of that dialogue, finding ways to deal with
Iraq in a more positive way. Maliki expressed appreciation
for this emphasis in U.S. policy.

DIFFICULTIES IN UNDERSTANDING IRANIAN DECISION-MAKING
-------------- --------------


6. (C) A/S Feltman told the Prime Minister he was interested
in hearing his views on two countries, Iran and Syria, that
posed particular challenges for U.S. policy in the region.
Maliki said that he had not discussed the nuclear issue with
Iranian leaders at any level but noted more generally that
what he heard from them most often, in terms of a motivation
that could explain their nuclear ambitions, was the depth of
their fears of Israel, rather than the U.S. The PM
underlined the difficulty of understanding Iranian political
decision-making. It is possible, he observed, that there are
divisions that are causing some paralysis in internal
decision-making. But "it is not easy to understand the way
the Iranians think about politics," warned Maliki.

FEARS ABOUT INCREASING TENSIONS WITH IRAN
--------------


7. (C) Maliki pointed to an increase in regional tensions
with Iran in the past several months. He attributed this to
Iranian paranoia about what they perceived to be American and
British intervention during and after the June elections and
to Iranian fears that Israel would strike their nuclear
facilities. He urged the U.S. to consider using Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN, to find ways to "calm the
situation" and assuage Iranian fears. Then there could be
some improvement in the situation. At present, given Iranian
fears and the traditional stubbornness that Iranian leaders
demonstrate when under heavy pressure, the situation posed
certain dangers for the region. Iraq for its part was
fearful about any escalation that might lead to military
conflict. While all Gulf countries would be heavily affected
by a conflict that might close the Straits of Hormuz, the
lifeline for oil exports and most imports for the region,
Iraq would be the hardest hit. Such conflict could also lead
to further interference in Iraq's internal affairs, another
unwelcome development, the PM noted. Maliki told the A/S
that Iraq could intervene with the Iranian leadership, if
that was desired, to try to calm their fears and tell them
there is an opportunity to reach an agreement.

ASSESSING SYRIAN INTENTIONS
--------------


8. (C) Regarding Syria, A/S Feltman noted that the U.S. is
attempting to re-engage, after years of a relatively sterile
diplomatic freeze in relations. PM Maliki said that he knew
the Syrians much better than the Iranians, noting that he had
lived in Syria for 16 years and spoke the common language of
Arabic. He pointed to some similarities between the Iranians
and Syrians, assessing that both liked to amass and play
Qand Syrians, assessing that both liked to amass and play
political cards. However, the two reacted differently to
intense pressure. In his view the Iranians become very
stubborn while the Syrians listen carefully, try to evade the
pressure, and wait for a more opportune moment to re-engage
with their exposed activities. He said he used to hear
lectures from the Syrians about how effective they were with
the Americans, piling up political cards to play.

MORE CLEVER THAN THE IRANIANS IN IRAQI INTERFERENCE
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Maliki described the Syrians as more difficult to
deal with than the Iranians. Iran in his view has never been
able to deny that it was interfering in Iraq's internal
affairs. But Syria, the country that had perhaps intervened
the most, was able without serious scrutiny to portray itself
publicly (and in the media) as if it was the country that
exercised the most caution about such interference. He noted
that during his last trip to Damascus, in mid-August, the
Syrian leadership had embraced his offer of political and
economic incentives for bilateral engagement, but had
subsequently refused to stop offering facilitation to foreign
fighters entering Iraq from Syria and support for terrorism

BAGHDAD 00003301 003 OF 003


inside Iraq. The PM also highlighted the pan-Arab Baathist
ideology that remained a pillar of the Assad regime in
Damascus and created some of the motivation for Syrian
interference to destabilize the current non-Baathist regime
in Iraq. "It is an ideology that does not respect borders,"
he noted. While Saddam shared this basic ideology, the
Syrians are much smarter than he was, said Maliki. They are
in a country without significant resources, but are
intervening across borders in key places throughout the
region.


10. (C) A/S Feltman's cleared on this message.

FORD