A/S FELTMAN MEETING WITH IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT ADIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003297

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/I. NSC FOR PHEE AND VROOMAN.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS: IR IZ KDEM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: A/S FELTMAN MEETING WITH IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT ADIL
ABD AL-MAHDI.

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR GARY A. GRAPPO FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: A/S Feltman on December 15 met with Iraqi
Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi to offer congratulations on
the Iraqi government successfully reaching agreement on an
election law compromise and to discuss the road ahead as Iraq
prepares for the national election and government formation
process. Abd al-Mahdi was optimistic that the government
formation process following the national election would be
shorter than that following the 2005 elections. With regard
to the U.S. role during government formation, Abd al-Mahdi
stated that US guidance was welcome and recommended the US
government advise the Iraqis to be "inclusive but practical."
With regard to Iran, Abd al-Mahdi said that despite divisions
within the Iranian leadership, the Iranian government is
still making decisions and negotiating decisively, but
commented that the June 12, 2009 elections were a turning
point in Iranian history. The Vice President also noted that
there are subtle indications that the Iranian leadership is
opening to the idea of engagement with the United States.
End Summary.

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INVESTMENT CONFERENCES AND OIL BIDDING
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2. (C) The Vice President noted that he had attended multiple
investment conferences recently and that the last conference
in the United States had gone well. Abd al-Mahdi said that
people are much more willing to invest in Iraq now than
during 2006-2007 and at times are more optimistic about
investment than even the Iraqis.


3. (C) Abd al-Mahdi noted the importance of getting Iraq to
become a 10 million barrel-per-day producer of oil. He noted
that on December 14 he had sent his congratulations to Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Oil Minister Shahristani for the
successful completion of the second round of oil bidding.
Abd al-Mahdi commented, however, that he would like to ask
Shahristani "why he had not allowed the bidding to take place
in 2005." The Vice President noted that he had been pushing
Maliki for open bidding early on as the best method to boost
Iraq's economy, but that the Prime Minister had been hesitant
that it would be costly.


4. (C) A/S Feltman stressed the importance of the Iraqi
government maintaining its commitment to oil contracts
already signed, noting that attempts by the government to
renegotiate first round contracts now sends a very bad
message. The Vice President agreed that Iraq needs a strong
government that is committed and will honor its signature and
word, but noted that it was the Prime Minister's Legal
Advisor who was, in fact, attempting to renegotiate
contracts.

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ELECTION LAW AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION
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5. (C) A/S Feltman congratulated and thanked Vice President
Abd al-Mahdi for his active role in working to reach an
election law compromise and highlighted US engagement
relative to the election law as evidence of the ongoing U.S.
commitment to and partnership with Iraq. Abd al-Mahdi
credited the ultimate compromise reached on the election law
to the joint effort put forward by the U.S., UN and Iraq.


6. (C) A/S Feltman asked what Iraq would face in the upcoming
government formation process, voicing concern that the period
Qgovernment formation process, voicing concern that the period
of negotiating not be so extended that it created a political
vacuum. Abd al-Mahdi thought that the government formation
process would be shorter than in 2005, with new coalitions
more coherent and already deciding on candidates for Prime
Minister. The Vice President noted that once a Prime
Minister was decided upon, "the rest would be easy."
Additionally, he stated that he believed the next president
had already been agreed upon, with the majority wanting to
renew President Talabani for a second term.


7. (C) With regard to election integrity, Abd al-Mahdi
commented that during the 2005 election the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI) had accepted the election results the
day after the election, because its primary goal, ahead of

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dealing with corruption and transparency, was to defend the
process. However, he noted, this time it is important to
make sure the election is free from party and external
interference.(Comment: Since those 2005 elections, when ISCI
did quite well, the 2009 provincial election took place, when
ISCI performed poorly. That difference likely explains
ISCI's shift in position about how much scrutiny it should
apply to IHEC and to the issue of election integrity. End
Comment.)

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U.S. ROLE IN GOVERNMENT FORMATION PROCESS
--------------


8. (C) A/S Feltman asked the Vice President what role the
U.S. should play during the government formation process, to
which Abd al-Mahdi noted that U.S. guidance can be helpful
and that the U.S. could play a role in bringing Iraqis to a
common perspective. According to Abd al-Mahdi, once there is
a winning list, the U.S. could assist by advising the winners
"to be inclusive" and by counseling the losers to participate
in government formation with minimum conditions to avoid
paralyzing the government. Abd al-Mahdi noted that if the
State of Law (SOL) or Iraqi National Alliance (INA) won,
there would already be a certain level of negotiations with
the Kurds, but that it would be more difficult negotiating
with Allawi and others. The Vice President said that in Iraq
there is no way to lead other than by a national unity
government, inclusive of everyone. Additionally, Abd
al-Mahdi noted that even if two lists won, there would still
not be a majority and other parties and blocs would have to
be incorporated.

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PRESIDENCY COUNCIL
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9. (C) Asked whether he thought it is a good idea to keep the
Presidency Council, Abd al-Mahdi stated that he did not. The
Vice President acknowledged the need for some mechanism of
"checks and balances," but felt it better to follow the
presidency concept designed by the constitution. (Note: The
constitution sunsets the Presidency Council after one term
and enshrines a much weaker sole President. End Note.)
Additionally, the Vice President joked that eliminating the
Presidency Council would make it easier to pass legislation
and govern, "with no Abd al-Mahdi or Hashimi to veto."
(Note: This was a clear reference to the election law
negotiations resulting from Vice President Hashimi's veto.
End note.) Abd al-Mahdi noted that if consensus was reached
to continue the Presidency Council, there should be a
referendum on whether to renew the Presidency Council or not,
as renewal would require a constitutional amendment, and
noted one proposal to hold a referendum the same day as the
national election with a yes/no question on whether to renew.


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ISCI'S IMAGE
--------------


10. (C) When asked about the changing tone of recent ISCI
statements, Abd al-Mahdi stated that ISCI,s image had been
deliberately distorted during the last elections and that
ISCI had always been a moderate party, even in the 1990s. He
noted that ISCI was always accused of being sectarian, but it
was an important party in establishing relationships with the
Kurds and Sunnis. Abd al-Mahdi said that ISCI should have
changed its language and platform after the 2005 elections in
response to the changing realities in Iraq, noting that most
Qresponse to the changing realities in Iraq, noting that most
ISCI leaders also now understand the lesson of losing seats
in the 2009 provincial elections. The Vice President
additionally noted that ISCI was not alone in revising its
party discourse to tone down sectarian emphases and
potentially divisive language on religion. He pointed out by
way of illustration that the Kurds' rhetoric on religion has
also changed, noting that the Kurdish constitution has
completely borrowed language from the Iraqi constitution with
regard to religion.

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WHY VOTE FOR THE INA?
--------------


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11. (C) In looking toward the upcoming national election, A/S
Feltman asked the Vice President what undecided voters would
find most appealing about ISCI over the SOL list. Abd
al-Mahdi said that the SOL is essentially Prime Minister
Maliki,s "personal" list, whereas the INA is a popular list,
with roots among the Iraqi people, and with candidates
capable of leading. He noted that on the security issue in
particular, the INA can do a better job than Maliki, with
both more experience and strong popular support. As an
example, he said that Maliki would not have been able to sign
the security agreement with the U.S. without ISCI support.
Additionally, Abd al-Mahdi mentioned that even if Allawi won,
he would need INA support.

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IRANIAN LEADERSHIP AND MESSAGES TO THE U.S.
--------------


12. (C) Abd al-Mahdi commented that during an official visit
to France prior to the Iranian election in June, President
Sarkozy had asked his predictions regarding the election, and
he initially speculated that Ahmadinejad would win. However,
after a subsequent trip to Tehran he sent a message to
Sarkozy changing his prediction. Abd al-Mahdi had noted a
change in the Iranian mood and reported that it was possible
that opposition candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi was the more
favorable candidate. According to Abd al-Mahdi, Iranian
Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and even some within Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) predicted Mousavi
would win.


13. (C) Abd al-Mahdi said that from his understanding, the
Iranian elections were fraudulent. Additionally, he noted
that it was a key mistake on Supreme Leader Khamenei's part
not to use his pivotal Friday sermon to quiet the situation
before student protests began. Abd al-Mahdi said that at
that point there was a perception that the state was against
the voters, and Khamenei could have corrected it. The Vice
President believed that the Iranian elections on June 12 were
a key turning point in modern Iranian politics, marking a
shift in Iran toward a more democratic system.


14. (C) The Vice President said that there are divisions
within the Iranian leadership and some hesitation in taking
action, but that there is not a leadership vacuum and that
one should not conclude based on divisions within the Iranian
leadership that the system is weak. Abd al-Mahdi noted that
the Iranian government is still respected, making decisions,
and negotiating powerfully.


15. (C) A/S Feltman noted that the US government had hoped to
start seeing progress on engagement with Iran following the
P5 1 meeting in Geneva on 1 October, but that agreements the
U.S. thought to have been achieved at the time now remain in
limbo. Abd al-Mahdi commented that the Iranians are known
for patience with their policies, noting that the U.S. must
keep trying to engage, but must demonstrate a similar level
of patience. He said that the U.S. must work to discourage
Iran from perceiving the U.S. as weak relative to the
situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as such weakness
would encourage extremist trends within Iran.


16. (C) Additionally, Abd al-Mahdi noted that he can see some
moderation, even among the Iranian leadership, with regard to
the United States. He noted that Khamenei's messages have
Qthe United States. He noted that Khamenei's messages have
shown some limited openings with statements such as "the U.S.
is our enemy, but(" As further evidence, Abd al-Mahdi noted
that two months ago the Canadian Ambassador to Iraq and
former Deputy Secretary of Treasury Robert Kimmit had asked
him to speak with the Iranians regarding a detained Canadian
national, Newsweek journalist Maziar Bahari. Abd al-Mahdi
said he spoke with the Iranians and helped secure Bahari's
release. Although the individual was a Canadian national, Abd
al-Mahdi stresssed the significance of the fact that he
worked for a U.S. organization.


17. (U) A/S Feltman cleared on this cable.
FORD