DEC 8 BOMBINGS RESULT IN FINGER POINTING, NEW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003295 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: DEC 8 BOMBINGS RESULT IN FINGER POINTING, NEW INTEL COMMITTEE REF: A. BAGHDAD 3183 ¶B. BAGHDAD 3267 ¶C. BAGHDAD 3193 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The combination of Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) high profile questioning of senior Iraqi security officials, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and Maliki's own public effort to coordinate intelligence agencies is doing little to bolster Iraqi public confidence in its national security and intelligence institutions. This public posturing resulted in the removal of a senior Baghdad security official despite insider acknowledgments that the removal is anticipated to have little practical effect. Nevertheless, GOI resolve and cohesion remain high, and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are pressing onward at a newly ordered higher state of alert, somewhat buoyed by recent recognition of its success in disrupting a portion of the December 8 attacks. U.S. officials continue to urge the GOI to refocus its public message on calls for national unity and to cease its public finger pointing. END SUMMARY. Parliament Questions PM and Ministers - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Maliki endured a six-hour session of questioning on security matters at the Council of Representatives (COR) on December 10 (ref A). COR members complained about the lack of a clear strategy to combat terrorism, the alleged presence of Baathists in the security forces, and poor security coordination in Baghdad between the Ministry of Interior (MOI),the Ministry of Defense (MOD),and the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC). Maliki held to a calm and consistent defense of his administration's efforts to combat terrorism but acknowledged that intelligence shortfalls are the GOI's greatest weakness. (Note: COR Speaker Ayad al-Samarrai reinforced this point December 15 to NEA A/S Feltman, noting that weak Iraqi intelligence collection was a contributing factor to recent security incidents (septel). End note.) The PM underscored the limitations on his ability to act given the nature of Iraq's consensual government, the halting progress toward national unity, and limited budgetary resources. Following the PM's presentation, the COR hosted Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir al-Mufriji, Minister of Interior Bulani, Minister of State for National Security Shirawn al-Waili, recently removed BOC Commanding General Abud Qanbar and other security officials for questioning December 12-14. ¶3. (C) In Parliament, Office of the Commander-in-Chief (OCINC) Commanding General Faruq pressed for the removal of key Defense Ministry individuals, while MPs encouraged Faruq to transfer or replace security officials working along the Iraq-Syria border. Bulani called for the BOC to be linked directly to the Interior and Defense Ministries to improve efficiency. (Note: The PM immediately named MOI Federal Police Commander Lieutenant General Hussein al-Awadi as deputy to the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC),in apparent hopes of improving coordination between the BOC (which reports to the PM and the MOD) and the MOI. End note.) The Iraqi press reported that Defense Minister Abd al-Qadir reminded the COR of the vast improvements in security since he assumed his post in 2006, but admitted that the units who responded to the early morning intelligence on December 8 Qresponded to the early morning intelligence on December 8 were possibly negligent. ¶4. (S/NF) Maliki has not called publicly for the removal of Minister of Interior Bulani, but indicated privately he would have no objection if the COR sought a vote of no confidence in the beleaguered minister. USF-I sources corroborated this report, adding that Maliki had joined forces with MP leaders and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq to scheme Bulani's removal from his post. (Comment: The efforts have been unsuccessful to date. Bulani is still the Minister and has not been threatened with a vote of no confidence. Maliki and Bulani have a contentious relationship that has been exacerbated by POLITICAL aspirations of both as well as recent security incidents. End note.) One MOI source reported that Bulani stormed out of a meeting with the PM after the two officials had a heated exchange in the days following the December 8 bombings. BAGHDAD 00003295 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Maliki emphasized the creation of a new intelligence committee during his remarks to the COR, and on December 17 announced an intelligence rewards program (ref B). These very public steps could discredit further the current intelligence and security coordination mechanism. Post had heard reports that OSI head al-Basri will be in charge of the new intelligence coordination mechanism, with Minister of State al-Waili as his possible deputy. Al-Waili, nonetheless, told acting PolMil Couns on December 20 that he heads the group with a two star military deputy. The Political Council for National Security held a session December 16 chaired by President Talabani. Maliki reportedly used the session to outline his plans to combat terrorism. Vice President Tariq al Hashemi told DCM and Pol M/C December 19 that Maliki and his poor security record were strongly criticized within the PCNS. PCNS members roundly harangued Maliki and his government for "failing to coordinate or seek input." Recommendations were made by several sides but there was no apparent decision for action, according to al Hashemi. (Note: The PCNS is comprised of the Presidency Council, the Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers, the Speaker of the COR and heads of all major POLITICAL blocs as a means for the Iraqi POLITICAL leadership to develop consensus and bargain on key issues. End note.) ¶6. (S/NF) Another OCINC-led security related committee met over the course of several days beginning on December 15, as ordered by the Prime Minister. According to BOC Brigadier General Wasifi, this committee includes participation from every intelligence, security, federal police, Iraqi army, and operations command headquarters in the country. The purpose of this committee is to develop an operational needs statement for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. BOC Commander Removed - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (S/NF) Maliki dismissed the head of the BOC, General Abud Qanbar, December 10, due to rumors that he had received reports of possible attacks in the early morning of December ¶8. General Abud responded to these allegations in Parliament with a well documented presentation claiming the he received this information, but that it did not provide accurate, actionable intelligence. The second-ranking official in the Interior Ministry, the well-connected Deputy Minister al-Asadi, told the DCM on December 12 that the PM had removed General Abud to satisfy the POLITICAL demand for action. He doubted it would lead to much change in Baghdad security operations. (Note: USF-I confirmed that they did pass information to the BOC regarding potential bombings on December 8, but agreed that it did not provide any insight into specific details of the attacks. The information in the report referred to a possible attack against the court building in Karkh, with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device between 1830 and 2030 on December 8. End note.) General Abud will retain his rank, and is currently serving as an advisor to the new BOC Commanding General, Lieutenant General Ahmed Hashem, formally the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCoS OPS) at the Ministry of Defense. General Abud told a BOC advisor that the PM plans to assign him as the new DCoS OPS once he is satisfied that the transition to Qthe new DCoS OPS once he is satisfied that the transition to the new BOC Commander is complete. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: With an election date on the horizon, the public appears to attribute POLITICAL motives as much as security strategy to the recent flourish of the COR's and PM's public maneuvers. Maliki has staked his reputation on security gains achieved in Iraq, and is likely cognizant of the impact such security breaches could have on his State of Law coalition in the upcoming national election. Recent attacks have targeted Iraqi government facilities as opposed to civilian targets such as markets and schools, which seems intended to undermined the public's confidence in the GOI's authority and ISF capabilities. It is worth noting that the ISF is on higher readiness in Baghdad now and have scored some successes against the December 8 attackers. We will continue to urge Iraqi leaders in the government and the COR alike to redouble their calls for national unity and resist the finger pointing which could foster public cynicism in the short term and damage to ISF credibility in public eyes if it continues. END COMMENT. FORD