IRAQ'S OIL BID ROUND 2: DOMESTIC POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003246 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019 TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON EINV EAID PREL IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ'S OIL BID ROUND 2: DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS REF: BAGHDAD 3196 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Hill for reasons 1.5 b,d ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The job creation and spin-off benefits of economic development should provide a significant boost to the citizens of Basrah. If developments in other countries offer a guide, however, there remains a chance that Basrah residents, living near the source of much of Iraq's wealth, could in the future demand a greater share of Iraq's revenues and development spending. Unless revenue sharing is carefully managed, rapid development in the Shi'a south could alienate Iraq's Sunni community. Convincing the Iraqi on the street that he/she too is a beneficiary of this oil boom will require an enhanced focus on good governance, transparency, social outreach, and effective local-level development initiatives by Baghdad. Elsewhere, tensions between Baghdad and Erbil over oil contracts remain high, and the recent bid round's success will entrench MOO resistance to accommodation with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on this issue. The notable transparency of the two recent MOO-hosted bid rounds also gives Baghdad enhanced moral authority to insist that Erbil make public its contracts and explain how and under what terms the contracts were awarded. Meanwhile, Erbil will likely seek to impede progress on the GOI's oil contracts as a means of putting political pressure on Baghdad to reach a deal on other issues of importance to Erbil. End Summary. ¶2. This cable is one in a series analyzing the impacts of Iraq's Second Petroleum Licensing Round ("bid round"),held December 11-12 in Baghdad. Results of the bid round are detailed extensively in reftel. This cable examines the impacts of rapid oil development on Iraq's domestic and sectarian politics. Other cables in this series will analyze the impact on Iraq's investment climate, challenges (notably infrastructure) to attaining the ambitious production targets set by this bid round, implications for OPEC, and impacts on U.S. firms. End Summary. Implications for Sectarian Relations: Shi'a - Sunni -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) A function of geology and geography, the majority of Iraq's known oil reserves are located in the far south of Iraq, in areas dominated by Shi'a Iraqis. Despite this source of wealth, Basrah province and other Shi'a areas remain as underdeveloped and mired in poverty as other provinces. The job creation and spin-off benefits of economic development (in oil sector support industries, port and airport services, and tech transfer) should provide significant benefits to the citizens of Basrah. If developments in other countries offer a guide, however, there remains a chance that Basrah residents, living near the source of much of Iraq's wealth, could demand a greater share of Iraq's revenues and development spending. We assess that the likelihood of a Basrah/Baghdad schism is diminished by the Shi'a dominance of the current federal government and the likelihood the next federal government will also be Shi'a led. That said, the federal government may increasingly have to pay greater attention to providing demonstrable benefits in the provinces from oil investments. One such proposal is to share 50 cents per barrel produced directly with oil producing provinces, over and above the allocation contained Qproducing provinces, over and above the allocation contained in the federal budget. Similarly, GOI spending on infrastructure (water, sewer, electricity, roads) will need to be expanded in the provinces, as tangible proof that all Iraqis are benefitting from Iraq's oil boom. ¶4. (C) In contrast, unless revenue sharing is carefully managed, rapid development in the Shi'a south could alienate Iraq's Sunni community. Many of the Sunni-dominated provinces lack significant oil sector development, and some (such as Anbar) are sparsely populated, leading to small budget appropriations as well. Unless efforts are made to share the benefits of this oil boom with the Sunni regions, any rapid increase in prosperity that is perceived as benefiting only (or primarily) the Shi'a areas could be seen an inequitable and inflame sectarian tensions. ¶5. (C) Both the first and second bid rounds offered oil fields in Sunni areas, ranging from Anbar to Diyala to Ninewa provinces. However, most of these fields are remote and relatively small in comparison to the truly giant fields in Basrah, which made them less attractive to investors. Poor BAGHDAD 00003246 002 OF 003 financial incentives (e.g. Anbar's Akkas field) and security concerns (e.g. the Diyala Group of fields -- located in disputed territory bordering the Kurdistan Region) discouraged bids on these fields. Two Ninewa fields (Najmah and Qayarah) were awarded and hold promise both for local development and as political symbols of the broad benefits of oil sector development. That said, these fields are small and produce less valuable, very heavy oil. We assess that the relative economic impact of these fields will be minimal, undermining somewhat their potency as political symbols of equity and broadly shared development. (However, in absolute terms, it is worth recalling that these two fields could require more than a billion dollars of outside investment, which is larger than anything else on offer in the Sunni areas.) ¶6. (C) At the end of the day, the real benefits for the provinces will come from a dramatically increased revenue stream to the Baghdad government, which must then be shared proportionally with all Iraqi provinces and regions. Making this work, and convincing the Iraqi on the street that he/she is also a beneficiary of this oil boom, could require an enhanced focus on good governance, transparency, social outreach, and effective, local-level development initiatives by Baghdad. ImplicatioXblPD" J23QH|QQRQRQQQQQto that are recent allegations, including one investigation Qthat are recent allegations, including one investigation launched by Norwegian securities regulators, that KRG officials participated in stock manipulation and insider trading related to these contracts. End comment.) Whether motivated by a desire to root out corruption or, more likely, a desire to embarrass and rein-in the KRG, Minister of Oil Shahristani has more standing than ever to refuse to recognize KRG contracts as legitimate. ¶9. (C) As is often the case, oil is also a political issue, and is being used in the larger dispute between the KRG and Baghdad over autonomy, revenue, and territory. Erbil likely seeks to impede progress on the GOI's oil contracts as a means of pressuring Baghdad to make concessions on other issues of importance to Erbil. Baghdad urgently needs these oil contracts to move forward, for the legitimacy, stability, and revenues they can confer. This is not lost on Erbil, which sees oil as handy leverage in negotiations elsewhere. Thus, as these contracts move towards signature and implementation, we will not be surprised to see a chorus of objections, led by Kurdish Member of Parliament and Chair of the Oil and Gas Committee Ali Balo, claiming that the contracts are illegitimate and must be approved by Parliament. For similar reasons, it is possible that BAGHDAD 00003246 003 OF 003 opponents will seek to impeach Minister Shahristani through a vote of no-confidence in the Parliament. (Note: Balo, working with Fadhila MP Jaber Khalifa Jaber, called Shahristani to Parliament for questioning in November with the intent of discrediting his performance, but Shahristani easily deflected the criticisms and likely emerged from his questioning stronger than before. With his spectacularly successful second bid round now concluded, and with largely muted protests from petro-nationalists, it seems even less likely that Shahristani's opponents can prevail. End Note.) ¶10. Comment: These issues will likely come up again in the negotiations leading to government formation next year, following the March 7 national elections. The Kurdish bloc will play an important role in the formation of any new government, and could indeed find itself in the role of kingmaker, as it did after the 2005 elections. Taking advantage of this, the KRG could in return for its political support ask for mutual recognition of prior-existing oil contracts, access to the Iraq-Turkey oil export pipeline, and payments to IOCs operating in the KRG in accordance with the KRG contracts. End Comment. HILL