SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEETING WITH THE GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003234 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEETING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ PRESIDENCY COUNCIL ON DECEMBER 10 BAGHDAD 00003234 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a December 10 meeting with the Presidency Council (PC) in Baghdad, Secretary of Defense Gates (SecDef) expressed his condolences for the December 8 bombings and reassured the Iraqis that the United States was willing to assist in any way possible. SecDef explained the importance of cooperation between the security ministries in preventing future attacks and warned the Iraqi leaders not to be complacent during periods of improved security. He stated that credible national elections and a timely government formation period are critical to sustaining Iraq's security gains. Although PC members were united in their concern over the implications of the attacks, their reactions and recommendations varied. Whereas President Talabani voiced support for Minister of Defense al-Mufriji, Vice President (VP) Hashimi said the al Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) threat was beyond Iraq's capacity and appealed for U.S. assistance, and VP Abd al Mahdi described the current system as a failure. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Accompanying SecDef were: Ambassador Hill, MNF-I Deputy Commanding General Hunzeker, Assistance Secretary of Defense Vershbow, Vice Admiral and Senior Military Advisor to SecDef Kernan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy Kahl, Special Assistant to SecDef McCarthy, Press Secretary Morrell, and U.S Embassy Political Counselor Yuri Kim. Accompanying Talabani, Hashimi, and Abd al Mahdi were: KRG Prime Minister Salih and Minister of Defense al-Mufriji. DECEMBER 8 BOMBINGS AND OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) SecDef met Talabani, Hashimi, and Abd al Mahdi December 10 in Baghdad. SecDef spoke with Talabani for 20 minutes before the other PC members arrived. Although SecDef had not specifically requested a meeting with them, Minister of Defense al-Mufriji and KRG Prime Minister Barham Salih also attended. ¶4. (C) When SecDef asked Talabani if he thought the security ministries were doing enough to coordinate their efforts, Talabani described the security problem as lack of unity. With several institutions and "special groups," Talabani said, everyone was reporting to a different person when they should all be reporting to the Minister of Defense. When Talabani said that life had been normalizing prior to the attacks, SecDef took the opportunity to gently warn the participants that the GoI had become too comfortable as a result of the vastly improved security situation before the August ministry bombings, and that these latest attacks should be taken as a reminder that AQI may be down, but they were not out. The GoI needed to remain vigilant in continuing to combat terrorist efforts to destabilize the country. ¶5. (C) SecDef told the PC members that the attacks were a measure of desperation, and that when he was in Kabul, he was reminded that Al Qaeda remains active in both Iraq and South Asia. MNF-I Deputy Commanding General Hunzeker pointed out the positive aspects of the situation by reminding everyone that the December 8 attacks were neither well-timed nor well-coordinated, due in part to the efforts of the Iraq Security Forces (ISF). When VP al Mahdi complained that the QSecurity Forces (ISF). When VP al Mahdi complained that the GoI had 400,000 troops in Baghdad and still could not protect the capital, SecDef stated that there were probably too many different groups charged with security and that they should be consolidated. He said he would raise the issue with Maliki during his meeting with him. ¶6. (C) Defense Minister Al-Mufriji vigorously defended the measures being taken by the government to combat terrorist attacks, stating that there was one center in Baghdad for security and one associated intelligence center and that U.S.-Iraqi coordination had been effective since June 30. He mentioned that the ISF had taken down an entire terrorist cell in Mosul. (Note: In a passing reference to foreign interference, Al-Mufriji said that ammunition found in the Mosul area could only have come from Syria. End note.) Al-Mufriji stated that Mosul was the capital for AQI financial planning and Baghdad was their center of operations. He also claimed that they had already found the people responsible for the August bombings and that the primary source of the most recent bombings is under BAGHDAD 00003234 002.2 OF 003 surveillance. Acknowledging the gravity of the threat, he said that he expected a big surge in terrorist operations in Baghdad in the next months and that the GoI had sent out alerts to citizens. He stated that Iraq's political system is "unacceptable" to the terrorists, and that the democratic process by which the election law was adopted is unique in the Middle East. ¶7. (C) In a statement echoed by Maliki during his meeting with SecDef, al-Mufriji admitted that Iraqi intelligence capabilities were not strong, and that the GoI depends greatly on U.S. intelligence. SecDef relayed General Odierno's pleasure with the progress of the ISF and the lack of renewed sectarian violence. He underscored the U.S. intention to fully carry out the Security Agreement and move to a long-term political, economic, and cultural relationship in addition to the existing security relationship. ¶8. (C) Vice President al Mahdi noted a distinction in the types of threats against the GoI, saying that the GoI had successfully combated insurgents and that the threat facing them now was terrorism. Both he and Abdul al-Mufriji pointed out that Iraq is not the only country that is a victim of terrorist attacks, naming Russia and Pakistan as two specific examples of countries also plagued by terrorist attacks. ¶9. (C) Hashimi concluded with an impassioned plea for more U.S. support, stating that security challenges were "beyond our capacity as Iraqis" to solve and that the U.S. as Iraq's friend and partner must help the GoI. He complained that the PC was being deliberately marginalized, and outlined four ways to improve Iraq's security: (1) reshuffle security ministries; (2) expand the term "security" to include reconciliation and power-sharing; (3) improve KRG-GoI relations; and (4) improve Iraq's foreign policy and relations with neighboring countries. U.S. INFLUENCE AND PASSAGE OF ELECTION LAW - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Regarding the election law, Talabani said, "We are Iraqis. We know how to quarrel but we also know how to solve problems." SecDef joked that the Iraqis were learning from the United States in this regard - as with the U.S. Congress, it helps to have tight deadlines. In jest, Talabani remarked that when all else fails, he blames the British for causing all these problems with Iraq's democratic development. He then became serious and expressed his gratitude to SecDef and to POTUS, whose phone call to President Barzani drove the KRG President to direct us to "immediately do what he (POTUS) asked us." ELECTIONS, GOVERNMENT FORMATION, AND THE PRESIDENCY COUNCIL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) Talabani discused the political jockeying in the run-up to the election, noting that blocs are actively exploring alliances. He also mentioned that former Prime Minister Allawi was reaching out to former opposition parties in an effort to forge alliances before the elections. When asked by SecDef whether he would reconsider his decision not to seek reelection, Talabani smiled but did not answer. In a thinly veiled jab at Maliki, Abd al Mahdi told SecDef that Iraq needs change. (Comment: Abd al Mahdi is widely viewed to be a contender for PM after the national elections. End comment.) Qcomment.) ¶12. (C) SecDef then reiterated the importance of Talabani's leadership. He urged Talabani and the PC to use their prestige and authority to ensure that government formation took place quickly, as the risks of a vacuum like the one the Iraqis experienced in 2006 was too high. Talabani assured SecDef that secret talks were already underway that would allow a government to be formed quickly, and that he was confident agreements would be formulated even before the elections scheduled to take place next March. Talabani reminded SecDef that Iraqis are new to democracy and are still making mistakes, to which SecDef laughingly replied that the United States has been at this game for a long time and still makes mistakes. On relations with other members of the PC, Talabani stated that the members have differing ideologies, but that in the end they will reach agreement. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN THE ELECTIONS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - BAGHDAD 00003234 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) In response to SecDef's question about attempts by neighbors to interfere with the upcoming elections, Talabani stated that all Iraq's neighbors were interfering, albeit in different ways: the Gulf and Saudi Arabia with money, Iran with money and political influence, and the Syrians by all means. The Turks are "polite" in their interference, but continue their attempts to influence Iraq's Turkmen community and Sunnis in Mosul. The only ones who do not interfere are the Kuwaitis, according to Talabani. OTHER ISSUES: IRAN AND OIL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) When Ambassador Hill asked Talabani to share his insights about Iran's internal dynamics, the President stated that things are now changing from the bottom up and the population is no longer satisfied with their government. Whereas Supreme Leader Khamenei was always seen as above political infighting and opposition demonstrations, he is now very much a part of the crackdown, with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and other hard-liner elements increasingly in control despite the people's unhappiness with the recent elections. SecDef told Talabani that domestic infighting was the likely reason why Iran backed away from a promising approach to build confidence about its nuclear program through the Tehran Research Reactor Proposal. He said that the U.S, China, Russia, and the Europeans were likely to strengthen sanctions if Iranian behavior does not change. ¶14. (C) Asked about the progress on oil-related meetings, KRG PM Salih informed SecDef that Iraq's second round of oil bids would take place on December 11 and that there is a need to start exploring deals even before the enactment of a hydrocarbons law to break the stagnation of the oil industry. Salih also stated that parliament would ultimately have to decide on action regarding the modernization of oil platforms in the South. ¶15. (U) DASD Kahl reviewed and approved this cable. HILL