Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD3143
2009-12-05 07:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

MEK/ASHRAF: GOI PLANNING "SOFT MOVE" OF ASHRAF

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER IR IZ 
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OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHSL
RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHGB #3143/01 3390710
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 050710Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5630
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003143 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/I. NSC FOR PHEE AND VROOMAN.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: MEK/ASHRAF: GOI PLANNING "SOFT MOVE" OF ASHRAF
RESIDENTS ON DECEMBER 15

REF: BAGHDAD 2942 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political Counselor Yuri Kim for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003143 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/I. NSC FOR PHEE AND VROOMAN. E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR IZ SUBJECT: MEK/ASHRAF: GOI PLANNING "SOFT MOVE" OF ASHRAF RESIDENTS ON DECEMBER 15 REF: BAGHDAD 2942 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Political Counselor Yuri Kim for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: According to senior GOI officials, the GOI will send buses and trucks to Ashraf on December 15 in order to encourage voluntary defection and departure of Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) residents from Ashraf. The GOI still ultimately plans to relocate residents to Camp Samawa in Muthanna province, but will house Ashraf residents in Baghdad hotels in the interim (6-8 weeks),pending the refurbishment of Samawa. The GOI is preparing to follow up the voluntary relocation measure on December 15 with steps to forcibly relocate remaining residents. It is not clear how much of PM Maliki's decision is driven by political considerations in the run-up to the elections, and how much is in response to Iranian pressure. Post will continue senior-level engagement with GOI officials to underscore the potential international costs for the GOI if violence erupts or the relocation proves a failure. Post will also prepare, in coordination with MNFI and UNAMI, USG contingencies in the event of renewed violence on December 15 or thereafter. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT From Ashraf to Hotels to Muthanna -------------- ¶2. (C) The GOI's Human Rights Minister, Wijdan Salim, and the Chairman of the Ashraf Committee, Ali Yassery, separately informed USG officials (Brigadier General David Quantock and Post's Senior Iran Watcher) that the GOI plans to carry out on December 15 the first step in a plan to relocate MEK residents out of Ashraf. The GOI's first step is, in the presence of international observers and media, to send buses and trucks to Ashraf on December 15 in an effort to solicit voluntary departures. The effort is being billed as a "soft" (i.e., voluntary) move that would allow residents the opportunity to go peacefully under the watchful eye of foreign media and the international community. Whereas Wijdan envisions buses returning on multiple dates over the course of several weeks, Yassery asserted that residents would have only one opportunity to board voluntarily on December 15. (NOTE: Three MEK members have defected from Ashraf over the past three weeks and turned themselves over to the local Iraqi police commander for subseque
nt transfer to a hotel in Baghdad. There are currently 9 MEK defectors residing in the Zuhoor Hotel in Baghdad awaiting resettlement/repatriation. END NOTE). ¶3. (C) Following the move from Ashraf, residents will be transferred temporarily (several weeks) to hotels in Baghdad, at GOI expense, pending their subsequent transfer to Camp Samawa in Muthanna, following the camp's refurbishment. Wijdan estimates refurbishment of the camp will take 6-8 weeks and believes the relocation will help separate the MEK leaders from the rank and file, thus helping to dismantle the organization in Iraq. Yassery said the GOI plans to upgrade Samawa in the coming weeks to accommodate all 3,400 residents and will invite USG and foreign officials to visit the camp prior to the MEK's arrival. Yassery believes the Prime Minister will secure the buy-in of Muthanna provincial officials, including the governor, for the subsequent Qofficials, including the governor, for the subsequent transfer to Camp Samawa, given the PM's political ties and influence in the province. (NOTE: The Muthanna Provincial Council last month voted to reject the proposed move. The GOI has not refurbished the camp following the turnover of the base from the Japanese in 2006. The camp currently houses 600 personnel from a local Iraqi Army battalion, but will require significant upgrades, including additional housing, medical, and dining units to accommodate up to 3,400 people for an extended period of time. END NOTE). Move Politically Motivated -------------- ¶4. (C) According to both interlocutors, the GOI does not anticipate violence on December 15 given the voluntary nature of the move, although Wijdan doubts the viability of the December 15 plan, commenting "I'll be happy if even one or two decide to get on the buses." Although Wijdan is an ardent critic of the MEK, she believes the GOI's decision to move residents is ill-timed and politically motivated, intended largely to win Maliki points before the elections and to BAGHDAD 00003143 002 OF 002 pacify Iranian calls for action. USG officials questioned the timing and necessity of the move given the absence of viable relocation sites, and the likelihood that poorly-planned and executed relocation could result in unintended humanitarian consequences and international backlash. USG officials also reminded both interlocutors of GOI assurances of humane treatment and the need to avoid bloodshed. BG Quantock complained about reports of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Ashraf were preventing the entry of medical equipment intended for residents. Yassery countered that the GOI had initially blocked the entry of wheelchairs because they had been used as media propaganda by the MEK during the July clashes. He noted that ISF officials had been instructed to allow all medical and humanitarian supplies. ¶5. (C) Both interlocutors reaffirmed the GOI's commitment to humane treatment of residents. Yassery said the ISF will not resort to force of any kind on the 15th but are prepared to remove residents forcibly in the coming weeks (NFI) in order to implement the GOI's relocation plan. He added that the GOI is also prepared to act on Interpol and GOI warrants for several dozen MEK members if they choose to resist. When asked about the details of the plan, Yassery demurred, stating that the plans were finalized but confidential. MEK in Ashraf Untenable -------------- ¶6. (C) Yassery said that the MEK's continued presence in Ashraf was untenable given the MEK's proximity to the Iranian border; Iranian threats against the organization; and growing insecurity in the province. "We are responsible for their (MEK's) welfare," Yassery asserted. When asked about the IRIG's reaction to the proposed relocation plan, Yassery commented that he had not spoken with the Iranian ambassador since the July GOI-MEK confrontation. "The Iranian ambassador feels neglected and complains that we don't see him. I told him that we will contact him when we need his assistance with passports, papers, etc." Yassery said. ¶7. (C) Wijdan criticized the GOI for its ineffective (or nonexistent) media strategy, saying "We are not good at talking to the press and the MEK will exploit this opportunity," she asserted. Yassery confirmed that both foreign and local media, along with UNAMI, ICRC, and other international organizations will be invited on December 15 to ensure transparency. Wijdan may also accompany Yassery and other GOI officials on a proposed interagency visit to Brussels before December 15 to brief EU officials on the GOI's relocation plan for the MEK and solicit their assistance with the resettlement of MEK refugees. Yassery has offered to brief Western diplomats and UN officials in Baghdad prior to December 15. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) The GOI, notably Maliki, sees no merit in inaction and prefers to demonstrate resolve and commitment against the MEK, irrespective of the practical and humanitarian challenges of such an operation. It is also unclear to what extent, if any, the GOI has devised a viable operational plan to carry out the proposed arrests and entry into Ashraf of ISF to ensure a successful relocation with minimal violence. MEK die-hards will ensure that GOI assurances of humane QMEK die-hards will ensure that GOI assurances of humane treatment are put to the test in the event of violent confrontation. Post will continue to impress upon GOI officials, notably in the PM's office, the international consequences of renewed violence and a failed relocation effort. Post will coordinate with MNFI and UNAMI on appropriate USG contingencies in the event of renewed violence on December 15 or thereafter. FORD

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