IRAQ'S ACTING NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ON THE MEK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003124 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO LIMBERT AND CORBIN. NSC FOR TALWAR, MAGSAMEN, PHEE, AND VROOMAN. E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ'S ACTING NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ON THE MEK AND IRAN Classified By: POLITICAL Counselor Yuri Kim for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a November 25 meeting with Post's Iran Watchers (IW),Dr. Safa Al-Shaykh (Da'wa party),the GOI's Acting National Security Adviser (A/NSA),said the GOI's policy on the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) is dictated largely by domestic and regional (vice international) POLITICAL considerations. According to Al-Shaykh, the December 15 deadline to relocate the MEK is increasingly unfeasible, thereby limiting GOI options until after the election. Al-Shaykh said he believes that Iraq's bilateral relationship with Iran will mature over time to allow for greater parity in the face of Iranian interference. Implicit in his tone was a subtle criticism of those who favor a rushed and aggressive approach to balancing Iranian influence. However, Al-Shaykh acknowledged the need to develop POLITICAL parity in Iraq's bilateral RELATIONS with Iran. Al-Shaykh is a soft-spoken GOI loyalist and rare breed of POLITICAL insider and technocrat. He can serve as an important voice of reason in internal GOI debates on the MEK and broader Iran policy. END SUMMARY Pressure to Act Against MEK -------------- ¶2. (C) On November 25, Dr. Safa Al-Shaykh, the GOI's Acting National Security Adviser (A/NSA) and close associate of PM Maliki, met with Post's Iran watchers (IWs) to discuss Iran-Iraq RELATIONS and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK). IWs briefed Al-Shaykh on UNAMI's monitoring and reporting role at the U.S. base (Grizzly) at Ashraf, explaining that the UN presence was an important and welcome development for the USG. Asked whether the GOI's December 15 MEK/Ashraf relocation deadline would hold, Al-Shaykh said the lack of relocation options made the deadline increasingly unrealistic and that the matter would likely be dealt with by the next GOI administration (NOTE: Latest GOI murmurings point to the possibility of a "soft" (i.e., voluntary) move of Ashraf residents on December 15 in an effort to solicit defections. We surmise that the GOI prefers some form of action rather than inaction, even if the effort is likely to prove fruitless. Post will meet with GOI officials this week to ascertain the facts and will report septel. END NOTE). ¶3. (C) IWs underscored the importance of avoiding renewed bloodshed and the need for a peaceful resolution that would allow the GOI to uphold its assurances of humane treatment of Ashraf residents. IWs also pointed out that violent confrontation between GOI security forces and Ashraf residents, even in accordance with law enforcement procedures, would undermine Iraq's international credibility. ¶4. (C) Al-Shaykh acknowledged the risks and the need for greater GOI sensitivity to international concerns, but countered that while there may be international consequences to harsh treatment of the MEK, the domestic (and regional) consequences are minimal, and Iraqi politicians are currently more concerned with the domestic equation. He added that any future GOI will face continued internal and external political pressure, notably from the Iranian government (IRIG),to expel the MEK from Iraq. "The MEK is the first thing Iranian officials discuss even before complaining about the U.S. occupation," Al-Shaykh claimed. ¶5. (C) Al-Shaykh urged that the international community, notably EU states, do more to help Iraq resolve its MEK Qnotably EU states, do more to help Iraq resolve its MEK problem by identifying viable resettlement options. IWs acknowledged the importance of international cooperation, noting that EU missions had expressed an interest in vetting Ashraf residents with ties to EU states and those designated as refugees by UNHCR for resettlement consideration but that the process would take time. Existing U.S. laws and regulations make it nearly impossible to resettle MEK refugees in the United States, IWs pointed out. Iran-Iraq: Parity Over Time -------------- ¶6. (C) Regarding Iraq-Iran relations, Al-Shaykh explained that the IRIG continues to view itself as the more senior partner in the bilateral relationship and does not hesitate to advance its interests in Iraq "with a high hand." IWs explained that the USG welcomed a healthy bilateral relationship that ensured parity between Iran and Iraq to protect Iraq's national interests and counter Iranian heavy-handedness. Al-Shaykh acknowledged the importance of BAGHDAD 00003124 002 OF 002 parity but cautioned that it would take time as part of a natural (vs. forced) process. "However, there are some in Iraq and the region who are opposed to this gradual approach," referring to Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors and other anti-Iran elements in the country eager for a more aggressive approach. ¶7. (C) Al-Shaykh asked IWs how developments inside Iran may affect Iraq and the United States. IWs briefed on the current status of the P5 1 and IAEA discussions, prompting the question of whether the nuclear issue was the only important issue to the USG. IWs stated while the Iran's nuclear program is the USG's primary foreign policy concern related to Iran, the USG is also very concerned about the human rights situation inside Iran--IWs highlighted the UN Third Committee resolution --and that the USG wants to see Iran play a responsible role in the region. IWs noted that Iran's stance on the nuclear discussion and, to a lesser degree, its regional policy are currently subject to intense POLITICAL debate within an increasingly fractious Iranian body politic, and that this is reflective more of Iranian POLITICAL infighting than a coherent Iranian strategy. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Al-Shaykh is a strong supporter of the GOI and rare breed of POLITICAL insider and technocrat. He has been A/NSA since May, having replaced his former boss, Mowaffak Rubaie. Al-Shaykh continues to have the support and confidence of fellow Da'wa party member PM Maliki. Although not involved in the day-to-day development of MEK policy, Al-Shaykh can serve as an important voice of reason in internal GOI debates on the MEK and broader Iran policy. FORD