IRAQ'S ACTING NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ON THE MEK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003124

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO LIMBERT AND CORBIN. NSC FOR TALWAR,
MAGSAMEN, PHEE, AND VROOMAN.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ'S ACTING NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ON THE MEK
AND IRAN

Classified By: Political Counselor Yuri Kim for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a November 25 meeting with Post's Iran
Watchers (IW),Dr. Safa Al-Shaykh (Da'wa party),the GOI's
Acting National Security Adviser (A/NSA),said the GOI's
policy on the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) is dictated largely by
domestic and regional (vice international) political
considerations. According to Al-Shaykh, the December 15
deadline to relocate the MEK is increasingly unfeasible,
thereby limiting GOI options until after the election.
Al-Shaykh said he believes that Iraq's bilateral relationship
with Iran will mature over time to allow for greater parity
in the face of Iranian interference. Implicit in his tone
was a subtle criticism of those who favor a rushed and
aggressive approach to balancing Iranian influence. However,
Al-Shaykh acknowledged the need to develop political parity
in Iraq's bilateral relations with Iran. Al-Shaykh is a
soft-spoken GOI loyalist and rare breed of political insider
and technocrat. He can serve as an important voice of reason
in internal GOI debates on the MEK and broader Iran policy.
END SUMMARY

Pressure to Act Against MEK
--------------


2. (C) On November 25, Dr. Safa Al-Shaykh, the GOI's Acting
National Security Adviser (A/NSA) and close associate of PM
Maliki, met with Post's Iran watchers (IWs) to discuss
Iran-Iraq relations and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK). IWs
briefed Al-Shaykh on UNAMI's monitoring and reporting role at
the U.S. base (Grizzly) at Ashraf, explaining that the UN
presence was an important and welcome development for the
USG. Asked whether the GOI's December 15 MEK/Ashraf
relocation deadline would hold, Al-Shaykh said the lack of
relocation options made the deadline increasingly unrealistic
and that the matter would likely be dealt with by the next
GOI administration (NOTE: Latest GOI murmurings point to the
possibility of a "soft" (i.e., voluntary) move of Ashraf
residents on December 15 in an effort to solicit defections.
We surmise that the GOI prefers some form of action rather
than inaction, even if the effort is likely to prove
fruitless. Post will meet with GOI officials this week to
ascertain the facts and will report septel. END NOTE).


3. (C) IWs underscored the importance of avoiding renewed
bloodshed and the need for a peaceful resolution that would
allow the GOI to uphold its assurances of humane treatment of
Ashraf residents. IWs also pointed out that violent
confrontation between GOI security forces and Ashraf
residents, even in accordance with law enforcement
procedures, would undermine Iraq's international credibility.



4. (C) Al-Shaykh acknowledged the risks and the need for
greater GOI sensitivity to international concerns, but
countered that while there may be international consequences
to harsh treatment of the MEK, the domestic (and regional)
consequences are minimal, and Iraqi politicians are currently
more concerned with the domestic equation. He added that any
future GOI will face continued internal and external
political pressure, notably from the Iranian government
(IRIG),to expel the MEK from Iraq. "The MEK is the first
thing Iranian officials discuss even before complaining about
the U.S. occupation," Al-Shaykh claimed.


5. (C) Al-Shaykh urged that the international community,
notably EU states, do more to help Iraq resolve its MEK
Qnotably EU states, do more to help Iraq resolve its MEK
problem by identifying viable resettlement options. IWs
acknowledged the importance of international cooperation,
noting that EU missions had expressed an interest in vetting
Ashraf residents with ties to EU states and those designated
as refugees by UNHCR for resettlement consideration but that
the process would take time. Existing U.S. laws and
regulations make it nearly impossible to resettle MEK
refugees in the United States, IWs pointed out.

Iran-Iraq: Parity Over Time
--------------


6. (C) Regarding Iraq-Iran relations, Al-Shaykh explained
that the IRIG continues to view itself as the more senior
partner in the bilateral relationship and does not hesitate
to advance its interests in Iraq "with a high hand." IWs
explained that the USG welcomed a healthy bilateral
relationship that ensured parity between Iran and Iraq to
protect Iraq's national interests and counter Iranian
heavy-handedness. Al-Shaykh acknowledged the importance of

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parity but cautioned that it would take time as part of a
natural (vs. forced) process. "However, there are some in
Iraq and the region who are opposed to this gradual
approach," referring to Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors and other
anti-Iran elements in the country eager for a more aggressive
approach.


7. (C) Al-Shaykh asked IWs how developments inside Iran may
affect Iraq and the United States. IWs briefed on the
current status of
the P5 1 and IAEA discussions, prompting the question of
whether the nuclear issue was the only important issue to the
USG. IWs stated while the Iran's nuclear program is the USG's
primary foreign policy concern related to Iran, the
USG is also very concerned about the human rights situation
inside Iran--IWs highlighted the UN Third Committee
resolution
--and that the USG wants to see Iran play a responsible role
in the region. IWs noted that Iran's stance on the nuclear
discussion and, to a lesser degree, its regional policy are
currently subject to intense political debate within an
increasingly
fractious Iranian body politic, and that this is reflective
more of Iranian political infighting than a coherent Iranian
strategy.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Al-Shaykh is a strong supporter of the GOI and rare
breed of political insider and technocrat. He has been A/NSA
since May, having replaced his former boss, Mowaffak Rubaie.
Al-Shaykh continues to have the support and confidence of
fellow Da'wa party member PM Maliki. Although not involved
in the day-to-day development of MEK policy, Al-Shaykh can
serve as an important voice of reason in internal GOI debates
on the MEK and broader Iran policy.
FORD