ELECTION LAW UPDATE: SUNNI AND SHIA EDGE TOWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003097 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: ELECTION LAW UPDATE: SUNNI AND SHIA EDGE TOWARD DEAL Classified By: Classified by Political Counselor Yuri Kim for Reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) A opening to Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi's initial hard-line stance regarding the Shia-Kurd backed amendment to the election law appeared late the evening of November 24, after Hadi al-Amiri, who has taken the lead for the Iraqi National Alliance (Shia) on the law, had visited Hashimi earlier in the day to explain his (Amiri,s) proposal for ending the stand-off on the amended election law passed the previous day. Hashimi's Director General, Krikor Der-Hapogian, called PolCouns toward midnight that evening to ask her to attend a meeting the following morning with Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi, MP Mohammed al-Tamim (a confidant of MP Saleh al-Mutlaq),and UNAMI experts to discuss a possible compromise. ¶2. (C) After laying out Sunni concerns regarding the law -- in particular Hashimi,s need to ensure that Sunni provinces retain the number of seats they would have had under the terms of the first amendment passed on November 8 -- and discussing possible technical fixes, Issawi proposed that the group reconvene later that afternoon with Amiri. Issawi stressed that Hashimi was willing to pass the law as amended November 23 if he could reach agreement with the Shia, with U.S. assistance, on a suitable distribution of seats, especially for Ninewa. Noting his good relationship with Kurdish leaders, Issawi expressed confidence that the Kurds would be on board with any agreement reached between the Sunni and Shia so long as it enable Kurdish governorates to gain more seats than the November 5 amendment would have allowed. Amiri made the same point. In the meantime, Issawi and Der-Hagopian pledged, Hashimi would take action to restrain Sunni leaders in Ninewa from staging protests. One protest was reported to have taken place in Mosul, but Hashimi in fact did issue a statement during the day saying that he had not yet made up his mind and that discussions were ongoing. ¶3. (C) Today,s discussions began with each side trying to maximize their respective positions through the array of technical tools available to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). The two sides then moved to discuss the distribution of seats to various governorates, with each side aiming to lock in as many seats as possible in the provinces where each held a majority, thus minimizing the stakes on election day. The day,s negotiations -- which saw each side slamming the table, throwing statistics, and threatening to walk out in frustration -- ended with Issawi and Amiri exchanging kisses, holding hands, and agreeing that the group should reconvene at 10:00 a.m. the following morning to continue negotiations with the goal of reaching agreement that day. ¶4. (C) Following the day,s marathon negotiating session, Issawi told the Ambassador that he felt much progress had been made and that a deal was within reach if the two sides could agree on the issue of where minority seats would be drawn: from governorates (as the law seems to suggest) or from the pool of compensatory seats (which the law does not disallow). Issawi told PolCouns that if this one issue were to be resolved, he believed Hashimi would sign the amendment into law. Issawi underscored the importance of reaching and announcing agreement the following day, the last before the start of the Eid holidays. Otherwise, he feared, we risked the prospect of tempers flaring as the idea of a Sunni loss of seats took hold. At Issawi,s request, the Ambassador reached out to Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi to seek his Qreached out to Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi to seek his help in encouraging Amiri to move quickly to resolve the remaining issue. HILL