ELECTION LAW UPDATE: SUNNI AND SHIA EDGE TOWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003096

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019
TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: ELECTION LAW UPDATE: SUNNI AND SHIA EDGE TOWARD

Classified By: Classified by Political Counselor Yuri Kim for Reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) A opening to Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi's initial
hard-line stance regarding the Shia-Kurd backed
amendment to the election law appeared late the evening of
November 24, after Hadi al-Amiri, who has taken the lead
for the Iraqi National Alliance (Shia) on the law, had
visited Hashimi earlier in the day to explain his (Amiri's)
proposal for ending the stand-off on the amended election law
passed the previous day. Hashimi's Director General,
Krikor Der-Hapogian, called PolCouns toward midnight that
evening to ask her to attend a meeting the following
morning with Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi, MP
Mohammed al-Tamim (a confidant of MP Saleh al-Mutlaq),and
UNAMI experts to discuss a possible compromise.


2. (C) After laying out Sunni concerns regarding the law --
in particular Hashimi's need to ensure that Sunni provinces
retain the number of seats they would have had under the
terms of the first amendment passed on November 8 -- and
discussing possible technical fixes, Issawi proposed that the
group reconvene later that afternoon with Amiri.
Issawi stressed that Hashimi was willing to pass the law as
amended November 23 if he could reach agreement with the
Shia, with U.S. assistance, on a suitable distribution of
seats, especially for Ninewa. Noting his good relationship
with Kurdish leaders, Issawi expressed confidence that the
Kurds would be on board with any agreement reached between
the Sunni and Shia so long as it enable Kurdish governorates
to gain more seats than the November 5 amendment would have
allowed. Amiri made the same point. In the meantime, Issawi
and Der-Hagopian pledged, Hashimi would take action to
restrain Sunni leaders in Ninewa from staging protests. One
protest was reported to have taken place in Mosul, but
Hashimi in fact did issue a statement during the day saying
that he had not yet made up his mind and that discussions
were ongoing.


3. (C) Today's discussions began with each side trying to
maximize their respective positions through the array of
technical tools available to the Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC). The two sides then moved to discuss the
distribution of seats to various governorates, with each side
aiming to lock in as many seats as possible in the provinces
where each held a majority, thus minimizing the stakes on
election day. The day's negotiations -- which
saw each side slamming the table, throwing statistics, and
threatening to walk out in frustration -- ended with Issawi
and Amiri exchanging kisses, holding hands, and agreeing that
the group should reconvene at 10:00 a.m. the following
morning to continue negotiations with the goal of reaching
agreement that day.


4. (C) Following the day's marathon negotiating session,
Issawi told the Ambassador that he felt much progress had
been made and that a deal was within reach if the two sides
could agree on the issue of where minority seats would be
drawn: from governorates (as the law seems to suggest) or
from the pool of compensatory seats (which the law does not
disallow). Issawi told PolCouns that if this one issue were
to be resolved, he believed Hashimi would sign the
amendment into law. Issawi underscored the importance of
reaching and announcing agreement the following day, the
last before the start of the Eid holidays. Otherwise, he
feared, we risked the prospect of tempers flaring as the
idea of a Sunni loss of seats took hold. At Issawi's
request, the Ambassador reached out to Vice President Adil
Abd al-Mahdi to seek his help in encouraging Amiri to move
QAbd al-Mahdi to seek his help in encouraging Amiri to move
quickly to resolve the remaining issue.
HILL