HASHIMI'S VETO BACKFIRES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003075 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: HASHIMI'S VETO BACKFIRES REF: A. BAGHDAD 3066 ¶B. BAGHDAD 3059 ¶C. BAGHDAD 3053 ¶D. BAGHDAD 3045 Classified By: Political Counselor Yuri Kim for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Dragging his feet on withdrawing his electoral law veto, Vice President Hashimi allowed his political opponents in the Council of Representatives (COR) to maneuver a successful vote on a new amendment that, among its provisions, could reduce parliamentary seats from Sunni-majority governorates. The Ambassador pressed Hashimi to avert this scenario by immediately and publicly retracting his veto, but the Iraqi VP continued to waver until it was too late. Hashimi's initial reaction to the passage of the new amendment was to move toward another veto, but late in the evening, his aide told UNAMI that the VP was taking a positive approach in reviewing the amendment. We will engage Hashimi and others again tomorrow to persuade him not to veto, pointing out that the new amendment contains two measures he had sought: counting of all votes, including out-of-country votes, toward home governorates, and a doubling of compensatory seats. The COR has now adjourned until December 8, all but pushing elections to February 2010. END SUMMARY. MISSING THE BOAT -------------- ¶2. (C) Encouraged by Hashimi's positive, though hesitant, response to the previous day's offer of a deal to withdraw his veto of the election law (ref A),Poloff contacted Krikor Der-Hagopian, Hashimi's Director General, the morning of November 23 for news of the VP's decision. Der-Hagopian replied that Hashimi still had concerns about the proposed technical fix on out-of-country voting (OCV) and wanted further clarification and assurances before he could withdraw his veto. PolOff warned Der-Hagopian that time was short and urged quick action. ¶3. (C) Meanwhile at the COR, UNAMI staff members attempted to explain the details of the technical fix to relevant MPs and the Legal Committee. PolOffs were also present at the COR to actively steer key MPs toward a conclusion of the deal. With no announcement forthcoming from Hashimi, however, the Legal Committee took matters into its own hands. With the Kurds determined to reallocate COR seats via an amendment to the election law and the Shia still raging against Hashimi, the committee put the finishing touches on a report (apparently started the previous evening) that criticized Hashimi's veto for not having a sound legal basis. More importantly, the report laid out two alternative amendments for a vote in the event the COR did not reaffirm the November 8 election law amendments in their present form (thereby "rejecting" Hashimi's veto). ¶4. (C) Rather than allow more time for a non-legislative solution, MPs were goaded into action by a widely circulated rumor that Hashimi had sent a letter to COR Speaker Samarraie that morning stating he refused to revoke his veto. Even Deputy Speaker Khalid Attiya (Shia independent) told PolCouns that he assumed that Hashimi had rejected the proposal offered by party bloc leaders and brokered by Hadi al-Ameri (INA/Badr) the previous day (ref A) ) but admitted he had not seen a copy of this letter. PolCouns urged that Attiya and Speaker Samarraie not bring the Legal Committee amendments to a floor vote pending our further engagement with Hashimi. Attiya agreed, but warned that pressure was building rapidly for a vote that afternoon. PolOffs quickly contacted Der-Hagopian who confirmed the existence of a letter from Hashimi to the Speaker, but stressed that it only asked for clarification and further information on the Qasked for clarification and further information on the proposed technical fix to the November 8 electoral amendments. PolOffs began spreading this news among MPs, but it soon became clear that by now, there was great momentum toward a vote in the COR on the Legal Committee report and that only a prompt and unequivocal revocation of the veto by Hashimi could prevent a vote. ELEVENTH HOUR INTERVENTION -------------- ¶5. (C) With the clock on a vote running out, the Ambassador went to meet with Hashimi and urged him to immediately announce publicly, via television if possible, that he was withdrawing his veto. However, Hashimi -- who was uninformed of the fluid situation in the COR -- demurred, stating that he needed more time for his questions to be answered and for party blocs to reach a consensus backing the offer proffered in their letter to him. BAGHDAD 00003075 002 OF 002 NO STOPPING THIS TRAIN NOW -------------- ¶6. (C) Under intense pressure from both Shia and Kurdish MPs, Samarraie, who had been stalling for time at Embassy behest, finally called for a vote on the Legal Committee report and amendments. After an argument over what to vote on first, the COR voted to "accept" the veto (i.e., agree that the November 8 amendments were no longer valid so as to allow for a vote on new amendments). Sunni MPs, with the exception of at least some of Samarraie's fellow Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) members, then angrily stormed out of the COR chamber but could not break the quorum. In the lounge outside the chamber, a shouting match ensued between Sunni MPs Salim al-Jaboori, Omar al-Karbouli, and Izza al-Dawla, each blaming the other for their predicament. ¶7. (C) The mostly Shia and Kurdish MPs left in the chamber proceeded to vote overwhelmingly (133 MPs out of 151 present) in favor of the first Legal Committee amendment option. The approved amendment instructs the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to use the 2005 Ministry of Trade population statistics and apply an across-the-board 2.8 percent annual growth rate for the past four years to determine the number of COR seats. The new amendment preserves five percent compensatory seats, but pulls the eight minority set-aside seats directly from the governorates, doubling the number of seats in the national compensatory pool to 16. OCV ballots would be counted directly towards the voter's home governorate, using procedures similar to those for Special Needs voting. The alternative amendment in the Legal Committee report, proposed by MP Saleh Mutlaq and his Sunni political allies and which only addressed OCV and raised the number of compensatory seats, garnered four votes. Declaring this contentious issue closed, at least for the time being, Samarraie adjourned the COR until December 8. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) It appears Hashimi was grossly uninformed and ill-advised throughout this latest electoral law crisis. His resulting missteps, despite the Embassy's best efforts, killed a promising deal and likely disadvantaged Sunni political interests through the resulting reallocation of COR seats. The Kurds, on the other hand, appear to have won yet another victory in the COR through guile and wit, while Shia parties succeeded in punishing Hashimi for trying to take a second bite at the election law apple. ¶9. (C) Although Hashimi would seem inclined to veto yet again, his aide indicated late in the evening that Hashimi was trying to take a positive approach in reviewing the new amendment. If Hashimi were to cast another veto, it would set the stage for a possible override attempt when the COR reconvenes in December after the long Eid al-Adha holiday. It is questionable whether the traditional Shia-Kurd alliance of the past four years can orchestrate the required three-fifths absolute majority vote. In any event, January elections now appear unfeasible. This does not necessarily violate the Iraqi constitution, however, since the Federal Supreme Court call for elections by January 30 was issued in a non-binding advisory opinion only (with strong dissenting legal arguments). While today's events are unfortunate, one Iraqi observer almost proudly noted, "This is happening because Iraq is a democracy, and it is unique in the Middle East." We would agree with the general sentiment, but will redouble our efforts tomorrow to engage Hashimi and others to work toward a positive conclusion to this great exercise in Qwork toward a positive conclusion to this great exercise in parliamentary democracy. END COMMENT. HILL