RESULTS OF IRAQ'S PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: AN INITIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000306 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: RESULTS OF IRAQ'S PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: AN INITIAL TAKE REF: A. BAGHDAD 288 ¶B. BAGHDAD 274 ¶C. BAGHDAD 210 BAGHDAD 00000306 001.5 OF 004 Classified By: A/Polcouns Steve Walker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: A complex and nuanced political picture is emerging out of Iraq's provincial elections as preliminary results are announced. Across the board, the results are diffuse: in all but one case, no electoral list secured more than 38%, and in a number of cases, the leading parties secured 20% or less each. Prime Minister Maliki's position has clearly been enhanced by the first-place showing of his "State of Law" list in Baghdad and across the southern provinces, mainly at the expense of his nominal Shi'a coalition partners, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). The Sadrist trend had a generally lackluster showing, although they tied for second in Baghdad, and also placed second in Maysan and Dhi Qar. ¶2. (C) Not all of Maliki's adversaries, however, have been vanquished: the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) took a plurality of the vote in Diyala, a province where pro-Maliki Shi'a parties had held sway and Maliki himself had attempted to undercut the Sunni political establishment. The IIP also placed first in Salaheddin province, and had respectable showings in Baghdad and the former insurgent heartland of Anbar, although ex-Ba'thist Sunni independent Saleh Mutlak surprisingly emerged at the top of the heap in the latter. In restive Ninewa, the Hadba, a Sunni list which ran on an anti-Kurdish platform, has ended up on top, edging out the Kurdish alliance. One surprise is the apparent comeback of former PM Ayad Allawi's secular Iraqiyya list, which made reasonably strong showings in a number of provinces. ¶3. (C) Indicative of Iraq's fractured political landscape, few -- if any -- parties will win outright majorities in provincial councils and will instead have to cobble together coalitions. The formation of coalitions will, in many provinces, be a drawn-out process with various potential outcomes. Iraqiyya, and other second- and third-place lists, will be well positioned to serve as coalition-forming lynch-pins. These results remain preliminary and do not include over 400,000 "special needs" votes which could tilt the balance in a number of close races. The formation of new provincial councils will trigger the implementation of the Provincial Powers Law, which expands the authority of provincial governments and could increase tensions between the provinces and the Maliki government's centralizing agenda (reftel). End summary. -------------- And the Winners Are... -------------- ¶4. (U) At a press conference on the evening of February 5, Iraq's High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced the preliminary results of the January 31 provincial council elections. Also, at the same event, the Arab League, which had sent a delegation of 17 observers, issued a statement congratulating the Iraqi people on the "transparent and peaceful" elections. Highlights of the preliminary results as announced by IHEC: -- Anbar: (percent) 17.6 National Project List (ex-Ba'thist al-Mutlak) 17.1 Sahwa and Nat'l Indep. Alliance (Abu Risha) 15.9 Intellectuals and Tribal Development (IIP) -- Baghdad: 38 State of Law (Maliki) 9 Free Independents (Sadrists) 9 Tawafuq - Accord Front - led by IIP 8.6 Iraqiya (Ayad Allawi) -- Babil: 12.5 State of Law (Maliki) 8.2 Shahid al-Mihrab (ISCI) 6.2 Free Independents (Sadrists) 4.4 National Reform List (Ibrahim Jafari) Q -- Basra: 37 State of Law (Maliki) 11.6 Shahid al-Mihrab (ISCI) BAGHDAD 00000306 002.5 OF 004 5.5 Justice and Unity Rally (Shi'a Independent technocrats) -- Dhi Qar: 23.1 State of Law (Maliki) 14.1 Free Independents (Sadrists) 11.1 Shahid al-Mihrab (ISCI) -- Diyala: 21.1 National Accord Front (IIP) 17.2 Kurdistan Alliance 15 National Project List (ex-Ba'thist Saleh Mutlak) 9.5 Iraqiya (Ayad Allawi) -- Karbala: 13.3 Yousef Majid Habouby (CPA-era mayor of Karbala-Shi'a indep) 8.8 "Hope of Mespotamia" (Independent - ISCI affilated) 8.5 State of Law (Maliki) 6.8 Free Independents (Sadrists) -- Maysan: 17.7 State of Law (Maliki) 15.2 Free Independents (Sadrists) 14.6 Shahid al-Mihrab (ISCI) 8.7 National Reform List (Ja'fari) -- Muthanna: 10.9 State of Law (Maliki) 9.3 Shahid al-Mihrab (ISCI) 7.1 Jumhour (ISCI-leaning indep party led by the governor) 6.3 National Reform Trend (Ibrahim Ja'fari) -- Najaf: 16.2 State of Law List (Maliki) 14.8 Shahid al-Mihrab (ISCI) 12.2 Free Independents (Sadrists) -- Ninewa: 48.4 National Hadba List (Sunni Arab, anti-Kurdish) 25.5 Ninewa Fraternity List (mainly Kurdish) 6.7 Iraqi Islamic Party -- Qadissiyah: 23.1 State of Law (Maliki) 11.7 Shahid al-Mihrab (ISCI) 8.2 National Reform Trend (Ja'fari) -- Salahedddin: 14.5 Accord Front (IIP) 13.9 Iraqiyya (Ayad Allawi) 8.7 National Project List (ex-Ba'thist Saleh Mutlak) -- Wasat: 15.3 State of Law (Maliki) 10 Shahid al-Mihrab (ISCI) 6 Free Independents (Sadrists) -------------- Maliki First in the South -------------- ¶5. (C) The first-place showing for Maliki's "State of Law" list in eight of the nine provinces of the Iraqi south, plus Baghdad province, is probably the single most significant outcome of the January 31 polls. Maliki's advances come principally at the expense of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI),the Shi'a juggernaut originally fostered in exile by Tehran and led by the Najaf-based Al-Hakim clerical dynasty. In the final weeks leading up to the elections, Maliki hit the campaign trail in the south, presiding at well-attended rallies. In the past two years, Maliki's Da'wa Party has cultivated a support base in the south, establishing an extensive patronage network of Tribal Support Councils which, as ISCI vehemently protested, largely by-passed provincial governments. At the same time, the Embassy's ISCI contacts lament, voters appear to be holding the group to account for provincial governments' failure to deliver goods and services. Maliki also enjoys considerable popularity in the south due to the GOI's success in vanquishing the Jaish al-Mahdi militia and spinoff criminal BAGHDAD 00000306 003.3 OF 004 gangs, which had terrorized the provinces of Basra and Maysan in particular. -------------- Sadrists Lackluster -------------- ¶6. (C) The Sadrists, who had enjoyed broad appeal among poor Shi'a until recently, turned in a relatively lackluster performance, although they tied for second in Baghdad (with the IIP-led Tawafuq list) and also placed second in the southern backwater provinces of Maysan and Dhi Qar. These results likely reflect the success of Maliki's GOI in reining in the Jaish al-Mahdi and neutering the Sadrists as a political force, as his Da'wa party cadres vie for the loyalty of Sadrist rank-and-file. -------------- -- Sunni Islamic Party Up in Diyala and Salaheddin -------------- -- ¶7. (C) At the same time, Maliki and the Da'wa Party leadership are likely disappointed by the results in Diyala province. There, the Shi'a minority, in coalition with the Kurds, controlled the governorship and the provincial council. Operation Benevolent Diyala, the security operation launched in the summer of 2008 (Diyala had been a venue for JAM as well as AQI activity),netted almost exclusively Sunni detainees - including prominent leaders of the province's IIP, which complained repeatedly of oppression at the hands of Diyala's Shi'a-controlled security forces. The results indicate the IIP has overcome this adversity and now appears well placed to be the senior partner in a coalition. The IIP also placed first in Salaheddin, although the results were more diffuse in Saddam's home province - where Ayad Allawi's Iraqiyya list also turned in a strong performance. -------------- Ex-Ba'thist's Strong Showing in Anbar -------------- ¶8. (C) Anbar's results were surprising. While the incumbent Iraqi Islamic Party told us they expected to edge out Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha's Awakening movement and other nascent tribals, the National Project List of ex-Ba'thist Saleh al-Mutlak ended up on top in the preliminary results. In the days leading up to the result, Abu Risha and rival tribal leaders-cum politicians issued angry threats - accusing the IIP of fraud, raising fears of renewed strife in the province (ref A). (Note: Nothwithstanding Abu Risha and Mutlak's vociferous complaints of IIP cheating, both parties finished slightly ahead of the IIP in the announced results. End Note). Particularly in Anbar, with relatively narrow differences between the top three lists, the results of the "special needs" voting (to be announced Feb. 11),and IHEC determination on what to do with an unannounced number of ballots quarantined pending investigation of fraud in the province, could alter the current standings. -------------- Ninewa: Arabs United on Anti-Kurd Platform -------------- ¶9. (C) The Hadba, a Sunni Arab list lead by parliamentarian Usama Nujaifi and his brother Athil, turned in, with 48 percent of the vote, the most robust performance of any list in Iraq. Hadba candidates had run on a strongly anti-Kurdish platform, stoking fears of Kurdish expansionist designs on the city of Mosul and Ninewa province more generally. At first glance, this result appears to underline the difficulty of reconciling Kurdish and Sunni Arab communities in the north. -------------- Ayad Allawi's Political Obituary Premature -------------- Q -------------- ¶10. (C) Ayad Allawi's Iraqiyya list, a coalition of mainly Shi'a secularists, turned in a surprisingly strong showing, coming in second in Salaheddin, a respectable fourth in Baghdad and Diyala, and in the top five in several other provinces. Iraqiyya appears to have benefited from many Iraqi voters' dissatisfaction with religious parties and desire for a secular alternative. The results would seem to reverse Allawi's gradual fade from the political scene in the past two years, during which he seemed to spend more time outside of Iraq than in it, while his deputies within the party were riven with disagreements and rivalries. Though not in a commanding position in any one province, Iraqiyya could now be placed to play a "kingmaker" role in several BAGHDAD 00000306 004.3 OF 004 provinces. -------------- Now for the Real Fun: Coalition Building -------------- ¶11. (C) The results show that the support of Iraqi voters' is more diffuse than ever. The ability of the winners to govern will depend on their ability to form coalitions with their rivals. The bitterness between Maliki's Da'wa Party and the humbled ISCI will be a particularly significant dynamic as the State of Law candidates seek to form coalitions in the southern provinces. In many cases, who came in second, third, and fourth will be as important as who came in first. In Ninewa, for example, the anti-Kurdish Hadba will likely seek common cause with the rival Islamic party, having won on a platform of enmity toward the second-place Kurds. The coalition building process in provincial capitals is surely already underway, but in typical Iraqi fashion they will take weeks, and probably longer in some cases, to reach conclusion, with a broad range of potential outcomes. ¶12. (C) Furthermore, the final standings may well be altered by the results of the "special needs" vote count (the votes of hospital patients, Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and some detainees - those held in prisons with 400 or more inmates). IHEC is expected to issue certified results on or about February 23. -------------- Provincial Powers Law: A New Frontier -------------- ¶13. (C) Finally, the formation of new provincial councils will trigger the implementation of the new Provincial Powers Law which will significantly expand the authority of the governor (appointed by the provincial council) and the provincial legislature to appoint local security officials and influence budget and fiscal policy. This process, which will unfold in the coming years, will take Iraq into uncharted territory and has the potential to increase tensions between the center and periphery, especially with the likely emergence of a number of provincial governments resistant to PM Maliki's centralizing agenda. CROCKER