ELECTION LAW UPDATE: HASHIMI CALLS FOR MORE SEATS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003005 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SUBJECT LINE) SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: ELECTION LAW UPDATE: HASHIMI CALLS FOR MORE SEATS FOR OUT-OF-COUNTRY VOTERS REF: A. BAGHDAD 2969 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2979 ¶C. 08BAGHDAD 573 BAGHDAD 00003005 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Two of the three members of the Presidency Council -- President Talabani and Vice President Abd al-Mahdi -- have signed the election law passed by Parliament on November 8. However, the third member, Vice President Hashimi (Sunni Arab),is withholding his signature, claiming that the law unfairly diminishes the electoral clout of out-of-country voters (OCV),presumed to be largely Sunni. Hashimi is threatening a veto in an effort to force political leaders, including Talabani, to agree to a re-vote in the Council of Representatives (COR) on the offending Article 1 of the law, in an effort to increase the overall number of compensatory seats from five to 15 percent, to better represent what Sunni Arab MPs estimate to be three million non-resident Iraqis. Deputy Speaker of Parliament Khalid Attiya told the Ambassador November 14 that Hashimi was unlikely to exercise a veto, but would push hard enough that parties would ultimately agree to an increase in compensatory seats. Embassy has made clear that the United States would not support a veto of the law; nor would we support an effort to amend the law in parliament, if it were to result in a postponement of the election. UNAMI, with whom we continue to coordinate closely, has taken a similar tack. It is likely that Hashimi will not sign the law during the prescribed review period; no PC member can kill a law through inaction or by failing to sign it. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION FOR NON-RESIDENT IRAQIS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) While all major political entities in Iraq expressed relief at the November 8 passage of the election law by the Council of Representatives (COR) (ref A),leading Sunni Arab MPs and Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi have voiced reservations about provisions for compensatory seats in the legislation. To meet the constitutional standard of one parliamentary representative per 100,000 citizens, the COR chose to estimate Iraq's population using statistics from the Ministry of Trade (MOT) food ration cards (ref B). MOT 
statistics, however, do not include an estimate of Iraqis living abroad because those Iraqis do not receive food ration cards. Some prominent Sunni politicians believe that the new election law favors domestic political participation over out-of-country voting. From our discussions with contacts, it is clear that these politicians believe a majority of out of country voters would cast ballots for Sunni-majority parties. ¶3. (C) The Vice-President's Director General, Krikor Der-Hagopian, assured poloffs November 13 that while the Vice President did not intend to veto the election law except "as a last resort," he was under intense pressure to address "the inadequate and unconstitutional representation of non-resident Iraqis." Der-Hagopian stated that IHEC has several potential options to address this perceived inequity, which could ameliorate Sunni Arab concerns: --Have overseas votes counted in the voter's "home province" like resident voters; or --Allocate a number of COR seats commensurate with the population of non-resident Iraqis as a separate pot of seats and have all out-of-country votes count only toward these seats. ¶4. (C) Sunni MP Dhafer al-Ani (TAWAFUQ) and Deputy Legal Committee Chair Selim al-Jeboori (Iraqi Islamic Party) told QCommittee Chair Selim al-Jeboori (Iraqi Islamic Party) told poloffs November 10 that their parties will seek reconsideration by the COR of Article 1 of the election law, which allocates five percent of total parliamentary seats for so-called national compensatory seats, (i.e., seats that are distributed to minority groups and candidates/parties on a national basis using a complex formula developed by IHEC),or 16 out of 323 total COR seats. On November 15, Ani and MP Osama al-Nujaifi (Sunni; Al Hadba) clarified to poloffs that Hashimi intended to submit a request to the COR asking that the Legal Committee work with IHEC to specify provisions for OCV. They added that if IHEC could not complete the request by November 18 (the prescribed end of the Presidency Council's review period for the law),Hashimi will request that Speaker Sammarraie submit Article 1 to the COR for a re-vote. Ani asserted that if this process does not result in an increased percentage of compensatory seats, "Sunni parties" will press Hashimi to exercise his veto. Poloffs have emphasized to Der-Hagopian and other Sunni interlocutors BAGHDAD 00003005 002.2 OF 002 on this issue that the United States would not support a veto of the law, or an effort to have the COR re-vote on its provisions if it results in delayed elections. We have instead encouraged them to work with IHEC on implementation of OCV. ATTIYA: VETO UNLIKELY -------------- ¶5. (C) Deputy Speaker of Parliament Khalid Attiya (Shi'a; State of Law Alliance) thanked the Ambassador on November 14 for his engagement with MPs and party leaders to help resolve differences related to Kirkuk in the election law. He noted that the Embassy "intervened at the right time, leading to the appropriate effect." Attiya observed that while the issue of Kirkuk voting rights delayed the passage of the law, it had a salutary impact on the overall debate because the Kurdish leadership made important concessions. He confirmed to the Ambassador that Hashimi wanted to raise the percentage of compensatory seats to 15, but said it was extremely unlikely that he would veto the election law. NEXT STEPS FOR PRESIDENCY COUNCIL -------------- ¶6. (C) According to the Iraqi Constitution, the Presidency Council has ten days to consider a new law. The ten day review period for the election law should expire on November ¶18. If a member of the Council does not veto a law within this time period, it is enacted; Hashimi or another PC member cannot kill a law through inaction or by failing to sign it. President Talabani's advisor Aram Yarwessi noted to poloff that Hashimi called the President on November 14 to say he was considering vetoing the law. Talabani reportedly tried to dissuade him. Yarwessi told poloff that the President acknowledged to Hashimi that the five percent figure for compensatory seats was low, but said that he was not inclined to try to change this and posed the option of a political agreement by parties to vote only on Article 1, and not to re-open other articles of the law. Iraqi media reported November 15 that Hashimi refused to approve the law pending further study. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: Hashimi has previously threatened to veto key legislation in order to attract attention to himself and to wring concessions for the Sunni community. During the negotiations over the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA) in 2008, he was able to link the SA to approval of a political referendum and a political reform document in the COR. In the run-up to the national election in January, Hashimi finds his political star fading fast, having been ousted from the leadership of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) earlier this year. By taking a public stand rejecting the election law, he has cast himself as the defender of the constitution. He has also staked out a position that no fellow Sunni can afford not to support. That said, the prevailing sense here is that the election law passed on November 8 is something that most -- but not all -- can live with and that re-opening the debate may not be in anyone's interest. HILL