LARIJANI'S VISIT TO IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002984 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO LIMBERT, NEA/IR, NEA/I. NSC FOR TALWAR, MAGSAMEN, VROOMAN, PHEE. E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IZ SUBJECT: LARIJANI'S VISIT TO IRAQ Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Iranian Parliament Speaker Larijani visited Iraq November 4-7, where he traveled to Baghdad, Karbala, and Najaf to meet with his Iraqi counterpart, parliamentary bloc leaders, PM Maliki, President Talabani, and Grand Ayatollah Sistani. His primary objective appears to have been to press for consolidation of Shia parties ahead of the January national elections. Larijani also urged the GOI to expel the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK),and discussed trans-boundary water issues, the transit of Iranian pilgrims to Iraq, and other bilateral issues, culminating in a memorandum of understanding with the GOI. He also took several swipes at the United States as well as Iraq,s Sunni neighbors. Larijani,s visit was not universally welcomed, as over a hundred Iraqi parliamentarians staged a press conference to protest the visit, accusing Iran of arming Iraqi militants, disrupting Iraq,s water supply, and exacerbating sectarian divides. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. Shia Consolidation a Top Priority -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani arrived in Baghdad November 4 for a four-day reciprocal visit, at the invitation of his Iraqi counterpart Council of Representatives (CoR),Speaker Ayad Samarra,i (a Sunni), following the latter,s recent visit to Iran. Although Larijani,s visit was billed as one of &parliamentary friendship,8 our contacts and local press reported that the primary objective of Larijani,s visit was to press for a merger between PM Maliki,s State of Law (SoL) coalition, and the Iraqi National Accord (INA) coalition, which includes the two other major Shia parties, ISCI and the Sadrist Trend. Deputy CoR speaker Khalid Attiyah told POL M/C, however, that in his view it would be very difficult for the INA and SoL to overcome enough political differences to allow them to join forces before the election. He said the coalitions &with some exceptions8 (implying the Sadrist Trend) will not undermine each other, but still disagree on a few important issues. ¶3. (C) According to a senior PUK official, President Talabani hosted a lunch for Larijani that included 90 guests, including some Shia (mostly ISCI) and Sunni notables such as Ammar al-Hakim, Jalal ad-Din al-Sagheer, Humam Hammudi, Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, Speaker Samarra,i, Deputy Speaker Khalid Attiyah, IIP Leader Osama Tikriti, and Hewar,s Omar al-Jeboori. ¶4. (C) Larijani also met separately with ISCI chairman Ammar al-Hakim, and other members of the INA. Following the meeting, Hakim commented to press that, &There are ongoing and lengthy consultations with all political sides...We hope to form big blocs that ensure a strong government and parliament...8 In meetings the following day with a visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff delegation, Hakim criticized U.S. media allegations that ISCI is an agent of Iran, commenting that ISCI had at times made decisions that were contrary to Iranian interests, such as its support for the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. ¶5. (C) According to the son of Grand Ayatollah Bashir Najafi (one of the four Grand Ayatollahs of Najaf),Larijani met with Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani and was accompanied by a group of Iranian Shia and Sunni MPs who traveled with Larijani to Iraq as part of parliamentary fact-finding mission. The large group did not allow for an intimate Qmission. The large group did not allow for an intimate conversation between Sistani and the parliament speaker, who on previous visits has met alone with Sistani. ¶6. (C) According to Najafi,s son, Larijani underscored Iran,s support for Iraq,s sovereignty and inquired about Sistani,s view on internal developments in Iran, noting that supporters of the opposition &Green Movement8 had used the recent anniversary of the U.S. embassy takeover as political cover for their anti-government demonstrations. Sistani reportedly acknowledged his awareness of recent developments but reaffirmed his preference to remain neutral on Iran,s internal political developments. Najafi reportedly called on Larijani to alleviate Iraq,s water shortages aggravated by the IRIG,s blockage of the Karun river. Larijani Not Universally Welcome -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Despite the wide range of Iraqi leaders who met BAGHDAD 00002984 002 OF 003 with Larijani, his visit was not universally welcomed. UAE-based Al Sharqiyya reported that more than a hundred MPs boycotted his visit to the CoR, and held a press conference in which they criticized Iran,s negative role in Iraq, charging that Iran arms Iraqi militants, disrupts Iraq,s water supply, transgresses Iraq,s national wealth, and exacerbates sectarian divides. ¶8. (U) Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi characterized his meeting with Larijani as 8uncomfortable and somewhat stressful,8 telling news outlet Asharq al-Awsat that &I told Mr. Larijani that the Iraqis lost trust in Iran to stabilize mutual relations between both countries, due to illegal and irrational internal affairs, especially the security and political issues in the country.8 ¶9. (C) Hashimi,s chief of staff, Krikor Der-Hagopian, told Poloffs the meeting between Hashimi and Larijani was highly contentious and embarrassing for the Iranian parliament speaker. The 45-minute discussion commenced with Larijani highlighting Iran,s support to the GOI. According to his aide, Hashimi brushed past pleasantries, insisting instead on frank discussion of Iranian meddling in Iraq,s affairs. The VP proceeded to criticize the IRIG of undermining Iraq,s stability and pointed to Iran,s violent June election as a vivid example of the IRIG,s shortcomings. Larijani blamed the United States for the election turmoil while warning that &the U.S. will do the same in Iraq.8 Larijani also called on the GOI to expel the MEK, referring to the organization as the &munafiqeen8 (hypocrites),with Hashimi countering that they are &mujahideen8 (holy warriors). Krikor noted that Hashimi had deliberately limited the size of Larijani,s delegation in the meeting &in order to send a signal.8 (NOTE: Both VP Hashimi and his chief of staff are ardently anti-Iran and are prone to exaggeration. END NOTE.) Expel the MEK -------------- ¶10. (C) The fate of the MEK continues to be one of Iran,s top foreign policy priorities vis-a-vis Iraq, and was raised during the visit. Larijani pressed the GOI to expel the MEK from Iraqi soil, saying, &We thank the Iraqi government for its efforts so far, but ask the Iraqi government not to allow terrorists to stay permanently in our friendly neighboring country.8 The Secretary General of the Council of Ministers issued a statement reaffirming the GOI,s desire to rid itself of the MEK in Iraq. (Note: The GOI had initially planned to relocate the MEK from Ashraf to Muthana province. However, the Muthana Provincial Council recently rejected the GOI,s proposal, citing security concerns. The decision forces the GOI to find an alternative site and likely postpone the relocation. End note.) Comments on Security and Iraqi Democracy -------------- ¶11. (U) In praising Iraqi democracy, Larijani implicitly criticized Gulf neighbors. 8Iran strongly supports the democratic process...Iraq,s people supports parliament because it was elected and not appointed as in Saddam Hussein,s time, which is still the case in other parliaments in the region,8 Larijani told Iraqi MPs. Larijani expressed sympathy for the Iraqi people after the October 25 bombings, saying, &We are sorry for the latest attacks, and the Iraqi people will cut off the hands of terrorists and occupiers.8 He also seemed to take a swipe at Saudi Arabia, criticizing &certain countries which support terrorism with violent Q&certain countries which support terrorism with violent attacks in Iraq under the pretext of fighting the Americans when in fact they love them.8 ¶12. (SBU) A Kurdish MP who was present during Larijani,s meeting with CoR leaders said that the Iranian parliament speaker criticized U.S. involvement in Iraq, calling the United States &the enemy of both sides8 (Iran and Iraq), and claiming that U.S. interference had delayed adoption of an election law. (Note: Ironically, the CoR had adjourned early on November 4 in preparation for Larijani,s arrival, thereby delaying a vote on the election law. End note.) ¶13. (SBU) Larijani and his GOI counterpart signed a 22-point MOU on a variety of bilateral issues, including water resources, POW issues, landmines, and judicial cooperation. (Note: The issue of water resources is one of particular importance for the GOI, as Iranian blockage and diversion of waters flowing into the Tigris River is contributing to drought conditions afflicting southern Iraq. BAGHDAD 00002984 003 OF 003 A readout of recent Iraq-Iraq bilateral negotiations on water resources is reported septel. End note.) Larijani was also quoted in the press calling on Iraq to help alleviate regional dust storms that have afflicted Iran. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Although his visit coincided with the 30th anniversary of the hostage crisis in Tehran, Larijani refrained from specific public reference to the embassy takeover, focusing his remarks more broadly on bilateral cooperation with Iraq and regional security concerns. Larijani,s visit may also have been intended to propagate an image of Iranian support to Iraq that transcends sectarian politics, based on the optic of Samarra,i, a prominent Sunni politician, hosting the visit. If so, the contentious meeting with VP Hashimi and vocal opposition from over a hundred MPs frustrated that aim. It remains to be seen how successful Larijani will be in convincing Maliki to join the INA with the hopes of forging a united Shia political front in the run-up to elections. HILL