IRAQI WATER RESOURCES NEGOTIATOR DESCRIBES WATER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002980 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019 TAGS: EAGR ECON IZ PBTS SENV TNGD TPHY SUBJECT: IRAQI WATER RESOURCES NEGOTIATOR DESCRIBES WATER TALKS WITH IRAN REF: A. BAGHDAD 2800 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2899 ¶C. BAGHDAD 2930 Classified By: Classified by EMIN John Desrocher for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During Iraq-Iran bilateral negotiations on water resources held October 23-25, Iraqi negotiators confronted their Iranian interlocutors with unclassified photographs of Iranian river blockages and diversions provided to the GOI by Embassy Baghdad, Ministry of Water Resources General Director of Planning and Followups Salar Bakr Sami told USG personnel November 2. Over Iraqi objections, the Iranian negotiators insisted that resolution of water issues between the two countries follow the provisions spelled out in the 1975 &Treaty Concerning the State Frontier and Neighborly Relations between Iran and Iraq8 that calls for an equal splitting of flows from three rivers and a sharing of four others based on previous agreements and custom. The negotiations did not result in any agreements from the Iranian side to increase water flows. The GOI has requested USG aid in contracting with and funding an international water expert to assist in developing the GOI negotiating strategy for the next round of discussions with Iran. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) Embassy ESTH Officer, ITAO senior consultant for water, and military liaison (CJ-9) met GD Salar Bakr Sami in early November to discuss recent water talks with Iran that occurred from October 23-25. Salar described the trip as a successful step in continuing negotiations with Iran over water issues that have become more critical in the last several months. Salar stated that that he was Iraq's primary negotiator with Iran's General Director of Water and Dams, who noted that his Iranian interlocutor did not have the same latitude that he (Salar) had been authorized and had to obtain continuous guidance from higher authorities to determine negotiating positions and responses. Salar also stated that acting Iranian Energy Minister Namjou -- reportedly an old friend of Iraqi Minister of Water Resources Rashid -- was not in a position to finalize binding bilateral agreements. According to Salar, the Iranians were unhappy with recent negative press stories on water, and Minister Namjou accused Iraq of trying to deflect the blame for water shortages from Turkey and Syria to Iran. ¶3. (C) Salar stated that during the negotiations, Iraq would identify areas in dispute and the Iranians would respond with expressions of surprise and denial. Salar said he brought up flow reductions in the Karun, Karkh, Galal Badrah, and Sirwan Rivers, and specifically accused the Iranians of diverting the Karun. When the Iranians denied the charge, Salar said, he showed them photographs showing diversion canals on the Iranian side of the border, low water conditions at the mouth of the Karun River as it emptied into the Shatt Al Arab, and low water levels near the Abadan refinery. He stated that he requested that Iran immediately release 200 cm/s into the Karun River as an emgergency measure. Salar also said he accused the Iranians of blocking the Karkh River with a sand berm, which the Iranians also denied. Salar said he again produced photographs, this time showing a sand berm constructed along the Iranian border and the resultant devastation of Iraq's Al Hawaza marsh. He stated that he also raised the 1971 Ramsar Treaty for the preservation of wetlands of international importance for water fowl to bolster his argument for more water. According to Salar, he requested that 120 cm/s be immediately released into the Qrequested that 120 cm/s be immediately released into the Karkh River for Iraq's use. Salar also said he accused the Iranians of blocking or diverting rivers flowing into the north of Iraq, which normally feed into the Iraqi Dokan and Derbendikahn Dams located in Kurdistan near the Iranian border. When the Iranians denied blocking the rivers, Salar said he presented daily dam inflow data showing drastic reductions in flow. He requested that the Iranians immediately release six cm/s for the Galal Badrah River and 2 cm/s for the Sirwan River (a tributary of the Diyala River that flows into the Derbendikahn Dam). Salar told us that while the Iranians did not specifically agree to any increases in river water flows, they had been surprised at the Iraqi's level of knowledge on bilateral water issues. ¶4. (C) According to Salar, Iran,s chief negotiating position was to propose the resolution of water disputes and issues based on provisions contained in the 1975 Treaty Concerning the State Frontier and Neighborly Relations between Iran and Iraq. (Note: The 1975 treaty designates rivers whose flow will be shared equally between Iran and Iraq and other rivers whose flows will be divided based upon the 1914 Commission on the Delimitation of the Iranian-Ottoman frontier and in accordance with custom. End BAGHDAD 00002980 002 OF 002 note.) Salar told us that this treaty was negotiated during the time of Saddam Hussein and that the treaty was deliberately slanted towards punishing Kurdistan. Salar told the Iranians that the Iraqi Minister of Water Resources did not accept the 1975 treaty as a basis for future water negotiations, but would be open to forming a technical committee to discuss water issues. (Comment: Ironically, the 1975 treaty specifically calls for the creation of a permanent joint technical commission composed of an equal number of experts from both States to conduct technical studies and to supervise matters relating to contiguous and successive watercourses. End comment) ¶5. (C) COMMENT: The GOI has requested USG assistance in contracting with and funding an internationally recognized water expert, Dr. Jon Martin Trondalen of the Compass Foundation in Geneva, to help prepare Iraq's position for the next round of water negotiations. Post is exploring ways to support the GOI request. END COMMENT HILL