IRAQ'S SOUTHERN IRAQ OIL AND GAS SITUATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002971 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019 TAGS: EAID ECON EINV ENRG EPET IZ PREL SUBJECT: IRAQ'S SOUTHERN IRAQ OIL AND GAS SITUATION REF: A. BAGHDAD 2299 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2389 ¶C. BASRAH 38 ¶D. BASRAH 56 Classified By: Economic Counselor John Carwile for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d ) ¶1. (C) Summary: BP plans to sign and implement its contract to increase the production of Rumaila oil field as soon as early December, even though some Government of Iraq (GOI) officials claim parliament must first approve the contract. While a significant production increase will likely not occur for more than a year, BP is already concerned about the lack of southern oil infrastructure capacity to export Rumaila production increases. We assess this infrastructure to be inadequate for expected production increases from Rumaila and other southern fields and to be in need of immediate repair and expansion. The GOI has begun several expansion projects, but questions remain as to whether these and additional expansion projects can be completed on time to ensure sufficient southern export capacity. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On October 24-26, econoffs traveled to Basra to assess the state - and future potential - of Iraq,s southern oil and gas facilities and the region,s export infrastructure. Econoffs met with representatives from a number of representatives from international oil companies preparing to begin work in southern Iraq, including BP. BP Cautiously Optimistic, Preparing to Implement Contract -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The president and the chief operating officer of BP-Iraq were both cautiously optimistic about finalizing the BP/China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) contract with the GOI to develop and increase the production of Rumaila oil field. (Rumaila is Iraq,s highest producing field and contains Iraq,s second largest reserves). The BP-Iraq officials expected the contract would be ready as soon as November 3. (Comment: Subsequent press reports indicate that the BP/CNPC/GOI contract was indeed signed on November 3. End Comment.) The contract will not enter into force until two conditions precedent (a Government of Iraq (GOI) letter stating that the Council of Ministers (cabinet) has approved the contract, and a baseline of current field production) have been met. BP-Iraq,s president said such a letter was needed as "further proof" that the contact is legitimate. When asked about some Iraqi parliamentarians, claims that the Council of Representatives (parliament) -- and not the Council of Ministers -- has final contract approval, the BP-Iraq president said his company would trust in the sanctity of the contract and proceed with its implementation. . . . But Significant Production Increase May Take Two Years -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The BP-Iraq officials stated that on November 1, the Iraqi Oil Ministry and BP would start a thirty-day period of metering Rumaila's current production to establish a baseline production rate (aka the initial production rate) for the contract. (Comment: Iraq,s South Oil Company is incapable of providing accurate production data for Rumaila, Iraq's most important single source of revenue. End Comment) Most of BP,s cost reimbursement and all its fee earnings will begin once the company increases Rumaila production to a level that is 10 percent above the baseline rate. BP-Iraq,s president said it might take up to two years to reach the 10 percent threshold. Qyears to reach the 10 percent threshold. Willing to Cooperate in Building-Out Infrastructure -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) BP-Iraq,s president expressed concern over the lack of both onshore and offshore capacity to export Rumaila production increases. (See septels for information on and analysis of onshore/offshore infrastructure.) He expressed BAGHDAD 00002971 002 OF 003 eagerness to work on improving Iraq,s southern export infrastructure with the Oil Ministry, as well as with international oil companies that win contracts for the West Qurna Phase 1 field, the Zubair field, and the oil/gas fields on offer in Iraq's December bid round. (Comment: After the contracts for Rumaila, West Qurna Phase 1, and Zubair are signed, we will attempt to meet with each contract consortium to encourage cooperation in crafting and implementing an export infrastructure solution with the Oil Ministry. Likewise, we also will encourage the Oil Ministry to work with the companies. End comment) Comment: Southern Oil Export Infrastructure Concerns -------------- -------------- 6.(C) About 75 percent of Iraq,s oil exports flow through three southern export pipelines running to two offshore maritime loading terminals in the Arabian Gulf. The pipelines, capacity is currently limited to approximately 1.6 million barrels per day (mbpd) due to concerns over the pipelines, state of repair and the possibility of ruptures if more oil, under higher pressure, were pumped through the lines. In 2007, Iraq,s Oil Ministry began the South Export Redundancy Project (SERP) to build two new offshore pipelines and supporting infrastructure to increase Iraq,s southern export capacity to 4.5 mbpd. This increased capacity would be sufficient to export the 1.8 mbpd production increase stipulated in the BP/CNPC contract, which must occur within six years after the contract begins, and the 1.5 to 1.6 mbpd currently exported through the southern infrastructure. However, even if SERP is completed on time, offshore export capacity will increase relatively slowly: by 0.2 mbpd (to 1.8 mbpd) by the end of 2011, by 1.4 mbpd (to 3.0 mbpd) by the end of 2012, and by 2.9 mbpd (to 4.5 mbpd) by the end of 2013. ¶7. (C)If SERP falls off schedule, we assess that new offshore export capacity could lag behind oil export plans as soon as 2012. This capacity imbalance could be averted, however, if a significant percentage of the oil production increase were used in domestic refining. Such a scenario would depend upon the Oil Ministry fulfilling its refinery expansion plans, and in any case is likely to account for only a modest portion (perhaps an additional 300,000 barrels per day) of oil production by 2013. ¶8. (C) Increasing offshore export capacity beyond SERP in the short term could only be accomplished by building additional pipelines or by continuing to use the two existing offshore pipelines. However, the existing pipelines are about 20 years past their intended life and are susceptible to rupture at any moment. A rupture would not only disrupt three quarters of Iraq,s current oil exports (and two-thirds of GOI revenues),but also could lead to environmental disaster in the Arabian Gulf, especially since the intakes for Kuwait,s and Saudi Arabia,s fresh water supply are relatively near the offshore pipelines. ¶9. (C) In addition to the BP/CNPC contract for Rumaila, the Oil Ministry is negotiating contracts to develop and increase production of two other large oil fields in southern Iraq: West Qurna Phase 1 (West Qurna Phase 1 and Phase 2 together is Iraq,s third highest producing field with Iraq,s largest reserves) and Zubair (Iraq,s fourth highest producing field). If these two contracts are signed and implemented, Iraq,s southern oil production Qsigned and implemented, Iraq,s southern oil production could increase by more than 3 mbpd during roughly the same time period as the BP/CNPC contract for Rumaila. A portion of the West Qurna and Zubair production might be needed to supply current and planned domestic refinery capacity. However, we assess that if proposed development plans occur on schedule,the Rumaila, West Qurna, and Zubair oil fields could together generate over 5 mbpd of additional oil exports within 7 years (by the end of 2016), while SERP would add only 2.9 mbpd of export capacity above current export capacity of 1.6 mbpd (for a total export capacity of 4.5 mbpd). Accommodating these increased oil exports would demand an expansion of SERP or an additional pipeline project or the continued use of the current southern export offshore pipelines. BAGHDAD 00002971 003 OF 003 HILL