PM ADVISOR RIKABI ON DFI, SADDAM-ERA CIVIL CLAIMS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002961 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC IZ KU SUBJECT: PM ADVISOR RIKABI ON DFI, SADDAM-ERA CIVIL CLAIMS, AND CHAPTER VII REF: A. STATE 109017 ¶B. STATE 105413 ¶C. BAGHDAD 2924 ¶D. STATE 105974 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Pol M/C and Embassy Legal Advisor (ELA) met with PM Advisor Sadiq Rakabi November 4 to review the points contained in refs A and B, regarding the settlement of Saddam-era civil claims and a one year extension of the arrangements for the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). Rikabi said he was unable to provide a counter-offer to the $650 million figure the USG had proposed to settle the civil claims until the U.S. responded with a revised text of the settlement agreement. Rikabi noted that issues like the amount of the settlement and whether the agreement resolved all outstanding claims were politically sensitive since the agreement would be public and debated in the Council of Representatives. He took on board ELA's point that he and the GOI legal advisor had agreed in Washington to resolve the long-outstanding issue of payment in the Stark case with an exchange of dipnotes. Regarding the offer of a one-year final extension of the arrangements for the Development Fund for Iraq, Rikabi did not object in principle to tying the extension to resolving Saddam-era legal claims and Oil-for-Food (OFF) claims, but questioned whether there would be sufficient progress after one year. Rikabi complained that the USG was not doing enough to help the GOI exit Chapter VII status and pointed to the need for more help on non-Kuwait-related resolutions such as UNSCR 707, dealing with WMD: He claimed that the Deputy Secretary had promised him during his October visit to Washington that he would try to do something "before Christmas" to resolve this issue for Iraq. End Summary. HEDGING ABOUT A GOI SETTLEMENT FIGURE -------------- ¶2. (C) Pol M/C and Embassy Legal Advisor (ELA) met with PM Advisor Sadiq Rakabi November 4 to review the points contained in refs A and B (previously presented to FM Zebari, as reported in ref C). Regarding the settlement of claims of U.S. citizens arising from the Saddam era, Rakabi reported that the GOI was keen to resolve this issue as soon as possible, which would help Iraq to further normalize its relations with the international community. Nonetheless, he said he was unable to provide a counter-offer to the $650 million figure the USG had proposed until the U.S. got back to GOI legal advisor Dr. Fadel (Jawad Khadum) with a revised text of the settlement agreement (based on discussions Rikabi and Fadel had with Principal Deputy Legal Advisor Donoghue in Washington in October). Dismissing ELA's point that it would be helpful to have a number from the Iraqi side to provide Congress, to show GOI seriousness of intent to settle the claims, Rikabi responded that the number should not "be a guess," and insisted it should be based on "principles" laid out in the amended agreement. The USG to needed to "be realistic," said Rikabi, further hinting that the original $650 million was too high. SEPARATING THE OKLAHOMA CITY AND 9/11 CASES -------------- ¶3. (C) Regarding the Oklahoma City (Lawton) case, Rikabi welcomed ELA's report that plaintiffs in the case have agreed (based on the recent Supreme Court decision in Beaty) not to contest Iraq's motion to dismiss. In response to Pol M/C's query on the 9/11 cases, he indicated the GOI's current intention to proceed with including these with the Saddam-era claims settlement, although there might be some Qclaims settlement, although there might be some reconsideration of this approach. Rikabi noted that he and the PM's office needed to be able to persuade Iraq's political leaders, especially in the COR, and the public that the large settlement agreement would "close the file" on all the outstanding legal cases. Leaving the 9/11 cases out would create a question mark over the package, he added. Rikabi did not rule out the option, however. GOI POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT -------------- --- ¶4. (C) Rikabi also pointed to the political sensitivities involved in the settlement agreement: "This will not be a secret agreement; it will attract a lot of criticism." Rikabi underscored in particular the challenges that would be involved in selling the agreement to the Council of Representatives. Toughening his rhetoric a bit more, Rikabi also noted that it would be a challenge to persuade the Iraqi people that it was a good deal when the GOI was paying "$50 million to an American who was used as a human shield, while BAGHDAD 00002961 002 OF 003 the Americans paid five to ten thousand dollars for Iraqis killed here." RESOLVING PAYMENT ISSUE IN STARK CASE -------------- ¶5. (C) Pol M/C also urged the GOI to resolve issue of payment in the Stark case (Ref D),which the two sides had long agreed to settle at a specific figure. Rikabi made a half-hearted attempt at pushing back, hinting that it was the fault of the American side that the GOI payment was never received, but took on board ELA's point that he and Fadel had agreed in Washington to resolve this case with an exchange of dipnotes, and accepted a hard copy of the dipnote that had already been sent to him electronically. TYING DFI EXTENSION TO CIVIL CLAIMS AND OFF -------------- ¶6. (C) Regarding the offer of a one-year final extension of the arrangements for the Development Fund for Iraq, Rikabi asked why the offer was limited to one year. He took on board Pol M/C's explanation that it was the Russians and Chinese, and that a final one-year would create a better environment for resolving Iraq's broader Chapter VII issues with the Council. He did not object in principle to tying the extension to resolving the Saddam-era legal claims and Oil-for-Food (OFF) claims, but questioned whether there would be a guarantee of sufficient progress after one year to render the DFI immunities unnecessary for the GOI. Rikabi said that the previous year, the initial proposal had been for a final three-year extension, which the GOI requested be limited to one year, with the option of revisiting the issue after a year. ¶7. (C) Rikabi reported that there were 32 OFF contracts claims outstanding. He insisted that the UNSC go ahead and close the file on this issue instead of waiting for the last contracts to be resolved. "Iraq should not be treated like an outlaw nation; it wants to fulfill its obligations and normalize its relations" with the international community. A POC ON CHAPTER VII AND UPCOMING JCC -------------- ¶8. (C) Rikabi took on board but did not respond to Pol M/C's request that the GOI designate a POC for all Chapter VII issues who could speak authoritatively for the GOI on these issues. Pol M/C noted that the U.S. and Iraq would soon hold a Diplomatic Joint Coordinating Committee (JCC),which would involve a team from the State Department visiting Baghdad to work through key Chapter VII issues, such as WMD and the Kuwait-related issues. WMD: "WE ARE BEING PUNISHED TWICE" -------------- ¶9. (C) Regarding the issue of WMD, Rikabi pointed out that the U.S. is very aware that there are no WMD in Iraq and no GOI intention to obtain or produce them (as opposed to Iran, which is actively seeking them, he added). "That should be enough" to resolve the concerns of the international community. He questioned why the WMD resolution was still on the books: "It should be canceled." Rikabi said he was aware of the issue of the Additional Protocol and said it needed to be ratified by the COR. He made the additional point that it was unfair to require it of Iraq. Hinting that it was being required of Iraq because of U.S. policy equities regarding Iran, Rikabi noted "We are being punished twice; once for Saddam and once for Ahmedinejad." More broadly, he claimed that the Deputy Secretary had promised him in October that he would try to do something "before Christmas" to resolve this issue for Iraq. "I am waiting," said Rikabi. CHAPTER VII: U.S. NOT DOING ENOUGH -------------- Q -------------- ¶10. (C) Rikabi repeated the standard GOI complaint that the U.S. was not doing enough, given that "you promised to help get Iraq out of Chapter VII." Rikabi made the broader rhetorical point that the U.S. focused too exclusively on GOI obligations in the Chapter VII resolutions and is too strict on these obligations, while not paying enough attention to "Iraqi rights" enshrined in the resolutions. When asked to elaborate, he noted that most of the Chapter VII resolutions contained obligations for Iraq but also for other concerned states. He picked up copies of several resolutions and read language from them. Regarding UNSCR 1483, for example, he noted -- making a dig at Syria -- that member states were under an obligation to deny safe haven to previous members of the Iraqi regime. Pol M/C responded that Iraq's exit from Chapter VII status would require Iraq to focus on its BAGHDAD 00002961 003 OF 003 obligations and take certain concrete steps. ¶11. (C) On the Kuwait-related resolutions, Rikabi acknowledged that progress "might" be too difficult before the elections. He described them as "very sensitive" but also underlined that they were related to the DFI issue and other Chapter VII concerns. HILL