IRAQI ELECTION LAW UPDATE, NOVEMBER 2, 2009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002931

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI ELECTION LAW UPDATE, NOVEMBER 2, 2009

REF: BAGHDAD 2920

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Gary A. Grappo for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Unable to overcome Kurdish intransigence on
the UNAMI proposal on Kirkuk in the national election, the
Council of Representatives (COR) ended session November 2
without a vote but agreed to return for an additional session
the next day. Embassy and UNAMI discussions with Kurdish MPs
suggest that KRG President Barzani has not yet issued a clear
directive. Speaker Samarra'i appeared exasperated and
requested that UNAMI draft new language that would
incorporate elements of VP Adel Abd al-Mahdi's proposal. The
Arab and Turkoman contingents have told us they remain
prepared to adopt the UNAMI proposal, but are reticent to
commit before the Kurds do (in the case of the Turkomans) and
wary of crossing the Kurds ahead of the national election (in
the case of the Arabs). We will be working overnight and
tomorrow to move the Kurds, making clear that the United
States strongly supports what it sees as the fairest possible
agreement for all parties and pressing for Barzani's
acceptance of the UNAMI proposal. END SUMMARY.

State of Play
--------------


2. (C) Speaker Samarra'i was unable to follow through with
his plan to call a vote on the election bill, including the
UNAMI proposal for treatment of Kirkuk, at the November 2
session of the COR. Though 165 COR members were present, it
quickly became evident that Kurdish parliamentarians would
not support the plan for voting rules in Kirkuk that was
presented by UNAMI on October 31. In the absence of Kurdish
support, the Speaker stalled for time, successfully
convincing members to stay in Baghdad for an additional
session on November 3 before MPs begin a scheduled week out
of session. As Samarra'i left the November 2 session open,
this means that he can resume the session November 3 without
a quorum of parliamentarians present. However, a quorum (138
MPs) is required for a vote on any legislation.


3. (C) COR Legal Committee MP Khaled Schwany (PUK - Kirkuk)
objected to two elements of the UNAMI proposal: 1) holding a
second round of elections in Kirkuk in January 2011, and 2)
including reference to the "current administrative
boundaries" of Kirkuk. With regard to the latter, Schwany
explained that Arabs and Turkomans insistence on using the
1957 census as a basis for review of the Kirkuk voter list is
a problem because that would include four districts with
significant Kurdish populations -- Kular, Chamchamal, Kifri
and Toz Khormatu -- that have since been incorporated into
neighboring provinces. In a meeting with acting Kurdish
Alliance list leader Friad Rwanduzi, Poloffs stressed that
while it was for the parties to decide whether to hold a
second round of elections in January 2011 as part of a
compromise agreement, raising the issue of the four provinces
constituted an attempt to inject disputed internal boundaries
(DIBs) issues into the election law debate, which the United
States strongly opposed.


4. (C) On November 2, MP Saadi Barzinji, KDP hardliner from
Kirkuk issued "an explanation" to the press about the Kurds'
objection to the October 31 UNAMI election law proposal.
Acting Kurdish Alliance List (KAL) leader Friad Rwanduzi told
Poloffs the KDP and Kurdish Islamic Union (KIU) acted without
instruction from Erbil in issuing their statement. (Note:
Rwanduzi was part of the Kurdish group present with Barzinji
when he gave his statement. End note.) Rwanduzi admitted
Qwhen he gave his statement. End note.) Rwanduzi admitted
that Barzinji's statement reinforced the perception that the
Kurds were being inflexible about the law and potentially
limited the Kurds' room for maneuver. Rwanduzi said he had
been in regular contact with President Jalal Talabani and
intimated that the PUK is willing to be more flexible than
the KDP with respect to election law modalities, but stressed
that with respect to Kirkuk, the PUK and KDP must maintain a
united front. (Comment: Rwanduzi's remarks were the first
suggestion at the level of Kurdish parliamentarians that
there is daylight between the PUK and KDP positions on the
election law. End Comment.)


5. (C) Rwanduzi and KDP Chief of Staff Sarchel Lawrani said
separately that KRG President Masoud Barzani contacted
Deputy House Speaker Arif Tayfour early November 2 to give
him limited latitude to negotiate on the election law;
however, Rwanduzi stressed that the KAL cannot move forward
on the UNAMI proposal or any other version of the law until
it receives specific instructions from Barzani. (Comment:
Rwanduzi's remarks make it clear that the Kurds' actions
today in the COR were designed to stall progress either to
allow the UNAMI proposal to die of its own accord or give

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Barzani time to reach a decision. End comment.)


6. (C) Rwanduzi expressed concern about interference in the
process by Turkish Ambassador Murat Ozcelik. He alleged that
Ozcelik had pressured Speaker Samarra'i and Iraqi Turkoman
Front Sa'ad Eddin Ergec to reject a new proposal by COR Legal
Committee Chair Baha al-Araji to vote on amendments to the
2005 law that would allow the Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC) to continue preparations for the election
according to its operational timeline. Al-Araji's proposal
was to vote only on the election date, open versus closed
list, and total number of COR seats, and to defer further
discussion on Kirkuk election modalities until November 30.
The Arabs and Turks fear, however, that if they accepted such
a formula, the issue of whether and how Kirkuk would vote
would not be addressed, constituting a de facto victory for
the Kurds. UNAMI Poloffs heard similar reports from Sunni
Arabs about Ozcelik's interventions; they were also told that
he had pressed Samarra'i to endorse an earlier proposal by
Arabs and Turkomans to give two compensatory seats to the
Sunni Arab and Turkoman blocs in Kirkuk (vice the one each
prescribed in UNAMI's proposal).


7. (C) Rwanduzi shared with Poloffs a separate proposal he
attributed to Speaker Samarra'i. It called for using the
2009 voter registration list and establishing a committee to
review voter lists in all provinces. In any province in
which fraudulent registrations were found to have exceeded
15-20 percent, new elections would be held in January 2011.
He re-stated that Kirkuk cannot be singled out for review and
that compensatory seats are unconstitutional.


8. (C) DCM Ford briefed Ayad Allawi (Iraqi National
Movement) and Adnan Pachachi (former Foreign Minister) on the
October 31 UNAMI election law proposal, of which they
appeared to be unaware. The DCM said that the Arabs and
Turkomans appeared ready to accept the deal, while the Kurds
are still studying the offer. He told Allawi that the Vice
President had spoken to KRG President Barzani on November 1
to encourage support for the proposal. The DCM then asked
Allawi -- who has a long-standing relationship with the KRG
President -- whether Barzani has the assurances he needs to
move forward on the election law. Allawi said Barzani is
nervous about Kirkuk's future. Allawi implied that he would
not take a position against Barzani or the Kurdish bloc.
(COMMENT: This is in line with what ISCI's Ammar al-Hakim and
Da'wa Ali al-Adeeb told Ambassador Hill November 1; the Shia
are reluctant to exert pressure on the Kurds to support the
UNAMI proposal. END COMMENT.)


9. (C) The Ambassador spoke frankly with President Jalal
Talabani November 1, and also engaged with KRG PM Barham
Salih on the election law twice on November 2. On the ground
in Kirkuk, the Ambassador's Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq
(ASANI) met with Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Christians to urge
support for UNAMI's proposal. Kirkuk's Sunni Arab Deputy
Governor, Rakan Saeed al-Jubouri, described the UNAMI
proposal as "a negative development," in large part because
it called for the "heavily falsified" 2009 voter registration
list. He called MP Omar al-Jabouri in Baghdad with the ASANI
in the room to raise his objections, and was discomfited that
Omar al-Jabouri and "the (Sunni Arab) brothers in Baghdad"
were "studying" UNAMI's proposal. Imad Yokhanna Yaqo, Kirkuk
Branch Director of the Assyrian Democratic Movement expressed
concern that UNAMI's proposal ignored Christians and
Qconcern that UNAMI's proposal ignored Christians and
non-Turkoman/Sunni Arab minorities in Kirkuk and urged the
USG not to forget the interests of Kirkuk's Christian
minority.

Next Steps
--------------


10. (C) As election law debate the COR drags on, the IHEC
Board of Commissioners continues to express anxiety about its
ability to meet the operational timeline for a January 16,
2010 election date. With just 75 days to go before the
election, IHEC is well under its previously stated
requirement of 90 days to prepare for an election.
Meanwhile, the Ambassador has instructed his Special Advisor
for Northern Iraq to engage various interlocutors in Erbil as
well as those traveling to Vienna with Barzani November 2.
The Ambassador and poloffs will continue to press Kurds and
others within the COR before a possible vote on November 3.
HILL