AMBASSADOR REVIEWS ELECTION LAW OPTIONS WITH PM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002916

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REVIEWS ELECTION LAW OPTIONS WITH PM,
OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary R. Grappo, for reasons
1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: After expressing condolences for the
October 25 bombings, the Ambassador engaged in a sustained
conversation with PM Maliki October 26 about possible
compromises to break the impasse over the election law. The
two agreed, with the concurrence of CG MNF-I, who also
attended, that it was critical to hold the elections on time
and also to signal publicly that the rules adopted for this
election would not set a precedent for deciding the political
status of Kirkuk. Also on October 26, the Ambassador met
with VP Adil Abd al-Mahdi, VP Tariq Hashimi, Speaker Ayad
Samarra'i, and Da'wa parliamentary bloc leader Ali al-Adeeb.
Abd al-Mahdi reported that consensus had formed among members
of the Presidency Councils around a single proposal for
Kirkuk voting that involved using both the 2009 and the 2004
voter lists. An initial sounding with UNAMI by Pol M/C
October 27 indicated that the SRSG and his elections
assistance team had questions about whether the proposal
could be implemented. Following the Ambassador's further
consultations with elections experts October 28 that
identified problematic political implications with the way
the proposal would function when actually implemented, the
Ambassador and SRSG Ad Melkert agreed to put aside the Abd
al-Mahdi proposal and pursue other possibilities. A revised
UNAMI-Embassy proposal began to get more traction November 1
(reported septel). End Summary.

POSTPONED ELECTIONS WOULD BE A DISASTER
--------------


2. (C) At an October 26 meeting with Iraqi PM Maliki, the
Ambassador conveyed his condolences for the bombings the
previous day that targeted the Ministries of Justice and
Planning and the Provincial Council Building. Maliki and the
Ambassador agreed that holding elections on time in January
is critical. Maliki said that any delay would be a victory
for those who wanted to derail Iraq's democratic process.
The Ambassador concurred, and underlined that he and the
Embassy, with CG MNF-I, were heavily engaged in pressing for
rapid passage of an election law. "The elections will happen
in January; it would be a huge mistake to allow them to be
postponed," the Ambassador noted.

THIS ELECTION NOT A PRECEDENT FOR KIRKUK
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador conveyed his understanding that later
that afternoon, the Prime Minister, the DPM, and the
Presidency Council would take up some 6-7 different proposals
that the Political Council for National Security (PCNS) had
recommended for consideration the previous night. He noted
that the Embassy is working closely with UNAMI on the issue
and was ready to get behind any workable solution the small
group referred back to the PCNS, for eventual Council of
Representatives (COR) action, as long a UNAMI found it
feasible. Maliki and the Ambassador agreed that it should be
made clear that the rules established for this election would
not set a precedent for any future political decisions about
Kirkuk. The Ambassador offered to issue a statement along
those lines if the PM thought it would be helpful. Maliki
concurred with the suggestion. The Ambassador also noted the
importance of making clear that the issue of Kirkuk would
need to be decided by political consensus, not by a census
politics fueled by deliberate efforts to shift the
demographic playing field.

PM PROPOSES GOING BACK TO 2004 VOTER LIST
--------------


4. (C) PM Maliki proposed using the 2004 voter registry,
Q4. (C) PM Maliki proposed using the 2004 voter registry,
rather than the current list, to determine voter eligibility
in Kirkuk and possibly Mosul. The Ambassador and CG MNF-I
both made the point that the proposal could disenfranchise up
to several hundred thousand (Kurdish) voters. General
Odierno highlighted that it would be worrisome -- and
potentially pose security implications -- to set up a system
in which on voting day large numbers of mostly young voters
(who would have been registered since 2004) would not be
allowed to vote.

VP LAYS OUT A COMPROMISE WITH LOTS OF BUY-IN
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador, CG-MNF-I and Pol M/C met Vice
President Adil Abd al-Mahdi later October 26. He reported
that an agreement has been reached among Iraqi leaders on an
election law proposal that should satisfy the Kurdish and
Arab-Turkomen sides regarding Kirkuk. He said the members of
the three Presidency Councils -- President Talabani, Vice
Presidents Hashimi and Abd al-Mahdi, Prime Minister Maliki,

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Speakers Samarra'i Attiyah and Tayfour -- had just adjourned
and settled on a single proposal that would allow all Iraqis
to vote at the same time on January 16 and settled the
stalemate between Kurds and Arab-Turkomen from Kirkuk on the
voter list in that province.


6. (C) Abd al-Mahdi explained the proposal as follows: IHEC
would distinguish between the 2004 and 2009 voter lists and
offer two ballot boxes in Kirkuk -- one for voters who appear
on the 2004 list and one for voters who were added since.
The results of the 2004 voter list would be counted as in
every other province. The results of the 2009 list would
count towards national compensatory seats until a committee
could verify the newly added voters. If the committee
verified the names, then those COR seats would represent
Kirkuk; if not, then the votes would still remain be valid
but the COR member would remain a national compensatory COR
seat. In this way, the committee could check the voter list
without disenfranchising anyone or delaying the election in
Iraq or in Kirkuk. Abd al-Mahdi predicted that the
difference between the 2009 and 2004 list was about 360,000
names; therefore, three to four seats would be impacted by
this committee, based on one COR seat per 100,000 Iraqis.

SPEAKER ELABORATES ON THE CONSENSUS PROPOSAL
--------------


7. (C) Speaker Ayad Samarra'i told the Ambassador October 26
that he would convene a COR bloc leader meeting October 27
and hoped to bring the proposal up for a vote soon
afterwards. When asked how the proposal got around
specifically mentioning Kirkuk, Samarra'i explained two
requirements would need to be met before a province would
come under the two-ballot-box idea. First, the province must
have experienced an increase in population greater than 5
percent per year between 2004 and 2009. Second, a given
number of COR members must submit a request for the review
committee and split ballot box. Samarra'i said he wanted
that number to be 25 COR members while the Kurds wanted that
number to be 50. These two conditions would probably only
apply to Kirkuk, and possibly Ninewa, Samarra'i said. He
said what is key to the agreed proposal is that that the
review committee would not hinder the electoral timeline and
that all Iraqis would get to vote on January 16.


8. (C) Vice President Tariq al Hashimi told Ambassador, CG
MNF-I, and Pol M/C on October 26 that the use of the
Political Council for National Security (PCNS) to address
election law deadlock was "encouraging" and that a "stumbling
block had been removed." He repeated his commitment to
holding elections on time.


9. (C) COMMENT: On October 27, UNAMI expressed considerable
unease about the Abd al-Mahdi proposal, questioning whether
it was technically feasible to implement. Following the
Ambassador's further consultations with elections experts
from UNAMI and IFES October 28 that identified problematic
political implications with the way the proposal would
function when actually implemented, the Ambassador and SRSG
Ad Melkert agreed to put aside the Abd al-Mahdi proposal and
pursue other possibilities. They further agreed that these
options would be presented as "jointly" supported by the U.S.
and UNAMI to the relevant Iraqi leadership beginning October

28. A revised UNAMI-Embassy proposal began to get more
traction November 1 (reported septel).




HILL