ACTION REQUEST: IRAQI ELECTION LAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002913

SIPDIS

OPERATIONS CENTER FOR SWO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: IRAQI ELECTION LAW

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2912

B. BAGHDAD 2851

Classified By: Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Gary A. Grap
po for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an Action Request, please see para. 10.


2. (C) SUMMARY. Following discussions with Iraqi
politicians, UNAMI SRSG Melkert presented October 31 a new
proposal for voting in Kirkuk province that blends elements
of prior schemes. The new approach followed a failed effort
on October 29 to pursue a "two-stage" election and an offer
on the part of a Kirkuk Arab hardliner that suggested some
softening in their position -- though not that of the
Turkomen. The Ambassador, MNF-I CG Odierno, and SRSG Melkert
agreed to work quickly, and in close coordination, to engage
key Iraqi leaders to build support for UNAMI's October 31
proposal and push for a vote in the Council of
Representatives (COR) within the next 48 hours, i.e. by
November 2. Following our coordination meeting, UNAMI
reported an initial "encouraging" meeting with Kirkuk Arab
hardliners on this proposal. In addition, UNAMI received
confirmation through Grand Ayatollah Sistani's son, Mohammed
Rida, that Sistani would support the new plan. END SUMMARY.

U.S.-UNAMI Coordination Meeting
--------------


3. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador and MNF-I CG Odierno
to coordinate a strategy to secure an election law, SRSG
Melkert summarized three options for the election law that
still offered interest to various Iraqi politicians. First,
there was the UNAMI proposal that both the United States and
UNAMI had been promoting since October 29 (Ref A),calling
for a one-year term of office for Kirkuk COR members and
other elements. Second, there was the option to
pre-determine the allocation of Kirkuk's COR seats (Ref B).
And lastly, there was still the possibility of delaying
elections in Kirkuk province for one year. U.S. and UNAMI
officials agreed that each option had its problems, and that
excluding Kirkuk from the January 2010 elections was the
least desirable solution. Melkert added that during an
October 31 meeting with Chairman Faraj al-Haydari of the
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC),he had had to
calm a "pretty nervous" Haydari and to ask that IHEC abstain
from making public comments in the near term while
negotiations on the election law continue.


4. (C) Melkert explained that UNAMI's October 29 proposal
was "near death" because Sunni Arabs and Turkomen from Kirkuk
want greater assurances of their respective representations
within the province's eleven seats in the COR. Melkert
reported Sunni Arab MP Omar al-Jabouri of Kirkuk expressed
these concerns to UNAMI during consultations late October 30.
Al-Jabouri suggested that instead of UNAMI's proposal to
conduct elections in Kirkuk with the 2009 voter list, Sunni
Arab and Turkomen from Kirkuk would prefer to receive two
compensatory seats each (four seats in total).


5. (C) NOTE: Al-Jabouri told Deputy PolCouns on October 31
that the "Arab street" in Kirkuk had rejected his previous
proposal, key elements of which were: (1) Elections should be
held on 16 January 2010 based on the 2009 voter registration
list, and the same number of compensatory seats will be given
to Arabs and Turkomen; (2) the 2009 voter registration list,
as well as any other voter list whether before or after, will
not be used for future electoral events until the completion
of review and scrutiny of all the population records and
data; (3) a special committee will be established by the COR
Qdata; (3) a special committee will be established by the COR
to work with UNAMI and relevant Iraqi authorities to
undertake the task outlined in part two in accordance with
the criteria of the 1957 census within the current Kirkuk
boundaries; (4) the results of the elections shall not have
any constitutional or legal implications over the political
and administrative future of Kirkuk. Al-Jabouri blamed the
rejection on Arab-Turkomen fears that using the 2009 voter
registration list would definitively demonstrate the Kurds'
majority in Kirkuk and that Kurdish politicians would find a
way to avoid a review of the 2009 voter registry -- a fear
fueled by erroneous reports that Barzani had called for the
"annexation" of Kirkuk into the KRG. Al-Jabouri subsequently
floated a new "compromise proposal" that calls for two
compensatory seats each for Kirkuk's Sunni Arabs and
Turkomen. The logic was that guaranteed compensatory seats
would ensure that the current balance of seats within
Kirkuk's parliamentary delegation -- elected in 2005 -- would
be perpetuated, blunting the Kurds' purported effort to
effect demographic change since 2004. END NOTE.

BAGHDAD 00002913 002 OF 002



Updated UNAMI Election Law Proposal
--------------


6. (C) Melkert proposed that the United States and UNAMI
support a solution that blends elements of Al-Jabouri's
proposals and UNAMI's former plan. The text is as follows:
"(i) The January 2010 parliamentary elections in Iraq shall
be conducted based on the 2009 updated national voter list.
In Kirkuk Governorate, the Arab and Turkmen components shall
each be allocated one compensatory seat. Those seats shall
be given to the lists within those components that acquired
the highest number of votes and IHEC shall implement this.
(ii) The voter list for these elections for the Kirkuk
Governorate will not be used for future electoral events in
this governorate. A special committee will be established by
the COR to work with UNAMI and IHEC to develop the criteria
for a voter registry and future electoral processes in
Kirkuk. The work of this Committee shall be completed in
time for a subsequent election that could be held in Kirkuk
Governorate on 16 January 2011. That election would be based
on the criteria recommended by the Committee, using the
current boundaries of Kirkuk Governorate and available
sources including the 1957 census. The term of office for
COR members elected on 16 January 2010 representing Kirkuk
will therefore be one year. (iii) No voter list shall be
used for any future electoral events in the Governorate of
Kirkuk until the completion of the work of the
above-mentioned special committee. The results of the 16
January 2010 elections shall not have any constitutional or
legal implications over the political and administrative
future of Kirkuk."

Next Steps
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador, CG Odierno, and SRSG Melkert agreed
that UNAMI, supported by the Embassy, will present the above
proposal to key Iraqi political leaders beginning the evening
of October 31. UNAMI and the Embassy agreed to present this
proposal as a final proposal, but agreed to consult again
should it become necessary to make adjustments or to consider
postponing the election in Kirkuk.


8. (C) SRSG Melkert October 31 called Grand Ayatollah
Sistani's son, Mohammed Rida, to ask for Sistani's support
for the October 31 UNAMI proposal. UNAMI D/SRSG Andrew
Gilmour reported that they read the message to him, and that
Rida replied that his father will support it. In addition,
the SRSG plans to talk with Speaker Ayad al-Samarra'i and
Deputy Speaker Attiyah on October 31. The SRSG will follow
up with outreach to the Arabs, Turkomen and other contacts on
November 1.


9. (C) The Ambassador will contact the Turkish Ambassador
the evening of October 31 to make the points listed in para.

12. The Ambassador, along with CG Odierno as appropriate,
will seek engagements November 1 with PM Maliki, Speaker
Samarra'i, Da'wa bloc leader Ali al-Adeeb, ISCI leader Ammar
al-Hakim, President Talibani (via telephone),INL leader Iyad
Allawi, and Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi. As the results
of these meetings become clear, Ambassador will then plan to
call KRG President Masoud Barzani to seek his support. The
Embassy will also reach out to key Sunni leaders, including
Osama Tikriti, Saleh al-Mutlaq, and Deputy Prime Minister
Rafi al-Issawi. Additional engagements are planned with
President Hashimi, ISCI bloc leader Humam Hammoudi, and
Deputy Speaker Attiyah.

Proposed Action for Washington
--------------


10. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests that the Vice
Q10. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests that the Vice
President be prepared to make follow-up phone calls to
Barzani and Talabani on November 1 or 2. Post also requests
that the Department immediately request the Government of
Turkey (contact Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General
Staff) to exercise all appropriate influence on Iraqi
Turkomen and Arabs in Kirkuk to urge them to support UNAMI's
proposed solution and to be present to vote in favor of an
election law to enable a credible and legitimate election on
January 16, 2010. END ACTION REQUEST.
HILL