CHALABI ON LARIJANI VISIT, IRAN, AND IRAQI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002910 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDED CAPTION E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019 TAGS: IR IZ PGOV PREL SUBJECT: CHALABI ON LARIJANI VISIT, IRAN, AND IRAQI ELECTORAL POLITICS BAGHDAD 00002910 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POL COUNSELOR YURI KIM FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MP and Iraqi National Alliance (INA) member Ahmed Chalabi blamed Iraq's "unprofessional and mostly Ba'thist" intelligence for having worked with Al-Qaeda to facilitate the October 25 bomb attacks in Baghdad. Chalabi told poloffs October 28 that PM Maliki was undermining the work of the De-Ba'thification Committee and defended his claim of U.S. support for the Ba'thists' return to the GOI's highest echelons. He also discussed prospects for coalitions in Iraq's upcoming national elections, predicting that the Kurds would ally with the INA. He summarized a recent trip to Iran that included meeting Iran's Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who Chalabi confirmed would soon visit Iraq to try and close Shia ranks and counter the influence of Iran's Sunni neighbors. END SUMMARY. OCTOBER 25 ATTACKS: ACCUSING BA'THISTS -------------- ¶2. (C) In an October 28 discussion with Post's Iran Watcher (IW) and poloff, Chalabi claimed that an "unprofessional and mostly Ba'thist" Iraqi intelligence service had facilitated the recent Baghdad bombings. He said the GOI lacked a command and control structure able to develop actionable intelligence. According to Chalabi, there was "no question" that Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had perpetrated the attacks. He claimed that "80 percent" of Iraq's intelligence services were from the previous regime and that they had helped conceal Al-Qaeda's planning and maneuvering. Chalabi said the force needed new direction, claiming it has erroneously focused on Iran due to an "American agenda." Despite growing parliamentary (and notably INA) dissatisfaction with Interior Minister Bolani, Chalabi noted, the INA did not support his removal now because doing so would allow Maliki to consolidate his control over the ministry. (NOTE: Rumors of Maliki wanting to dismiss Bolani before the election continue to circulate. The motivation appears driven more by political rather than security concerns. END NOTE). ¶3. (C) Emboffs confronted Chalabi about his recent statements to a pan-Arab daily newspaper claiming that the United States was actively working to return Ba'thists to power, conveying our strong dismay and displeasure. Chalabi countered that "it's not an accusation, it's a statement of fact." He asserted that the United States had fostered a Ba'thist meeting in Istanbul (NOTE: Likely a reference to meetings in March and April 2009 between an MNF-I unit and the Sunni insurgent umbrella group the Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance) and had brought Ra'ad Hamdani, a former Lieutenant General and leader of former military officers, to meet GOI leaders to discuss reintegration of officers into the military or their honorable retirement. Largely repeating the substance of his October 24 interview with "Al-Sharq Al-Awsat," Chalabi accused the United States of pressuring the GOI to bypass safeguards that the De-Ba'thification Committee had put in place to vet candidates for government service. Chalabi claimed PM Nouri al-Maliki had used the pretext of U.S. pressure to install former Ba'thists in influential intelligence jobs. Chalabi pointed to lack of U.S. congressional visits to the De-Ba'thification Committee as evidence that the United States is not serious about blocking Ba'thists' return to power. IW strongly cautioned Chalabi against making false assertions that ignored the facts and downplayed U.S. Qassertions that ignored the facts and downplayed U.S. sacrifices in Iraq. ¶4. (C) Chalabi criticized Maliki's focus on Syrian government involvement, saying Damascus "had nothing to do with the explosions" and that alienating Syria at this time was counterproductive. He posited that "jihadis" and "takfiris" were not simply crossing through Syrian territory to fight but were a power in their own right inside Syria. Like Riyadh,he said, Damascus might not be perpetrating attacks but it was "averting its eyes" as individuals donated "hundreds of millions of dollars" to extremists. ELECTORAL COALITIONS: SUNNI OUTREACH, KURDISH COMPROMISE -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Chalabi predicted that the Kurds would ally with the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) coalition (to which he belonged) and that they would agree to a compromise on Kirkuk (he did not elaborate). According to Chalabi, there was broad agreement that the Kurds were "abusing the system" now by focusing more on Kurdish political national equities, but that they could overcome that "perception." Chalabi said many parties in Anbar wanted to join the INA but feared being branded as "pro-Iranian." INA was working to overcome that fear, and a meeting between 120 INA members and Sunni politicians held the previous Friday had been "very successful." Chalabi eschewed the need for an INA primary, noting that the high voter turnout for the Sadrists' primary BAGHDAD 00002910 002.2 OF 002 proved that voters were also certain to show for actual elections. LARIJANI TO CLOSE SHIA RANKS, COUNTER SUNNI INFLUENCE -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The purpose of Iranian Speaker Ali Larijani's upcoming Iraq visit was to reduce tension among Shia groups (possibly convincing Maliki to join the INA) and counter the influence of neighboring Sunni states, Chalabi explained. Chalabi thought Iran had no incentive to use violence to achieve its political aims in Iraq, although it could work to undermine the government in other ways. The Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council for Iraq (ISCI) were most opposed to Maliki retaining his job as PM, and Maliki had accordingly avoided their INA coalition. Still, it might be possible to entice Maliki's participation in some way. What Iran wanted to avoid at all costs, Chalabi said, was a Shia split that allowed the other side to gain a plurality and form a cabinet--a possible but unlikely scenario. What worried Larijani and the Iranian government (IRIG) most about Iraq, Chalabi said, was the possibility that a coup d'etat in Baghdad would usher in a government that would be, once again, hostile to Tehran. Chalabi said Larijani's visit was also intended to counter Sunni influence,claiming that Jordanian intelligence had unsuccessfully tried to promote a coup d'etat and that Qatar was funding efforts to shape Iraq's political landscape, with Jordan running the operation and Israel blessing it. THE WORD FROM IRAN -------------- ¶7. (C) Recently returned from a trip to Iran, Chalabi said Muqtada al-Sadr was still there but that he was unlikely to return anytime soon because if necessary he could rally followers by television and media statements. Chalabi confirmed that al-Sadr was continuing studies there but thought it unlikely that he would become an ayatollah because "it takes time and he's not inclined that way." ¶8. (C) Regarding rumors of a clerical migration from Qom to Najaf, Chalabi confirmed that Muhammad Muhammad Hashimi, former head of Iran's judiciary and an acolyte of the late Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, was seeking to come to Najaf and establish himself as a cleric. Chalabi thought it unlikely that Najafis would accept a "marjiya" with such close links to Iran's "wilaayat al faqih," links that Hashimi would never disown. Chalabi confirmed that Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Ishaq Fayedh (al-Afghani) would succeed Sistani in Najaf in the event of the latter's death. He explained that Fayedh was well respected by Iraqi Shia given his personal sacrifices during Saddam's regime and commitment to Sistani's school of thought. (NOTE: Chalabi recalled that Fayedh had once refused to meet with al-Sadr on the grounds that the aspiring ayatollah should focus more "on his studies." END NOTE.) ¶9. (C) Narrating his meeting with Larijani in Iran, Chalabi said there were some "crazies" in Iran who feared a U.S.-backed "Velvet Revolution" but Larijani was not one of them. Larijani and other senior IRIG officials, including Supreme Leader Khamenei, were confident in the IRIG's staying power and ability to thwart the opposition. Chalabi predicted that Iran would likely propose a counter-offer to the Vienna proposal that would allow it to remove its low-enriched uranium in several smaller tranches. In general, Chalabi said, Iran perceived itself as a culture that was not restricted to territory, and this shaped its view of the region. (NOTE: As an aside, Chalabi commented Qview of the region. (NOTE: As an aside, Chalabi commented that Iran was also housing and supporting in Mashhad the son of former Afghan Mujahideen leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud. END NOTE.) HILL