Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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09BAGHDAD2906 | 2009-10-30 16:28:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad |
VZCZCXRO4950 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #2906/01 3031628 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 301628Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5284 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 002906 |
1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador's Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq, Alan Misenheimer, held a round of meetings in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah October 19-22. He met with the incoming and outgoing KRG Prime Ministers, the KRG Parliamentary leader, KDP and PUK officials, President Barzani,s Chief of Staff, the leader of the Goran (Change) movement, the heads of the two leading Islamist parties, and others. The electoral law for the January election, the situation in Ninewa and Kirkuk, and relations with neighboring countries dominated the conversations. KRG officials all rejected the idea of a pre-allocation of seats for Kirkuk province in the electoral law, arguing that it unfairly singled out Kirkuk and was undemocratic. The KRG officials believe this issue is an excuse for their opponents in the COR, whom the Kurds are convinced want no elections at all. The emergence of a newly strengthened opposition in the Kurdistan Region may be contributing to the Regional Government,s unwillingness to be perceived to be compromising on Kirkuk. End Summary. Electoral Law: -------------------------- 2. (C) The Senior Advisor emphasized in all of his meetings the U.S. view that the overriding priority is that national elections be held on time in January, and that Kirkuk province be included. All the KRG interlocutors agreed. None of the KRG officials had any problems with the proposal to establish a committee to review voter rolls as long as voter rolls throughout Iraq are looked at and not just those in Kirkuk. KRG Presidency Chief of Staff Fuad Hussein said that having the elections in January benefits Kurds as well, since nothing is being done on other issues because GOI officials and politicians are consumed with the elections. 3. (C) However, KRG officials unanimously rejected the proposal to pre-allocate Kirkuk,s seats in the COR on the basis of ethnicity. Fuad Hussein also asked why there was no allocation for Christians. KRG PM-designate Dr. Barham Salih said that from a KRG point of view the Kurds are always asked to compromise, and that this proposal looks like it is not only giving special status to Kirkuk but that it is pre-determining Article 140. He and Fuad Hussein both said that if something like this is going to be done in Kirkuk, why can,t something similar be done in Mosul as well? Dr. Barham complained that the U.S. is asking Kurds to accept power sharing in Kirkuk, while the Kurds are being blocked from power in Ninewa despite a significant Kurdish population. In an October 22 follow-up meeting, Dr. Barham said that President Barzani had convoked a meeting of 22 political parties represented in the KRG and not a single party was willing to accept the idea of pre-allocation of seats in Kirkuk. The KRG parliament issued a statement to this effect, as well. Dr. Barham reported that at the meeting with political parties, President Barzani asked rhetorically whether it would be better to make a stand now or wait until the GOI has tanks and F-16,s. 4. (C) Parliamentary leader Kamal Kirkuki said that to prevent a province from having an election was both corrupt and a violation of human rights. Director of Intelligence Masrur Barzani said that it would be an injustice if Kirkuk was not treated equally. Minister responsible for External Relations Falah Mustafa and others said that it is important for the KRG that Kirkuk not be singled out. He added that allocating seats through an agreed quota would not be Qallocating seats through an agreed quota would not be democratic and would set a negative precedent. Fuad Hussein said that instead of solving one problem it would create three, in addition to creating an apartheid system. Goran Movement/Change List leader Nawsherwan Mustafa commented that Diyala, Ninewa and Baghdad also each have ethnically mixed populations. Delaying Tactics: -------------------------- 5. (C) The Senior Advisor was repeatedly told that the various proposals for an electoral law "compromise" on Kirkuk were just a way for elements that either do not want the election to be held, or who would like it delayed, to put the blame on the Kurds. Fuad Hussein said that there are those in the COR who don,t want the elections because they don,t want to lose their jobs. He also said that Maliki wants to delay the election in order to strengthen his coalition. He added that, if tomorrow they agree about Kirkuk, then the BAGHDAD 00002906 002 OF 005 next day those who want to delay will come up with a new problem. KDP Politburo Director Fadhil Mirani said that parliamentarians in the COR are not independent, with factions getting direction from Syria, Jordan, Iran, Turkey, or Saudia Arabia. Open Versus Closed Lists: -------------------------- 6. (C) KRG Officials viewed the current COR debate over open versus closed lists as an issue of secondary importance to the KRG officials. Fuad Hussein and others said that they would agree to use the 2005 election law. Fadhil Mirani said that the KDP prefers a closed list because an open list will cause them to lose some voters. Outgoing KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani said that the Shia are worried because of the huge number of Shia entities registered for the election. He said that Sistani said that the lists should be open in order to get Shia to participate in the election. In Nechirvan,s opinion, with an open list it will be harder to fill the mandated 27% seats for women. Change List leader Nawsherwan Mustafa voiced his support for open lists in the January elections. He pointed out that previous closed list elections have led to the current situation, in which some governorates have virtually no representation in the Iraqi COR. Need a Census: -------------------------- 7. (C) The KRG leaders were emphatic in reiterating the familiar Kurdish call for a census, including the Kirkuk-specific census called for in Article 140. KRG Deputy PM-designate Azad Barwary said that the Iraqi Planning Committee had said that it was ready to conduct a census, but Maliki blocked it. He added that in the last two months two million new ration cards have been issued to non-existent people and that the food allocations are being sold to pay for weapons. In Mosul, for example, there has been a 100% increase in the voting population due to fraud and a heavy influx of ethnic Arabs and Arabic speaking Iranians who have been given ration cards and registered to vote in southern provinces. Falah Mustafa aptly summarized the issue: without a census everyone talks about numbers but there are no clear numbers on ethnic or religious populations anywhere in Iraq. Asayeesh: -------------------------- 8. (C) The Senior Advisor raised with key interlocutors the sensitive issue of the Asayeesh (PUK and KDP intelligence services) in the DIBs region, particularly Kirkuk City. He observed that the invisibility of the Asayeesh worked against Kurdish interests in Ninewa and Kirkuk by making it easy for Arabs and Turkomans to blame unsubstantiated crimes and abuses on the Kurds; and while the Asayeesh are a positive counter-terrorism asset, continuing friction with the Arabs and Turkomans over Asayeesh activities would impede longer term progress toward reconciliation within the DIBs. Barham Salih welcomed future U.S. help in training the Asayeesh and in supporting the impending merger of the PUK and KDP wings into a single organization. He characterized the Asayeesh and Peshmerga as part of the over all defense architecture of Iraq. He cautioned that restructuring the Asayeesh is a very sensitive subject, and the Senior Advisor reassured him that the USG would not get out ahead of the KRG in any public references. All interlocutors said the KDP and PUK arms of the Asayeesh needed to be merged and professionalized; but there were variations in emphasis. PUK members tended to refer to the merger as already on track or in immediate prospect. Masrur Barzani said that the hold-up was with the PUK side. Nawshirwan Mustafa agreed on the need to merge and QPUK side. Nawshirwan Mustafa agreed on the need to merge and modernize the KDP and PUK security and intelligence operations--each of which is extremely expensive, and constitutes a heavy burden on the KRG budget--but was skeptical that the political will existed within either party to carry out such a process. Lack of Trust: -------------------------- 9. (C) KRG officials uniformly dismissed Turkoman and Arab fears that the Kurds are preparing to declare independence. In strikingly similar terms they laid out a sophisticated argument that independence would be economically and politically impossible, even if the Kurds wanted to do it. Masrur Barzani cited the Kurds' geo-political circumstances, including its "tough lineup" of neighboring states, as precluding independence for Kurdistan. Barham Salih and BAGHDAD 00002906 003 OF 005 Interior Minister Karim Sinjari stressed that a Kurdish state could not long bear the stress of enmity from "all" its neighbors, and that "nearly all" Kurds therefore recognize that their best hope for sustained future prosperity is to make the most of their inclusion within Iraq. Opposition Views on KRG Politics: -------------------------- 10. (C) Nawsherwan Mustafa reiterated that Goran is in agreement with the KDP and PUK on Kurdish equities on national issues, and that Goran,s opposition point of view focuses on issues of internal KRG governance and administration. He said that even though there has been the appearance of a PUK/KDP administration merge, in reality they are still separate. Regarding even low-level government jobs, the PUK still has a lock on those in Sulaimaniyah province and the KDP on those in Erbil and Dohuk. Anyone who is not a PUK/KDP supporter has no hope of working as a public official, even as a public school principal. Nawsherwan decried the lack of KRG budget transparency. He said that both the KDP and PUK take $35 million each off the top of the KRG general budget every month for their own private purposes, including giving money to smaller parties to buy their support. The KDP and PUK try hard to maintain a coalition in the government to prevent criticism and minimize questions about contents of the budget. Regarding recent allegations of corruption facing Sulaimaniyah governor Dana Majeed, Nawshirwan said that the governor would resign over the mistrust created from the investigation, even though the investigation did not find a smoking gun. 11. (C) Meetings with the leaders of the two main Islamic parties confirmed that their outlooks are similar. Salahadin Bahadin, leader of the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), confirmed that his party would remain in opposition, even though some central KIU figures had favored entering the governing coalition. Ali Bapir, Amir of the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), had a list of criticisms for KDP/PUK leadership including lack of budget transparency, arbitrary arrests, lack of timely trials, and party membership determining job opportunities. He said he had submitted a list of conditions, focusing on anti-corruption and human rights, for his party to join the government. Deputy PM-designate Azad Barwary and Fuad Hussein later said that Bapir had also asked for control of several municipalities, a commitment that laws would not be in conflict with Sharia and even separate schools for boys and girls. Fuad and Barwary told us the KRG had rejected Bapir,s conditions and the KIG would not be included in the government. Ninewa: -------------------------- 12. (C) Nawsherwan Mustafa said that the Kurds need to work to rebuild relationships with the Arab communities of Ninewa, and was scathing in criticism of Kurdish (read: KDP) handling of the situation in Ninewa since 2003. Similarly, Sa,dy Pira, Head of Public Relations for the PUK, who assisted the CPA in governing Mosul, said that he had repeatedly recommended that the KDP change their representatives in Ninewa, because the current KDP leadership is making things worse. He specifically criticized Ninewa KDP Chief (and former Ninewa Deputy Governor) Khasro Goran as mishandling the situation, particularly in dealing with tribal leaders. Salahadin Bahadin, Secretary of the Kurdistan Islamic Union said that KDP leadership in Mosul was heavy-handed, adding that breaking the law may work in the short term but not forever. New PM Dr. Barham Salih, in a one-on-one discussion Qforever. New PM Dr. Barham Salih, in a one-on-one discussion with the Senior Advisor, similarly blamed Khasro Goran for making the worst of an already tough political/ethnic situation in the province. He underscored that Khasro is unpopular even within the KDP, but President Barzani cannot replace him while the Arab side--particularly Governor Atheel al-Nujafi--maintains a maximalist anti-Kurdish posture across the board. Masrur Barzani said that the current government in Mosul is working with terrorists who are bringing foreign fighters to Iraq through Syria. Masrur and Council of Ministers Chief of Staff Nouri Sinjari said the hardline, and supposedly Arab nationalist Nujafi brothers--governor Atheel and COR member Osama--are not Arab at all, but Arabized Turkomans whose grandfather wrote a letter in support of Turkey retaining Mosul province in the 1920,s. More recently, according to Masrur, the Nujafis made their their family fortune as horse breeders for Uday and Qusay and through other lucrative dealings with the Baath regime. Regarding Shammar tribal confederation leader Sheikh Abdullah al-Humeidi al-Yawar, Masrur acknowledged that he was not as hardline as the Nujafis, but asserted that there are other, more moderate Shammari sheiks that should be cultivated. BAGHDAD 00002906 004 OF 005 Kirkuk: -------------------------- 13. (C) Several KRG officials derided Arab and Turkoman accusations that Kurds from Turkey or Iran had moved to Kirkuk, noting that the difference in dialects would make any such people easily detectable. Intelligence Chief Masrur Barzani said the KRG had difficulty encouraging even former Kirkuki Kurds to return, because of the relatively better conditions in the KR. Referring to Article 140, Peshmerga Affairs Minister Sheikh Jafar stressed that if all parties moved forward following the constitution, all difficulties would be resolved, including the mosaic of security forces in Kirkuk. He said that "the other side" claims that the Asayeesh causes all the problems in Kirkuk. He proposed that an investigation committee be formed to look into the truth of these claims. He said that reconciliation could be achieved with all parties at the table. 14. (C) Sheikh Jafar expressed concern about the proposal to deploy the Iraqi Army to Hawija, especially under the leadership of General Abdul Amir, who participated in the Anfal campaign. Jafar suspected that if Abdul Amir deploys his troops as far as Hawija, his real intent will be to enter Kirkuk, and it will undermine the authority of the Iraqi police inside the city. Sheikh Jafar acknowledged that Iraqi PM Maliki has the constitutional right to deploy Iraqi forces wherever he deems their presence necessary, but still cautioned that any IA movements within Kirkuk Province, either into Hawija, or more so into Kirkuk City, would inescapably be destabilizing. 15. (C) Nawsherwan Mustafa proposed that Kirkuk have multiple constituencies to allow citizens to choose the local representative they want. Several KRG officials said that the KRG is not trying to take control of Hawija sub-district and that the Kurds would accept Hawija being attached to Salah ad Din Province. Some made the case that the Arabs of Hawija were imported from southern areas in the 1930s and permitted by the Kurds to settle in the Hawija area, which was at the time a grazing area for Kurdish livestock. Hence, in this analysis, they are not "true" natives of Kirkuk and in fact should/should be administered by a majority Arab Province like Salah Ad Din. Speaking of the DIBs in general, Nawsherwan admitted that the Kurds had made mistakes when initially setting up administrative bodies in Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala that repelled the Turkomen and Arab communities rather than attracting them. He expressed some hope that the hardened attitudes caused by Kurdish overreaching since 2003 could be undone in time, with the aid of the USG and the UN. Turkey and Iran: -------------------------- 16. (C) Outgoing PM Nechirvan Barzani said that the KRG has been careful to maintain a low profile in ongoing discussions with Turkey from the Makhmour district of Ninewa. He added that they have worked hard to build confidence and that the KRG has bent over backwards to encourage Turkish firms to come to the KRG. Nechirvan revealed that the KRG had been an active but behind-the-scenes facilitator of the recent return of PKK members to Turkey. He said that the KRG had been communicating with the PKK on the issue, with Turkey,s full knowledge. He said that the KRG talks not only with ruling party officials but also with the Turkish intelligence organization (MIT) and military officials. Further, he said that in the past the Iranians have actively fed misinformation about the Kurds to Turkey, but Turkey has now stopped listening to them. The improved relationship between Qstopped listening to them. The improved relationship between the KRG and Turkey has made Iran unhappy. Sheikh Jafar requested U.S. assistance in putting pressure on the Iranians to cease shelling the border areas. KRG External Relations Chief Falah Mustafa said that the KRG would like U.S. help to bring them closer to Turkey. He expressed no optimism for the improvement of relations with Iran in the near future. Vision for the Future: -------------------------- 17. (C) Falah Mustafa said that Iraq needs a real national reconciliation that includes everyone, where every group believes that they can live together. He said that the Kurds recognize that compromise is needed, but it should be compromise and not surrender. He further said that the majority should make assurances to the others that "this is an Iraq for everyone." He said that the KRG wants people in government who believe in 'Iraqiness' and are loyal to Iraq rather than to Iran, Syria, and others. To help with building trust he said that the KRG would like to host BAGHDAD 00002906 005 OF 005 inter-ministerial meetings, training sessions, and conferences to bring people to the Kurdistan Region. Nechirvan Barzani complained that in Baghdad there is no vision for the future. Describing a private sector investment into power generation for the Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan said that Baghdad was against the project from the beginning telling the Kurds that they would fail. Nechirvan said that the region has now gone from 3 hours to 22 hours of electricity a day thanks to foreign private sector investment. He added that they would like provincial councils from all over Iraq to come to the Kurdistan Region to see what is possible. 18. (C) COMMENT: Throughout a week of meetings in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, KRG officials presented a strikingly consistent front concerning dealings with Baghdad and prospects for reconciliation in the DIBs area. On the continuing impasse over the election law, Kurdish leaders uniformly rejected any "singling out" of Kirkuk. They were suspicious even of Kirkuk-specific arrangements of a purely administrative/technical nature as tantamount to imposition of "special status"--an outcome which no one acknowledges as desirable, and some describe as unacceptable. There is positive movement on Peshmerga and Asayeesh integration and modernization, but U.S. urging and assistance will be needed. 19. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Internally, the emergence of an unprecedented level of domestic political opposition, embodied in Change List, had altered the Kurdish domestic equation in a way many find unsettling. In fact, the weakening of the traditional two-party bedrock of Kurdish politics may be a constraint on Kurdish leaders, perception of their own room to maneuver on the election law and/or DIBs issues. Aware as never before of a noncompliant opposition looking for grounds to criticize them--and of a Kurdish public opinion that will take such criticism seriously--KRG officials will continue to need U.S. reassurance in conjunction with any concession or compromise with what they regard as an uncertain partner in Baghdad and an overtly hostile Arab face across the DIBs line, particularly in Kirkuk and Ninewa. HILL |